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New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:  
Executive Summary 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the potential 
implications of the removal of the Claiborne Expressway 
segment of Interstate 10 (I-10), a proposal that has gained 
traction since Hurricane Katrina. This study complements 
previous analyses of the impacts of removing the elevated 
expressway. It considers case studies of best practices in 
highway removal, the history of the study area, and the 
proposal in terms of its local and regional context -- in 
particular the transportation system, land-use patterns, the 
economy, and the community of the affected area. 
Stakeholder interviews and surveys were conducted to 
assist with drawing conclusions and recommendations 
about the proposed removal of the I-10 highway segment 
and redevelopment of the Claiborne corridor.  
Interviews were conducted with 25 stakeholders, including 
representatives of adjacent neighborhoods, the business 
community, real estate interests, city and state elected 
officials, commuters, and urban planners. Moreover, an 
online survey was completed by more than 800 residents 
from across the city. Each of these efforts informed 
conclusions and recommendations about the 
redevelopment of the Claiborne corridor.  
While the study revealed substantial support for removing 
the highway, many participants expressed a desire for 
more information about the specifics of any removal 
project and its likely ramifications. Some interviewees in 
particular posited that removing the expressway alone 
would not fully address the problems plaguing the corridor 
and additional economic and community interventions 
would be needed.  
Of the survey respondents, 58% supported removal and 
16% were opposed. Twenty-one percent of respondents 
said they were uncertain of their stance on removal, while 
the remainder indicated indifference toward the proposal.  
 
Other key findings: 
 The vast majority of respondents (82%) predicted that removing the expressway would positively impact the area by 
fostering economic and community revitalization. 
 Only 28% of drivers who use the expressway four or more days a week oppose the removal. 
 Respondents rated the following elements as “very important” to the successful revitalization of the corridor: 
sidewalks (87%), bike lanes (67%), a tree-planted neutral ground (63%), and light rail/streetcar (56%). 
 Interviews revealed concern that gentrification could occur from the removal of the Expressway and revitalization of 
the corridor; however, only 31% of survey respondents “Agreed” or “Somewhat Agreed” that the removal of the 
Expressway would result in fewer housing options for lower income residents. 
 Respondents “Agreed” or “Somewhat Agreed” that the removal of the Expressway would revitalize the following 
neighborhoods: Tremé (75%), the 7
th
 Ward (70%), Tulane-Gravier (67%), the Central Business District (64%), 
Iberville Public Housing (63%), and the French Quarter (51%). 
 Unknown impacts on travel patterns during and after removal were a significant concern of survey respondents. 
 
Based on these concerns we recommend the following: 
 Incorporate transit and bikeable/walkable infrastructure into any redevelopment designs. 
 Consider providing convenient interchanges from I-10 to I-610 to facilitate additional capacity for motorists as part of 
a follow-up traffic study. 
 Educate the public concerning transportation alternatives. 
 Address fears of housing and gentrification within the redevelopment of the Claiborne corridor as part of the ongoing 
planning process. 
 Reach out to residents of the Claiborne corridor to better gauge resident stakeholder opinion. 
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This study will examine the potential redevelopment of the 
Claiborne Avenue corridor (see Figure 1.1). Since Katrina, 
several plans for the future redevelopment of New Orleans 
call for the removal of the Claiborne Expressway portion 
of I-10 as a catalyst for redeveloping several 
neighborhoods, including the Tremé, Lafitte, and other 
neighborhoods within the core of New Orleans. Many of 
these neighborhoods within the Claiborne corridor 
currently suffer from high rates of crime, blight, and 
poverty. This area also includes some of the highest 
vacancy rates in the city and a stagnant local economy.  
The report will examine case studies and best practices in 
highway removal. It will also address the history of the 
study area, the local and regional context, in particular the 
transportation system, land use patterns, the local 
economy, and the local community, including 
demographics. Stakeholder interviews and public opinion 
surveys were conducted to assist with drawing conclusions 
and recommendations about the proposed removal of the I-
10 highway segment and redevelopment of the Claiborne 
corridor. 
Chapter 2 includes a series of case studies of removal 
projects similar to the one proposed for Claiborne Avenue. 
Cities who decided to remove such expressways include 
Boston, Milwaukee, Portland, Oakland, two in San 
Francisco, and Seoul, South Korea. The cases in this 
chapter provide examples of how freeway removal impacts 
the travel patterns, environment, community, and 
economic vitality of the surrounding area. By examining 
the policies and methods used in these cases, we can learn 
from their successes and failures when evaluating the 
removal of the Claiborne Expressway.  
Built in the late 1960s, the Claiborne Expressway replaced 
a tree-lined boulevard with a section of elevated interstate 
highway (see Figure 1.2). Chapter 3 investigates the 
history of the neighborhoods that make up the Claiborne 
corridor and the previous and current plans for revitalizing 
the area. These studies provide extensive groundwork for 
the removal of the Claiborne Expressway and 
redevelopment of the corridor. To better understand the 
needs of the residents of the corridor, we next present an 
overview of the local and regional context - the existing 
conditions - to provide background for our analysis. 
Chapter 4 details current conditions along the corridor. 
Economic and demographic data for the neighborhoods 
show how the area has declined from historic conditions. 
Traffic data provides information on current usage patterns 
on and around the Claiborne Expressway. Land use and 
zoning are also presented as vital components of 
understanding the larger perspective. The Claiborne 
corridor clearly lacks economic and social advantages of 
other areas of New Orleans. Any plans for removing the 
Claiborne Expressway will need to include significant 
investment in the surrounding area to overcome the current 
conditions. 
Many of the previous 
plans discussed in 
chapter 3 included 
resident advisory 
groups. In order for 
this report to better 
understand stakeholder 
views, we interviewed 
individuals including 
community, non-profit, 
and business leaders as 
well as local residents. 
These interviews 
revealed several social 
and cultural, 
economic, and 
transportation concerns about the Expressway removal. 
These themes informed the generation of a broader survey. 
Surveys further investigated public opinion throughout 
Greater New Orleans. Both local residents and non-
residents support removal of the Expressway. Most 
supported redevelopment of the area and thought social 
and economic conditions would improve. Many expressed 
concerns about traffic and were worried about increased 
commute time or more congestion on surface streets. 
This report encompasses the history and present conditions 
of the Claiborne Expressway and provides 
recommendations for its future. Removing the freeway 
would impact transportation and the economy of both the 
corridor and the region and have dramatic effects on the 
surrounding communities. We hope this research 
contributes to the literature and provides useful information 
to the community as it considers the future of the Claiborne 
Avenue corridor.  
Figure 1.2:  North Claiborne Avenue, at Dumaine Street, looking 
towards Elysian Fields. "Oak Tree Conservation." Undated. City 
Archives New Orleans Public Library 
 
Figure 1.1: Claiborne-adjacent 
neighborhoods outlined in red. Base 
map source: GNOCDC (2004) 
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Highway removal projects have been successful in many other cities in the past two decades. After the post-World War II 
period of highway building, new transportation paradigms began to change communities’ approach to infrastructure. Urban 
freeways were often a contentious issue, and some cities elected to remove parts or entire roads. To gain a better understanding 
of best practices in highway overpass removal, we studied cases from Boston, Milwaukee, Oakland, Portland, two from San 
Francisco, and Seoul, South Korea. These case studies illustrate the process and impacts resulting from highway removal. We 
identified and summarized several themes from these case studies, which can be found in a chart at the conclusion of this 
chapter. For the sake of brevity, summaries of the complete case studies are presented in this chapter. More in-depth accounts, 
including references, may be found in Appendix A. 
2.2 Boston: Central Artery 
History 
Boston, Massachusetts had one of the most congested 
highway systems in the United States, causing enormous 
traffic delays and car accidents. Traffic was expected to 
get critically worse over time due to the natural increase of 
people driving. In order to solve Boston’s traffic problem, 
a plan was created in the 1980s to replace the Central 
Artery Highway with a new mostly underground 
infrastructure that was capable of handling the expected 
traffic flow. The project later became known as the “Big 
Dig”, spanning over two decades and costing billions. 
Travel Behavior 
The Big Dig was highly successful in terms of travel 
impact. Traffic congestion was practically eliminated 
according to an assessment study showing that travel time 
in the project area was reduced on average by 62 percent, 
depending on the route and time of day. Indirectly, the 
project advocated public transit, along with cycling, by 
creating provisions for cyclists and extending light rail 
service. Along with reducing travel time and increasing 
mobility, the project connected neighborhoods that were 
severed by the elevated highway.  
Environment 
Boston’s environment was affected both positively and 
negatively by the project. Large amounts of CO2 were 
released during the construction process, yet after 
completion, the project lowered the amount of CO2 
emissions coming from idling cars stuck in traffic. 
Community 
This project designated lots of land to the residents of 
Boston in the form of public parks, fountains, recreational 
facilities, etc. The former space that was occupied by the 
elevated highway was utilized for the infamous Rose 
Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway, which is an open strip of 
grass spanning four city blocks. Boston residents also 
received Spectacle Island, which was once a dump, from 
the Big Dig. Spectacle Island was transformed using the 
dirt removed during construction of the underground 
expressway. It is now a popular destination that provides a 
scenic place to hike and relax.  
Many residents were wary of the project, fearing that a rise 
in surrounding property taxes would price out the locals. 
Others criticized the project for going severely over budget 
and surpassing all project duration estimates. Lastly, critics 
have found fault with design components. The American 
Planning Association protested the Greenway as a massive 
open space with little to attract residents.  
Economy 
The Big Dig was estimated to cost $22 billion - accounting 
for interest payments on bonds, and it will not be paid off 
until 2038. The good news is that the project has created 
numerous economic benefits, such as new development 
investments, wages from constructions, property price 
increases, and tax revenue from real estate. Other economic 
benefits are less obvious such as time saved commuting, 
and less fuel consumed. 
Figure 2.1: Boston Artery Before and After. Source: 
HFBoards.com 
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2.3 Milwaukee: Park East Freeway 
History 
In 1960, Milwaukee hatched the grand scheme to create a 
loop of freeways surrounding their entire downtown. Park 
East freeway, the first freeway making up the loop was 
built and opened, but due to strong opposition, especially 
from the Mayor, the remaining freeways were not built. 
With the cancellation of the other proposed freeways that 
would have completed the loop, the remaining Park East 
Freeway had little purpose, making it a less controversial 
issue when the discussion came to tear it down. With the 
hopes of replacing the freeway with something more 
pedestrian friendly, demolition commenced June 2002 and 
was completed in April 2003. Connecting ground level 
roads have been reinstated, and currently construction is 
underway for new developments within the area. 
Environment & Travel Behavior 
The environmental assessment of the removal project, 
conducted by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
indicated no major environmental impacts occurred during 
the construction process for the removal of the Park East 
Freeway. Similarly, a 1998 evaluation of current and 
future traffic impacts concluded very minimal traffic 
effects or increased congestion were to be expected. The 
full environmental impacts have not been realized yet, since 
the redevelopment portion is not fully complete. There was 
no taking of commercial or residential property during the 
removal process, thus there are no negative social impacts 
anticipated. It is hoped that the freeway removal will pave 
the way for future sustainable transportation.  
In 1999, the Park East freeway carried approximately 54 
thousand vehicles on an average weekday.  The Park East 
freeway was 0.8 miles long; therefore, its removal 
accounts for a reduction of 43,000 vehicle miles traveled 
each day.  This also translates into 41,000 fewer pounds of 
CO2 per day emitted from freeway travelers.  
Community 
Redevelopment was focused on residential homes, but it 
also included retail shops, office spaces, and the opening 
of a public waterfront. These new developments and 
ground-level roads connect downtown Milwaukee to 
surrounding neighborhoods. The absence of a freeway has 
created a lot of positive improvements for residents 
including reduced crime rates, lowered CO2 emissions, 
and promoted cycling or walking habits. These 
improvements have definitely made the area more 
appealing. Not just the project area, but all surrounding 
areas downtown have seen improvements since the 
removal project. 
Economy 
The cost for the project came to $ 37 million with separate 
plans for redevelopment costing an additional $8 million 
dollars. It is expected that the tear down project will bring 
in between $58 and $800 million in investment to the 
Freeway footprint, depending on whether the source is 
local planners or political leaders. Redevelopment of the 
area has increased property values along with tax revenue 
for the city. Between 2001 and 2006, the average assessed 
land values in the Park East Tax Increment District grew 
by 45%. Opportunity for new growth has lead to a decent 
amount of private investment and will hopefully continue 
to be an economic asset to the city and downtown. 
The actual building of new development has been a slow 
process because many projects had trouble obtaining 
adequate financing.  Pleas for financial assistance from the 
city were met with mixed emotions, and in 2007 the city 
declared that it would not help developments that were 
overly speculative.      
  
Figure 2.2: Park East Freeway. Source: Marketplace.com 
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2.4 Oakland: Cypress Freeway 
History 
As a result of the Loma Prieta earthquake that was 7.1 on 
the Richter scale, the Cyprus viaduct collapsed, killing 42 
people and injuring 108. Although only 1.5 miles of the 
freeway collapsed, 160,000 cars were forced to disperse 
amongst the already heavily used Oakland highways and 
streets. The removal of this section of I-880 had serious 
implications on the local shipping industry and other local 
employment centers throughout the city. Community 
leaders opposed the rebuilding of the viaduct as it blighted 
and divided the community of West Oakland. Blight, 
noise, and pollution caused by the Cypress freeway were 
an eyesore and drove away businesses leaving behind 
gangs and violence. The main community revitalization 
proposal was the connection of I-80 to I-880; Caltrans 
believed that this would alleviate the majority of 
congestion running through the adjacent arterial streets.  
Environment 
Adverse impacts of the freeway collapse included 
containment exposure, noise pollution, and visual 
pollution. The most detrimental impact was the re-
construction process, which mostly took place in an 
industrial corridor. Thirty-two contaminated sites were 
identified in the footprint of the new freeway. This 
contamination was found in both the soil and groundwater. 
These containments consisted of asbestos, lead, petroleum 
hydrocarbon, polynuclear aromatics, and VOC’s. 
Travel Behavior 
Immediately following the freeway collapse, travelers re-
routed their travel patterns by detouring through nearby 
I-580 and I-980. In the days immediately following the 
earthquake, there was a significant spike in transit use. 
Daily rail ridership figures increased by over 50%, from 
218,000 to 342,000. Once the connection to the Bay 
Bridge was completed, it was estimated that not having the 
connection would create a loss of  $2.5 million per month in 
travel time to the public. 
Community  
The removal of the freeway led to community 
reunification and cultural wealth. The Community 
Emergency Relief Team (CERT) was formed and gave 
citizens an unprecedented voice in the decisions regarding 
rebuilding their community. The community experienced 
reductions in freight trucks traveling through residential 
neighborhoods thanks to the construction of an interchange 
that services the Port of Oakland. From 1990 to 2000, the 
community residents also experienced 36.3% growth in 
average income and a 3.7% decrease in poverty. Attempts 
to bring in higher income housing developments have been 
rejected as gentrification. A focus on job placement 
services and community outreach led to an 82% success 
rate with finding community members employment. 
Economy 
Immediately after the earthquake and shutdown of the 
freeway, added travel times for motorists, shipment delays, 
and higher vehicle operating costs amounted to $22.5 
million in lost revenue. Additionally in the short term, the 
demolition of the freeway cost the San Francisco 
Metropolitan area $5,287,716. Federal relief funds 
totaling $1.106 billion contributed to the repair of the I-
880 freeway. Meanwhile, the San Francisco retail sector 
was not greatly affected. 
  
Figure 2.3: Cypress Freeway. Source: Federal 
Highway Administration 
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2.5 Portland: Harbor Drive Freeway 
Background 
Harbor Drive Freeway was a ground-level four-lane 
highway following the western side of the Willamette 
River. Upon completion in 1942, the three-mile long route 
carried 25,000 vehicles per day.  
In the 1950s, with the approval of the Federal Highway 
Act in 1956, many more highways were planned for 
Portland. By 1964, Interstate 5 was completed and spanned 
the east bank of the Willamette, running in the same 
direction as Harbor Drive.  
By 1968, in anticipation of rapid growth, Oregon further 
attempted to boost their infrastructure. During this process, 
the State Department of Transportation proposed widening 
the existing Harbor Drive Expressway from four lanes to six. 
That same year, groups of citizens began calling for closing 
down Harbor Drive and developing the land as a park 
instead.  
Governor Tom McCall was the primary proponent of 
getting the road removed and sided with a citizen alliance 
as they argued against traffic engineers of the time. The 
alliance argued that the overflow traffic from shutting 
down the highway would find spillover lanes or follow I-5 
in order to move north and south within the city. In 1974, 
Harbor Drive closed, and other roads handled spillover. 
Drivers were able to find manageable alternate routes. 
Environment and Travel Behavior 
Reducing roadway capacity reduces the overall number of 
auto trips. In fact, Robert Cervero found before and after 
comparisons for Harbor Drive showing 9.6% fewer vehicle 
trips on surrounding roads. Such reduction certainly goes a 
long way in lessening the health problems associated with 
exhaust-based air pollution.  
The creative urban design of downtown streets, the 
successful diversion of traffic to alternative freeways, 
bridges, and roadways, and the development of an 
extensive intermodal public transit system have 
contributed to the alleviation of congestion, environmental 
degradation, and automobile dependency surrounding the 
former Harbor Drive Freeway. Affordable fares, efficient 
service, and easy access to multiple routes from various 
locations have perpetuated continued growth of transit 
ridership. 
Planners redesigned downtown streets to be one-way, 
altered traffic signals to allow for more fluid flow of 
traffic, and reduced speed limits as a means of increasing 
safety for pedestrians and bicyclists. Additionally, there 
was a substantial increase in the number of drivers on I-5 
and I-405. Some of this congestion was minimized by the 
development of Fremont Bridge, which improved the 
connectivity between the two freeways.  
The most significant change in travel patterns was the 
increase in the number of commuters choosing to use 
public transit services rather than drive private 
automobiles. The development of Portland’s sophisticated 
transit system, Tri-Met, has caused gradual decline in 
automobile trips near the former Harbor Drive Freeway. 
Citizens were able to divert funds allocated for other 
highway projects in Portland for the creation of the city’s 
first light-rail line, which now consists of four different 
lines with 85 total miles. 
Community  
The Harbor Drive Freeway was not taken down due to 
safety concerns or an estimated high cost of expansion 
versus demolition. The public’s interest to make 
downtown Portland a more inviting place for all people 
fueled the success of this project. 
Additionally, Portland has seen a 65% decrease in crime in 
the area surrounding the former freeway. The community 
also saw a new sense of empowerment against the current 
model of highway expansion. 
The 36.59 acre Tom McCall Waterfront Park allows its 
visitors to take advantage of views of the Willamette River 
and recreational opportunities all seasons of the year. 
Among its bicycle and pedestrian paths and green space, 
the park hosts many different festivals and public events.    
Economy 
The removal has lead to a substantial increase in property 
tax revenue for the city. Since its development, roughly 62 
development projects (retail, mixed use housing, office 
space) have been successfully implemented. Some of the 
most profitable projects include the development of the 
Pioneer Place commercial building, RiverPlace retail and 
housing development, and The Yards at Union Station. 
There is continued interest in development within the 
district such as the revitalization of Old Town/ Chinatown, 
Ankeny/ Burnside, and the Portland Saturday Market.   
Figure 2.4: Tom McCall Waterfront Park, 2009. Source: 
Event.com 
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2.6 San Francisco: Central Freeway 
History 
Mid-century California freeway designers envisioned a 
San Francisco with highway connections both through and 
outside the city. Soon after construction, one of the internal 
San Francisco highways, the Central Freeway, experienced 
a freeway revolt regarding its placement through the 
neighborhoods along Division and Octavia Boulevards. 
After the 1989 Loma Pieta earthquake, community support 
to remove the freeway strengthened again. While the 
damaged northern portion of the freeway could not be 
rebuilt, community leaders could get a full removal. A 
compromise was struck – part of the freeway would be 
removed, and part would be rebuilt. City leaders and 
citizen activists worked to replace the ruined elevated 
portion with housing and residential amenities in 1992. 
The boulevard portion replacing the structure measures 
133 feet in width and contains four lanes for traffic, a 
grassy median, and two bicycle and pedestrian lanes. 
Construction of a new portion of freeway was completed 
in 2006. 
Environment  
Due to the fact that Octavia Boulevard consisted of 
sustainable transportation choices, the environmental 
impacts were positive. Green transportation results in 
lower emissions as a result of less people choosing to 
drive, which was the case for the original Central Freeway. 
Noise barriers were also incorporated into portions of the 
new central freeway, thus reducing noise pollution. The 
designation of more green space within the project area 
proved to be very beneficial to the health of the 
community and provided more of a habitat for urban 
wildlife. 
Travel Behavior  
As anticipated, the removal of the freeway led to the 
reduction of roadway capacity in the short term. However, 
through studies, traffic was found to have diverted and 
spread amongst other roadways in the long term. 76% of 
the 8,000 drivers that had previously used the freeway 
shifted their route to another freeway, 11% used city 
streets for their entire trips, 2.2% switched to public 
transit, and 2.8% said they no longer made the trip 
previously made on the highway. With the completion of 
Octavia Boulevard in 2005, residents’ travel behaviors 
changed. With the complete streets design of the 
boulevard, traffic is much more dispersed. The design of 
the Octavia Boulevard was intended to be pedestrian and 
bicycle friendly. After completion, 47% of residents chose 
public transportation, and 16.5% of residents chose to 
cycle to work. The remaining 26% of residents chose to 
drive to work. 
Community  
Once the central freeway was removed, the community 
experienced a reduction in crime rates and higher land 
values in the communities of Hayes Valley, Market and 
Octavia. An increase in green space also improved the 
quality of life for residents of Octavia Boulevard. The 
community benefits of having a more sustainable 
transportation system are perhaps the greatest of all. No 
longer are streets congested, and residents have the option 
to utilize public transit or bicycling if they so choose. The 
removal of the Central Freeway led to an enhanced quality 
of life for all residents in its vicinity. The Central Freeway 
removal helped pave the way for urban revitalization. Now 
affected areas, such as the Haynes Valley neighborhood, 
are filled with fashionable stores, restaurants, and galleries.  
Economy 
The impacted area greatly benefited from the freeway 
removal. Restaurants and shops appeared following the 
project, which attracted those who worked in the civic 
center. Octavia Boulevard was given the freeway 
project of the year award by the California Transportation 
Foundation. Prior to the reconstruction of the Highway 
after the earthquake, the highway contributed to low land 
values and a high crime rate, as well as urban decay. The 
restored highway provided neighborhood access to a 
regional freeway, created an aesthetically appealing public 
space, and raised land values. Since the removal of the 
highway, from 1996 to 2006, the average sales price of a 
Hayes Valley condo rose from $203,000 to $ 760,000 
(City of Seattle: 2008). The City of San Francisco also 
profited with $35 million from the sale of the lots that the 
previous central Freeway was placed upon. The revenue 
from these sales was invested into transportation and 
affordable housing.  
Figure 2.5: After Removal. Source: Infrastructurist.com 
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2.7 San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway 
History 
The Embarcadero Expressway was a 1.2-mile highway 
spur completed in 1959 and demolished in 1991. 
Originally part of a plan to crisscross San Francisco with 
highways, the Embarcadero was intended to connect the 
Bay Bridge with the Golden Gate Bridge along the 
waterfront. The system was never completed, due in part to 
resistance from the community. In 1989, the Loma Prieta 
earthquake exposed problems in the elevated highway’s 
construction, leading to the decision to remove the 
Embarcadero section. In 2000, a six lane surface 
boulevard, streetcar route, bicycle lanes, and pedestrian 
promenade opened in place of the expressway. The area 
has become a key public space for the citizens of San 
Francisco, and the character and value of the surrounding 
land uses has improved dramatically. 
Environment and Travel Behavior 
At one time, the Embarcadero carried over 60,000 cars per 
day (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008). When 
the freeway suddenly closed due to the earthquake, traffic 
found other routes, surface streets were not overwhelmed, 
and transit use increased (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007; 
Marquez, 1989). Currently, the six lane boulevard carries 
26,000 cars per day and the streetcar carries 18,000 daily 
riders. The earthquake brought a perceived distrust of 
elevated highways, and the aftermath was made possible 
by a citywide increase in transit ridership. Combined with 
bicycling and walking, the transportation options along the 
Embarcadero are much more sustainable with the removal 
of the highway. 
Community  
In the 1950s, community opposition challenged San 
Francisco’s highway plan. Although the Embarcadero 
separated an industrial waterfront from the business center 
of downtown, extension of the road was halted by 
opposition from the Rincon Hill and South Beach 
residential neighborhoods (Siegel, 2007). One 
neighborhood that the road served well was Chinatown, 
causing merchants to oppose the removal four decades 
later. With the freeway gone, the character of the land use 
along the Embarcadero has changed dramatically. 
Commercial and residential uses have replaced industrial 
buildings, making the area one of the most desirable places 
to live in the city. The Embarcadero’s public spaces and 
multi-modal corridor have drawn many more visitors and 
residents to the area, and Chinatown has seen little impact 




San Francisco’s traditionally industrial waterfront had 
been losing business before the removal, so the 
transformation to a commercial and residential area was a 
positive change. Chinatown merchants worried about a 
large drop in tourism, but the area remains one of the top 
attractions in the city. In the immediate vicinity, quantities 
of housing increased by over 50%, and property values 
grew up to 25 times larger (U.S. Census Bureau). There 
are 23% more jobs in the area, as well as many new 
businesses (Congress for the New Urbanism, n.d.). The 
centerpiece of the Embarcadero is the Ferry Building, 
which remains a ferry terminal, but has also been 
repurposed for offices and a farmers market. The removal 
of the freeway made financial sense as well. The project 
cost $50 million with only $3.25 million for the actual 
demolition. A three year project to repair the expressway 
would have cost $70 million (The Preservation Institute, 
n.d.). 
  
Figure 2.6: Before and After. Source: Flickr.com 
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2.8 Seoul: Cheonggyecheon Highway 
Background 
Seoul developed around the Cheonggyecheon (“clean 
water stream”), a former seasonal stream, which divides 
the city in two. The stream has been a pivotal part of 
Seoul’s landscape for centuries. By the 1950s, however, 
migration from the country that settled along the banks of 
the stream had exacerbated pollution.  
From 1958 to 1967, the stream was encased underground, 
as a 3.7-mile elevated highway was built 164 feet to 262 
feet above the former stream. The elevated highway ran 
parallel to a grade-level roadway, and included four lanes 
of two-way traffic that carried 168,600 vehicles daily 
before its deconstruction (Kil-Dong 2007). 
Between 2003 and 2005, the metropolitan government 
planned and executed the removal of the Cheonggye 
Elevated Highway and the ground-level roadway beneath 
it that covered the stream. The Cheonggyecheon has been 
restored, and it is the centerpiece of a park with two-lane 
one-way streets on each side.  The project cost an 
estimated $384 million.  
Environment and Travel Behavior 
Overall, the Cheonggyecheon restoration has been an 
unqualified environmental success. The restored river has 
been found to reduce the urban heat island effect and 
increase wind speeds, reducing summer temperatures in 
the corridor by more than 3 degrees Celsius (Revkin 2009; 
Vidal 2006). Air quality has also improved substantially 
due to reduced motor vehicle traffic. Small-particle air 
pollution has dropped 35 percent, which accounts for an 
economic value of up to $40 billion per year (Revkin 
2009; Hwang, 2006).  
The restored riverbed was designed to maximize flood 
capacity and safely accommodate 200-year flood levels 
(Hwang 2006; Kil-Dong 2007; Revkin 2009). New sewage 
lines were installed to segregate rainwater and wastewater 
and prevent wastewater intrusion during flood events (Kil-
Dong 2007). In addition, soil and groundwater 
contamination have been largely eliminated (Kil-Dong 
2007). The river’s ecosystem has been greatly restored as 
the stream has been engineered to serve a variety of fish 
and wildlife. As a result, fish, bird, and insect species have 
multiplied. 
A significant modal shift occurred, diverting motorists to 
buses and subways, and overall traffic flow and speeds 
downtown have improved (Revkin 2009). Subway 
ridership has increased 13.7% since the restoration project 
began (Lee 2006). Increases in bike, pedestrian, and public 
transit mode shares due to public infrastructure investment, 
crossing improvements, and education campaigns promote 
transportation equity for low-income commuters who save 
time and money due to these improvements (Young 2010).  
Community 
Along the Cheonggyecheon stream today, there are new 
running and pedestrian paths, waterfalls where children 
play, and a museum. The park serves as the backdrop to a 
variety of arts and entertainment events. Additionally, 
property values and interest in the downtown area have 
taken off in light of the freeway’s removal.  
Although the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon seems to 
be reaping great benefits at a broader scale in a variety of 
levels, concerns have arisen for a local group of informal 
merchants that once occupied and worked in the streets 
around the expressway. Gentrification has caused concerns 
about former residents and merchants being forced out of 
the area by rising property values (Walsh 2006). In 
addition, the Commission for Architecture and the Built 
Environment declares the end result of the ambitious 
project an “inspirational space which is family-friendly,” 
but it faults designers’ failure to facilitate “inclusive 
planning” that would have better accounted for a full range 
of community concerns and interests such as handicap 
accessibility (Commission for Architecture and the Built 
Environment n.d.). 
Economy  
Tourism has boomed in central Seoul. In the first three 
months after the project’s completion, approximately 12 
million visitors came to the CGC, and in the three months 
following the grand opening, there were more than 71 
million visitors to the CGC (Noh 2009).  
The project has been economically beneficial to 
landowners and developers. Commercial land, located 
within five hundred meters of the CGC, enjoyed greater 
property value benefits with the urban greenway than they 
did with the elevated highway. In addition, the restoration 
of the CGC and its transformation into an urban greenway 
reversed the negative impacts of the highway but conferred 
beneficial economic impacts on residential landowners. 
The closer one lived to an entrance to the greenway, the 
higher one’s property value when compared to residents 
living more than three kilometers away.  
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2.9 Best Practices 
All of the case studies demonstrate the concept of “induced 
demand.” When a freeway exists, people will use it.  The 
traffic volumes that were observed on the original roadway 
are based on the perception that unrestricted access is 
available. When replaced with a surface street, the traffic 
relocates to the new street, other streets in the network, or 
to public transportation. In many of the cases, the traffic 
simply disappeared, with people choosing to make fewer 
trips. Thus, it is appropriate to replace freeways with lower 
traffic volume streets. 
The case studies fall into two main categories of highways: 
redundant roads and spurs. In Boston, Portland, Seoul, and 
Oakland, the roads connected two highway sections that 
remain. In Portland, the road was redundant because of 
another existing highway. In Boston and Oakland, the 
projects involved replacing the freeway with another. 
Seoul took the most drastic approach, removing the 
roadway altogether. In all of these cases, removing a link 
caused a new equilibrium of highway traffic. In 
Milwaukee and San Francisco, the roads were spurs, 
leading to surface streets rather than another highway. In 
all three cases, these spurs were unnecessary, and removal 
was successful with the use of existing street grids. 
In most of the case studies, stakeholders redeveloped the 
actual footprint into something other than private 
development. Linear parks are commonly chosen to 
feature prominently in the design. Surface boulevards 
often replaced the freeway, usually focusing on a more 
multi-modal facility with bike lanes, transit, and pedestrian 
facilities. In San Francisco, small pockets of new land 
were developed. Milwaukee was the only case study that 
used the footprint predominantly for new development. 
Before a freeway is removed, traffic engineers and others 
will often express the need for a highway due to traffic. 
Burial of a new highway and alternate routes are popular 
options. These proposals were part of the planning process 
for all of the case studies but were only built in Boston and 
Oakland. Building a new freeway elsewhere can remove 
the financial benefits of highway removal; that is, it is 
cheaper to not rebuild. Boston is an oft-cited example of 
how expensive such a project can become. 
Highway removal can reunite existing neighborhoods and 
create new neighborhoods. The roads in Boston, 
Milwaukee, Oakland, San Francisco (Central), and Seoul 
all featured urban development on both sides, and the 
division caused by the freeway was well documented. The 
highway is often cited as a location with increased blight 
and crime, and universally a place people don’t like to 
spend time. Highways also provide a barrier to pedestrian 
travel. In these cases, the new design became an attractor 
for neighborhood activity. In some cases, the new areas 
took on new names and identities. With the Portland and 
Embarcadero examples, the roadways followed the 
waterfront. This created a barrier in which city residents 
did not visit the water, and removal made the locations 
gathering points. In these cases, neighborhoods were not 
created, but they became more residential. Because 
highways often exist in industrial areas, many of the case 
studies featured industrial buildings being repurposed into 
residential and commercial space. 
New development around highway removal increased 
property values in all of the case studies. As mentioned 
above, some of the cities were able to create new parcels, 
generating revenue with their sale. In several of the cities, 
special districts were created to capture the rise in property 
values or to encourage development with incentives. Many 
of these cases featured a vision of urban development 
consistent with New Urbanism, and used strict design 
requirements to achieve this. 
The lifespan of an urban freeway was fairly consistent 
within these case studies: 30 to 50 years. In the Bay Area 
case studies, the freeways were damaged by a natural 
disaster, but the degrading quality of the structures had 
been documented beforehand. There is a necessary state of 
disrepair with these removals; the idea of removing them 
when they are new isn’t likely to have traction. Repairing 
costs are often higher than removal, another reason for 
these lifespans. 
Citizen action was a key ingredient to the movement to 
remove highways. These groups often protested the initial 
construction of the freeway but only found their voice 
again after the lifespan mentioned above. Unfortunately, 
the citizen action was not enough – a political champion 
was needed. Mayors, city councils, and governors were 
often the leading voice in the highway removal. City 
planning departments and traffic engineers were more 
likely to oppose the removal. 
An important aspect to the success of highway removal 
observed in case studies was construction periods. Many of 
these projects took five or more years to complete and 
were disruptive to the neighborhoods around them. 
Business owners were often hesitant about the removal 
simply because of the drop in customers during the 
construction. There are techniques to minimize the 
disruption, such as pedestrian walkthroughs and signage 
for businesses. Many of these construction periods were 
lengthened because of political infighting, design disputes, 
and cost overruns. There are delays that should be better 
planned to reduce the time it takes to remove the highway. 
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Replaced with: Waterfront park. 
Built: 1959 
Removed: 1992 
Replaced with: Surface boulevard. 
Built: 1959 
Removed: 1991 



















 $7.4 billion in real estate 
investment. 
 $1.3 billion increase in property 
values. 
 43,000 new jobs. 
  
 11 developable city blocks. 
 Land values grew by over 180%. 
 Many planned mixed-use, 
residential, and commercial 
properties. 
 Housing market downturn has 
stalled much of the development. 
 
 Increased travel times while 
closed. 
 Oakland Private Industry Council 
provided jobs to local residents. 
 Retail access did not suffer. 
 
 Tax Increment Financing to pay 
for the park. 
 62 successful development 
projects generating millions in tax 
revenue. 
 
 Retail businesses open along 
Octavia Boulevard. 
 7 acres and 22 parcels were newly 
developed, generating $35 million 
for the city. 
 Rise in condo prices. 
 
 Removal was less expensive than 
repair. 
 Increased tourist activity, 
including in Chinatown. 
 Large increase in property values. 
 
 Jobs and residents returned to the 
area. 
 Storeowners reported fewer 
customers during construction. 

















 300 acres of green space. 
 Shoreline restoration. 
 New park on an old landfill. 
 
 Limits to sprawl through land 
efficiency. 
 More green and permeable 
spaces.  
 
 Soil contamination in rail yards 
where freeway was relocated. 
 Lower noise and air pollution in 
West Oakland. 
 
 36 acre public park. 
 Vehicle trips on surrounding 
streets have actually dropped. 
 
 Patricia’s Green, a 16,000 square 
foot park, and another linear park. 
 
 Linear parks, public spaces, 
walking and biking promenade. 
 Revitalized waterfront. 
 
 River had become an open sewer 
and flood hazard, both mitigated 
in the new design. 
 Poor air quality near the highway. 
 Water is artificially pumped into 
the stream. 


















 8.5% drop in daily traffic. 
 62% drop in travel time. 
 Reduced travel time to the 
airport. 
 Slight increase in transit 
ridership. 
 
 No increase in congestion on 
surface streets. 
 Vehicle Miles Traveled in 
Milwaukee has decreased. 
 Reconnected the street grid 
pattern. 
 Citywide drop in transit ridership. 
 
 New freeway has lower traffic 
volumes. 
 Increase in transit use during 
earthquake recovery. 
 No HOV lane added. 
 
 Other streets absorbed traffic with 
no problems. 
 Large increase in transit ridership. 
 Trucks and engineers opposed the 
removal. 
 
 Other highways and streets 
absorbed traffic, many people 
made fewer trips. 
 Bicycle and pedestrian facilities 
contributed to an increase in use 
of these modes. 
 
 Traffic successfully absorbed by 
surface streets. 
 Increase in transit use, and high 
ridership on new streetcar. 
 
 Two-lane road was built. 
 Bus and subway system were 
coordinated. 
 Significant modal shift. 















 Development adjacent to the 
site. 
 Gentrification of Chinatown and 
the North End. 
 
 Connection between two 
neighborhoods. 
 New neighborhood identities. 
 New overlay zoning guidelines. 
 
 Reunited the neighborhood. 
 Growth in income and decrease in 
poverty in West Oakland. 
 Community chose to preserve 
industrial zoning, has had trouble 
attracting new industry. 
 
 Affordable housing included in 
much of the development. 
 Decrease in crime in the vicinity. 
 Major festivals and markets in the 
new park. 
 
 Neighborhoods have less urban 
decay and higher land values. 
 Affordable and senior housing in 
new developments. 
 
 New neighborhood identities 
formed. 
 Change in uses from industrial to 
residential and commercial. 
 Opposition from Chinatown 
merchants. 
 
 Large numbers of residences in 
the area. 
 Public spaces are well used. 
 Some handicapped accessibility 
issues. 
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3.1 Introduction  
The area directly adjacent to the Claiborne Expressway is comprised of several established neighborhoods varying in age, 
composition, and history.  This chapter will outline the history of the Claiborne Expressway corridor and briefly discuss the 
history of the following neighborhoods adjacent to the Claiborne Expressway: Tremé, Seventh Ward, St. Roch, 
Tulane/Gravier, and the CBD.  Many of these neighborhoods have shared histories and similarities because of their proximity 
to one another.   
It should be noted that the construction of Interstate 10 in New Orleans in the late 1960s coincided with the population decline 
in New Orleans from its decennial census peak of 627,525 in 1960 to 593,471 in 1970 (Gibson, 1998).  This pattern of decline 
has continued each decade since 1970 (Gibson, 1998), and according to 2010 Census data, New Orleans is now home to 
343,829 residents (U.S. Census Bureau).  The decline is attributed to several factors, including suburban out-migration, 
intrusive urban renewal projects, large infrastructure projects, and the relocation of industry away from the city of New 
Orleans. Such factors led to urban disinvestment in many neighborhoods, making the correlation between neighborhood 
decline and proximity to the interstate difficult to isolate. 
3.2 North Claiborne Avenue  
North Claiborne Avenue in New Orleans was once a 
commercial district filled with grocery stores, restaurants, 
and businesses convenient to the neighborhood residents. 
The median (referred to as "  neutral ground‖ locally) of the 
avenue was lined with established oak trees and greenery. 
The atmosphere was vibrant and friendly. The area was the 
heart of the surrounding neighborhoods, and Mardi Gras 
parades rolled by as residents celebrated on the North 
Claiborne Avenue neutral ground.  
Until the mid-1950s, African-Americans were prohibited 
from participating in Mardi Gras celebrations on St. 
Charles and Canal streets (GNOCDC 2005a). Therefore, 
the Krewe of Zulu and tribes of intricately costumed Mardi 
Gras Indians paraded along the tree-lined avenue much to 
the delight of the parade goers that resided in the area. 
New Orleans Restaurateur Leah Chase was one of those 
residents. Her words paint a vivid picture exemplifying the 
neighborly feel of this once vibrant area of North 
Claiborne Avenue: 
After World War II, however, the area suffered a 
devastating blow that severely impacted the character and 
vitality of the surrounding neighborhood. 
 
 
We would go to see the Zulu parade, which was 
on Claiborne Avenue from Canal Street to St. 
Bernard Avenue. Claiborne was lined with 
beautiful oaks then. Some of the people held 
open houses on Claiborne, for their friends. The 
street was full of booths, with blacks selling fried 
chicken, fried fish, and red beans. My favorite 
thing about Mardi Gras was that we could eat in 
the street. My father never even let us eat candy 
outside normally. (Chase, 2009, p. 154)  
Figure 3.1:  North Claiborne Avenue, at Dumaine Street, looking 
towards Elysian Fields. "Oak Tree Conservation." Undated. City 
Archives New Orleans Public Library 
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Figure 3.2:  North Claiborne Avenue, showing oaks August 29, 1968. [Photograph by 
Joseph C. Davi]. City Archives New Orleans Public Library 
Figure 3.3: Circle Food Store - 1954 – before the elevated expressway. City Archives New 
Orleans Public Library 
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3.3 I-10 Expressway Construction 
During the 1950s, the Federal government paved the way 
for urban freeway construction by contributing 90% of the 
necessary funds for interstate projects (CNU 2011). 
Officials announced that the Interstate 10 Claiborne 
Expressway, an elevated highway, would be engineered 
and constructed above North Claiborne Avenue to allow 
better access to the Central Business District. At the same 
time, the Vieux Carré Riverfront Expressway was also 
proposed, to be constructed through the French Quarter to 
make the area more accessible.  
The term  "  The Second Battle of New Orleans‖ has been 
used to describe the controversy in the 1960s over the 
Vieux Carré Riverfront Expressway. Richard O. 
Baumbach, Jr. and William E. Borah, opponents of the 
project themselves, described the expressway fight in: The 
Second Battle of New Orleans: A History of the Vieux 
Carré Riverfront Expressway Controversy. The idea of an 
elevated freeway along the riverfront was not a new one. It 
was suggested in 1946 by Robert Moses, a New York 
builder. Baumbach and Borah explain that the project drew 
opponents. Preservationists had been fighting for years to 
protect the character of the Vieux Carré. They suspected 
that the proposed expressway was an intrusion that would 
harm the fragile beauty of the old city. On the other hand, 
supporters of the expressway believed that the expressway 
would preserve the Vieux Carré by alleviating traffic on 
the narrow streets of the French Quarter. The Second 
Battle of New Orleans became more than just a conflict 
between preservationists and downtown developers; it was 
a battle of values, attitudes, and conflicting beliefs and 
perspectives about the character of the city (Weingraff 
2011). The French Quarter Expressway was stopped by 
preservationists who battled fiercely and persuaded the 
federal government to withhold funding. However, 
residents of the North Claiborne Avenue area—which 
included some of the oldest African American 
neighborhoods in the country—did not have the funds or 
political clout to stop construction of the Interstate 10 
Claiborne Expressway. 
Five hundred homes along North Claiborne Avenue were 
torn down to prepare for the construction of the highway 
that opened in 1968 (CNU 2011).  The final blow to the 
neighborhood was the removal of the quadruple rows of 
live oak trees from the neutral ground of the avenue. A 
May 2002 article in the Times-Picayune quotes Jerome 
Smith, a resident and community activist of the 





Of the changes along the avenue since 
the 19th century, none has been more 
devastating than the cutting down of the 
oaks on the neutral ground in the mid-
1960s to erect the interstate ramp. It took 
something out of the spirit of the 
neighborhood. The shady promenade ran 
for blocks down the center of the avenue 
and was a place where people embraced 
each other in the daily rituals of life. The 
old ladies would come out here and 
stretch their curtains. . . .When Joe Lewis 
was fighting, the men would be out here 
on the backs of their trucks, and our 
Mardi Gras was here. (GNOCDC 2005a)  
The construction of the elevated Interstate 10 Claiborne 
Expressway permanently exchanged the historic green 
space for concrete. This further diminished the vibrancy of 
the neighborhood, and soon many more properties were 
abandoned. Soon afterward, the business district showed a 
marked decline, and the once-serene way of life for the 
neighborhood residents was gone. Interestingly, in 1968, 
the Zulu parade was finally allowed to roll on St. Charles 
and Canal due to the destruction of the North Claiborne 




Figure 3.4: North Claiborne Avenue, showing oaks.  Undated.  
City Archives New Orleans Public Library 
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3.4 Overview of Impacted Neighborhoods
Tremé 
In 1730, Fort St. Ferdinand and Fort St. John were built in 
the area of New Orleans that is now known as Tremé. 
Chevalier Charles de Morand owned the city‘s first 
brickyard in the area, and his plantation was bounded by 
North Rampart, Claiborne Avenue, and Bayou Road 
(Governor Nicholls). As time passed, most of the Morand 
Plantation had been acquired by Claude Tremé, who built 
a plantation on Bayou Road. The area became more 
accessible, especially in 1794, when the Spanish Governor 
of Louisiana built a canal from the French Quarter to 
Bayou St. John right through Tremé‘s land. By 1810, 
Tremé had sold off most of his land, and the land was 
subdivided for development. Free people of color, 
Caucasians, and Creoles who had recently arrived from 
Haiti purchased the subdivided lots.  The people of color 
who resided in the area were some of the city‘s finest 
craftsmen and musicians.  
Likewise, the Haitian descendants excelled as writers, 
teachers, and doctors.  Tremé grew in leaps and bounds, 
and by 1883, there were only a few undeveloped lots left. 
Double shotgun houses and Creole cottages stood among 
businesses (GNOCDC 2005a). The neighborhood was 
ethnically diverse and prosperous.  
Figure 3.5: Neighborhoods of New Orleans; Claiborne-adjacent neighborhoods outlined in red. Base map source: GNOCDC 
(2004) 
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The livelihood of Tremé was dealt a huge blow in the 
1920s when the Municipal Auditorium was constructed 
adjacent to Congo Square.  This facility destroyed a 
portion of the neighborhood in order to create a venue for 
Mardi Gras balls, operas, and other events usually reserved 
for the upper echelon of New Orleans society.  Then urban 
renewal began in earnest in the 1960s with the 
construction of Louis Armstrong Park.  This project 
destroyed nearly one third (32 acres) of historic Tremé and 
limited access to the park. Congo Square and the 
Preservation Hall, hallmarks of the neighborhood, were 
now fenced off, along with newer facilities like the 
Mahalia Jackson Center for Performing Arts (Johnson 
2001). 
Around the same time as the Louis Armstrong Park was 
being developed, construction of the Claiborne 
Expressway began.  The construction process crippled 
businesses located on Claiborne Avenue.  The number of 
businesses along a eight block stretch on Claiborne 
Avenue declined from 132 in 1960 to 35 in 2000 (Lacho, 
Parker, and Carter 2005).   
Seventh Ward 
The land occupied by the Seventh Ward neighborhood was 
first developed by Bernard Marigny in the late 1700‘s.  
After successfully developing Faubourg Marigny, he 
sought to develop the Nouveau Marigny, which was 
bordered by Elysian Fields Avenue, St. Bernard Avenue, 
St. Claude Avenue, and Gentilly Road. These boundaries 
are essentially the same as those of the current day Seventh 
Ward, except that it is slightly larger, extending from 
Elysian Fields Avenue to Esplanade Avenue. This 
additional land was once owned by Charles de Morand of 
Tremé fame (GNOCDC 2005b). 
The development of the Pontchartrain Railroad in 1830 
helped to encourage growth in the area.  By the latter half 
of the 19th century, the Seventh Ward developed into a mix 
of French Creoles, Germans, and free people of color.  
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Seventh Ward was 
notable for its strong business community, contributions to 
early Jazz, Creole culture, and civil rights activists.  
However, the construction of I-10 through the Seventh 
Ward neighborhood shuttered many businesses and 
rendered many homes undesirable causing residents to 
relocate (GNOCDC 2005b).   
St. Roch 
St. Roch developed considerably later than the 
abovementioned neighborhoods.   It was settled after the 
completion of the now defunct Pontchartrain Railroad 
along Elysian Fields Avenue in 1830, which positioned the 
area favorably between the Mississippi River and Lake 
Pontchartrain.  Additionally, railroad lines connecting New 
Orleans to the rest of the country have for decades 
crisscrossed the northern portion of the neighborhood.  
Figure 3.6: Tremé Neighborhood Map. Source: Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina Data Center, 
Tremé Neighborhood.  (www.gnocdc.org). 
Figure 3.7: 7th Ward Neighborhood Map. Source: Greater 
New Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina Data 
Center, Seventh Ward Neighborhood.  (www.gnocdc.org). 
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Culturally, the neighborhood is very similar to the Seventh 
Ward as it was historically settled by French Creoles, 
Germans, and free people of color. It was also home to 
many early Jazz musicians, most famously Jelly Roll 
Morton (GNOCDC 2005c). 
St. Roch is notable for its public spaces and the St. Roch 
Market, one of the last remaining historic public markets 
in the city. The neighborhood‘s namesake is from the St. 
Roch shrine and cemetery, which was dedicated in 1867 
after a German priest invoked the healing powers of St. 
Roch, the patron saint of good health, to protect his 
parishioners from the yellow fever epidemic.  
Miraculously none of the parishioners died in 1867 or 
1868 (GNOCDC 2005c). 
The portion of the Claiborne Expressway that runs through 
the neighborhood is in the northern portion near the 
railroad lines. The construction of the interstate further 
divided the neighborhood and created an undesirable 
stretch along its boundaries (GNOCDC 2005c). 
Tulane/Gravier 
The early development of Tulane/Gravier involved many 
owners and exchanges of property, but its namesakes are 
those of Paul Tulane, founder of Tulane University, and 
Jean and Bertrand Gravier, developers of Faubourg St. 
Mary (CBD).  The neighborhood began to develop in the 
mid 19th century (GNOCDC 2005d). 
There are many landmarks, such as the Dixie Brewery and 
Falstaff Brewery, which hint at the industrial past of the 
neighborhood. The area was essentially sandwiched 
between the Carondelet and New Basin Canals, providing 
easy access to both the lake and river. Later railroad 
development provided the backbone for an industrial boom 
(GNOCDC 2005d). 
The 19th century saw increased commercialization, 
especially along the main avenues (Tulane, Broad, and 
Canal), in addition to increasing residential densities.  
Aside from the imposing structures of the now abandoned 
breweries, the neighborhood is also home to a large 
number of biomedical facilities such as University 
Hospital and the LSU School of Nursing (GNOCDC 
2005d).   
After Hurricane Katrina devastated many of the city‘s 
buildings, plans were made to abandon Charity Hospital in 
the CBD. LSU's medical facilities, previously housed in 
Charity Hospital, and the Veterans Affairs Hospital will 
relocate north of Claiborne Avenue into the neighborhood.  
They will also expand their facilities in an attempt to 
promote the Tulane Avenue corridor as a nationally 
competitive Biomedical District. Construction is 
underway, and though plans have been subject to scrutiny, 
the greatest impact has already occurred. The LSU and VA 
sites occupy 27 blocks and removed or demolished 249 
buildings.  It is anticipated that many of the streets will be 
removed and much of the traffic will funnel to Galvez St. 
(Save Charity Hospital 2011). 
Figure 3.8: St. Roch Neighborhood Map. Source: Greater 
New Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina Data 
Center, St. Roch Neighborhood.  (www.gnocdc.org). 
 
Figure 3.9: Tulane/Gravier Neighborhood Map. Source: 
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina 
Data Center, Tulane/Gravier Neighborhood.  
(www.gnocdc.org). 
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In addition to being situated adjacent to the Claiborne 
Expressway, this neighborhood is also bounded by the 
Pontchartrain Expressway portion of I-10.   
Central Business District (CBD) 
The CBD started out as Jean Baptiste LeMoyne de 
Bienville‘s plantation, granted by the Superior Council of 
Louisiana in 1719.  It changed hands over the years and 
was subdivided after the French Quarter Fire of 1788 by 
Bertrand Gravier, who established the neighborhood as 
Faubourg St. Marie (St. Mary).  Americans flocking to the 
city after the Louisiana Purchase (1803) made this the 
"American Quarter.‖ By the 1830s, Canal Street had 
replaced Chartres Street as the commercial center of the 
city, and thus, the CBD was established (GNOCDC 
2005e). 
The construction of the New Basin Canal in the 
neighborhood and Louisiana‘s booming sugar and cotton 
trade contributed to the rise of the CBD.  While the Civil 
War and Reconstruction took its toll on the city, the CBD 
quickly rebounded. In 1870, New Orleans became a 
deepwater port, and skyscrapers, paved roads, and electric 
streetcars followed. The stock market crash of 1929 
brought a period of decline, which was only exacerbated 
by the suburban white flight that occurred after 
desegregation in the 1960s (GNOCDC 2005e). 
The CBD experienced a brief renaissance in the 1970s and 
80s because of the oil boom.  Poydras Street became the 
new hub for commerce, but when oil prices crashed in the 
late 1980s, the CBD was left with a surplus of office 
towers. Today, vacancy rates remain relatively high, but 
many of the buildings have been converted to hotels for 
the burgeoning tourist industry in New Orleans.  
Additionally, commercial and residential development is 
on the rise again with many projects slated for construction 
along Loyola Avenue where a new streetcar line is planned 





Figure 3.11: CBD Neighborhood Map. Source: Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina Data Center, 
Central Business District Neighborhood.  (www.gnocdc.org). 
 
Figure 3.12: Claiborne Avenue circa 1960 (Times-Picayune) 
 
Figure 3.10: Claiborne Expressway/Interstate 10 above Claiborne Avenue 
today. Source: Congress for New Urbanism (2010).  
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3.5 Project Background: 
Summary of Claiborne Avenue 
Expressway Removal 
Proposals 
Throughout the Post-Katrina planning process (2005-
2010), the removal of the I-10 Expressway at Claiborne 
Avenue has been consistently identified—particularly by 
residents of surrounding communities—as a top long-term 
priority. In 2010, the Congress for New Urbanism released 
a report on the viability and desirability of the 
Expressway‘s removal. In an effort to assess the feasibility 
of this proposal, the City of New Orleans submitted an 
application for federal funding to perform a detailed, 
comprehensive analysis, and received $2M for the project. 
This section briefly outlines the various planning processes 
and proposals that address the Claiborne Avenue 
Expressway‘s potential redevelopment. 
 
Bring New Orleans Back Commission 
(BNOB) 
Immediately after Hurricane Katrina (October 2005), the 
Bring New Orleans Back Commission was created to 
develop recommendations to the City for recovery. The 
documents the commission produced, published in January 
of 2006, were focused on the city‘s most immediate 
priorities and did not specifically call for the 
redevelopment of Claiborne Avenue. However, it did call 
for new and rebuilt roads to  "   be designed with the wide 
median (neutral ground) model for pedestrians, bicycles, 
transit, and open space‖ (BNOB 2006, p.33).  In addition, 
the BNOB‘s "Action Plan‖ called for the development of 
53 miles of new light rail service, including a light rail line 
along Claiborne Avenue, extending from Carrolton 
Avenue to New Orleans East.  The Commission also 
advocated the adoption of a "  Neighborhood Center Model‖ 
of development (see Figure 3.13), which emphasizes 
mixed use boulevards, greenways, neutral-ground transit 
service, and regional connectivity. 
 
Lambert Neighborhood Rebuilding 
Plans 
 
Next, in September of 2006, a series of neighborhood level 
recovery plans were published, in which neighborhoods 
outlined priority projects and needs for their communities. 
Both the 6th Ward/Tremé and 7th Ward Neighborhood 
Rebuilding Plans highlighted the negative impact that the 
Claiborne Avenue Expressway had on their communities, 
and identified a study of its potential removal as a key 
long-term recovery need. The neighborhoods‘ final plans 
both included a stated recovery goal of  "address[ing] the 
former civic importance of Claiborne Avenue, and the 
destruction and separation of the neighborhood caused by 
I-10‖ (New Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization Plans 
(Lambert Plans): 7th Ward Rebuilding Plan 2006, p.5). 
The Lambert Plans proposed to transition the I-10 corridor 
to grade level at Elysian Fields Avenue, or, if necessary, at 
St. Bernard Avenue, in a phased process which would 
remove the expressway‘s access ramps first, to be replaced 
with enhanced landscaping and open space, followed 
eventually by the removal of the highway entirely (see 
Figures 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16). The plan also calls for the 
restoration of the St. Bernard Avenue traffic circle. To this 
Figure 3.13:  BNOB Neighborhood Center Model. Image Source: BNOB (2006)  
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end, the 7th Ward and Tremé plans demand a study to  
 "determine how the impacts of this divisive and 
destructive elevated roadway can be minimized or 
eliminated‖ (New Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization 
Plans (Lambert Plans): 7th Ward Rebuilding Plan 2006, 
p.17).  
 
The Lambert plans identified pollution from the I-
10/Claiborne corridor as a public health concern, in 
addition to noise pollution and damage to historic 
buildings from vibration, and demands that, if the 
expressway cannot be removed, steps must be taken to 
mitigate its ongoing impacts. Interestingly, there seems to 
have been some discussion of adapting the open space 
underneath the expressway for recreational use, an idea 
which was rejected by the community based on the area‘s 







Figure 3.14: Proposed Plan of Redesigned Claiborne/I-10: 
Phase II. Image Source: City of New Orleans (2006)  
 
Figure 3.14: Proposed Section of Redesigned Claiborne/I-10: 
Phase II. Image Source: City of New Orleans (2006) 
Figure 3.15: Proposed Plan and Section of Claiborne Avenue 
Redesign, phase III. Image Source: City of New Orleans 
(2006) 
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Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) 
 
The Lambert neighborhood plans were consolidated and 
reorganized into the City of New Orleans‘ Unified New 
Orleans Plan.  The District Four Recovery Plan (City of 
New Orleans 2007) addresses the needs of the area 
impacted by the Claiborne Expressway. In this plan, the 
funding of a study examining the feasibility of removing I-
10 (see Figures 3.17 and 3.18) was the second of 29 
priority planning projects for planning District 4, with 
 "high‖ priority. The proposed timeline for this study was 
2-5 years. The previous neighborhood plans‘ 
recommendations for a phased removal of the highway are 
retained in this proposal (see Figures 3.19 and 3.20). The 
UNOP Plan called for coordination of this proposal with 
public transportation and green space planning efforts, and 
identifies the project as a "  highest priority project both for 
planning and economic development interests‖ (Ch. 6, 
p.9). UNOP cites the expressway‘s key outcomes as 
reconnecting neighborhoods, restoring a tree-lined avenue 
(including the restoration of the St. Bernard Avenue traffic 
circle, see Figure 3.21), and providing economic benefits 
to the corridor by redistributing traffic to Claiborne 
Avenue businesses. The UNOP plan also suggests timing 
modifications to Louis Armstrong Park (e.g. a partially 





Figure 3.16: UNOP Map of Existing Freeway System. 
Image Source: City of New Orleans (2007) 
Figure 3.17: UNOP Map of Proposed Freeway System Adjustments. Image Source: City of 
New Orleans (2007) 
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Figure 3.19: UNOP Phase I Removal Proposal. Image Source: City of New Orleans (2007) 
Figure 3.18: UNOP Phase II Removal Proposal. Image Source: City of New Orleans (2007) 
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New Orleans Master Plan--Plan for the 
21st Century: New Orleans 2030 
 
The recently adopted comprehensive Plan for the 21st 
Century: New Orleans 2030 (New Orleans Master Plan 
and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, 2010) states as one 
of its goals:  "  Advance [transportation] projects that 
enhance connectivity, reduce barriers and improve 
attractiveness of neighborhoods, commercial sites and 
public spaces while addressing transportation mobility‖ (p. 
11.20). Under the authority of this goal, studying the 
removal of the Claiborne Expressway—which the plan 
observe "   attracted extensive comment‖ (p.11.21) during 
the planning process—is mandated. Its removal, the plan 
notes, would "right a decades‘ old wrong‖ (p.11.21) while 
enhancing the livability of surrounding neighborhoods and 
promoting private investment in the corridor.  
 
The first step toward the expressway‘s potential removal is 
the execution of a feasibility and environmental impact 
study, funded by federal grants, to determine the relative 
costs and benefits of removal, as well as the anticipated 
near-term costs of maintaining the existing infrastructure.  
 
Concerns about the proposal identified in the Master Plan 
include: the capacity of I-610 to handle increased traffic 
diverted from the Claiborne Expressway (see Figure 3.22) 
and how to maximize its capacity without widening; 
restoration of Claiborne Avenue to its historic appearance; 
how to best utilize land formerly occupied by the 
expressway and its on-and-off ramps (see Figure 3.23); 
and protecting neighborhoods from excessive through 
traffic. 
Figure 3.20: UNOP Proposed Re-Design of St. Bernard Traffic Circle. Image Source: City of New 
Orleans (2007) 
Figure 4.21: Rendering of Redeveloped Claiborne Avenue, 
2030. Image Source: New Orleans Master Plan and 
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (2010). 
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“Restoring Claiborne Avenue: 
Alternatives for the Future of 
Claiborne Avenue” 
 
The 2010 Restoring Claiborne Avenue: Alternatives for 
Future of Claiborne report was commissioned by the 
Congress for the New Urbanism in order to explore future 
alternatives for the elevated Interstate-10 Claiborne 
Expressway corridor. The main goal of the report was to 
start the process of gathering expert opinion and 
community input to inform future discussion of restoring 
Claiborne Avenue. The report determined key baseline 
assumptions based upon review of traffic data by 
LADOTD, various studies, historical information, and 
present state of the Claiborne neighborhood. The key 
baseline assumptions are the following: 
 Claiborne Expressway traffic is 30% or more below 
the pre-hurricane levels. Surface street volumes on 
parallel and intersecting streets also have below pre-
hurricane volumes, which show that there exists 
capacity to absorb or redistribute traffic. 
 Retaining the expressway would entail substantial new 
spending. Structurally, Claiborne Expressway is 
nearing the end of its useful life and beginning to 
deteriorate. Some of its exit ramps are far below 
current geometric standards and would require a larger 
footprint, potentially demolishing more urban fabric.  
 The area is currently underserved by public transit. 
The removal would allow for new transit opportunities 
such as a rapid-bus transit, light rail, or streetcar, and 
commuters would enjoy improved circulation and 
accessibility to the street network. 
 A study must be done dealing with the effect of 
restoring Claiborne Avenue to freight routes, since the 
expressway serves port traffic that is heading 
eastbound on I-10. 
 Evacuation routes would not be affected by 
expressway removal since Claiborne is not part of the 
hurricane evacuation route. 
 Bicycle and pedestrian issues need to be addressed 
since there are not bicycle facilities along Claiborne, 
and there are safety concerns for pedestrians along the 
corridor.  
The 2008 data from the Louisiana Department of 
Transportation and Development ranges the volume on the 
Claiborne Expressway from 51,309 to 69,466 vehicles per 
day. The report assumes that a restored Claiborne Avenue 
would have traffic volumes of up to 50,000 vehicles per 
day, and assumes that 33% of the existing freeway traffic 
would disperse onto other routes. This assumption is based 
on the past experience of other highway removals. The 
removal of the expressway would also need to be 
accompanied by a number of changes to the New Orleans 
freeway system such as: 
Figure 3.22: Diagram of Proposed Claiborne Avenue Expressway Removal and Freeway Redesign. Image 
Source: New Orleans Master Plan and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (2010). 
New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:  
3 - History and Background 
24 
 
 Interstate designation would be changed to reflect the 
new system. 
 Freeway interchanges would need to be redesigned to 
handle new traffic flows especially for freight 
transportation. 
 A new interchange of Broad Street with the current I-
10/Ponchatrain Expressway should be considered to 
further encourage dispersal of traffic onto alternate 
routes. 
 Establishing Galvez as a through route can improve 
connectivity between uptown and downtown across 
the I-10 corridor. 
The removal of the elevated expressway is organized into 
three segments. Segment A includes the interchange with 
I-10/Pontchartrain Expressway/North Claiborne Avenue. 
Segment B includes North Claiborne Avenue from the 
interchange to St. Bernard Avenue. Segment C is where 
the elevated expressway crosses the 7th Ward 
neighborhood, between St. Bernard and Elysian Fields. 
 
Segment A: The high speed ramps that make up the 
interchange with the I-10/Claiborne Expressway would be 
removed and replaced functionally with a diamond 
interchange with Claiborne Avenue. A new crossing of the 
Pontchartrain would reduce the volumes crossing the 
Pontchartrain at Claiborne. 
 
 
Segment B: The Claiborne Expressway is removed 
between the I-10 interchange and St. Bernard Streets and is 
replaced by a grade-level restored Claiborne Avenue. The 
restored avenue would have three travel lanes in each 
direction, a wide median that can be landscaped or put to 
other public uses, parallel parking, sidewalks and bicycle 
paths. The designed speed would be between 30 mph and 
35 mph, and there would be signalized intersections as 
frequently as every other block. The restored avenue 
would also provide a great opportunity to restore the 
historic St. Bernard Circle, which it would function as a 
three lane modern roundabout or as a traditional traffic 




Segment C: There are two options for this area. 
 
 Option C1: This option would create a new at-
grade boulevard through the Seventh Ward 
between St. Bernard and Elysian Fields, in the 
path of the elevated freeway. The cross section 
would include three lanes of traffic in each 




 Option C2: The expressway would be removed 
from Elysian Fields to St. Bernard, but not 
replaced with a boulevard. Rather, traffic 
circulation and access to several alternative 
corridors would be improved to encourage 
dispersal onto the street network. 
 
Figure 3.24: Segments of Express Removal Plan. 
Source: Smart Mobility, Inc 
Figure 3.23: Drawing of Expected St. Bernard Circle. 
Source: Smart Mobility, Inc. and Waggonner & Ball 
Architects 
 
Figure 3.25:  Option C1 Rendering. Source: Smart 
Mobility, Inc. and Waggonner & Ball Architects 
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The removal of the elevated expressway will have various 
impacts to New Orleans and the region. The report stated 
that a full analysis will be required and a more detailed 
feasibility study must be completed, but it found that 
following impacts that should be further studied: 
 
 Traffic on the restored Claiborne Avenue is 
projected to be reduced to 70% or less of the 
current expressway volume. 
 Traffic will divert to the I-10 portion of the 
Pontchartrain Expressway and I-610, resulting in 
an increase of less than 10% of existing volumes 
on these corridors.  
 The freeway removal will allow for improved 
street connectivity, which can shorten pedestrian 
travel distances. 
 The new avenue would result in improved 
conditions for bicyclists, and an opportunity for 
new modes in public transit. 
 The freeway removal would improve 
neighborhood noise levels, air pollution, and 
opportunities for storm water retention. 
 Economic impacts can occur due to increased 
local property values, redevelopment 
opportunities, and new acreage availability. 
 
The City’s Application for Federal 
Funding for Further Study 
 
Following the announcement of the federal 
HUD/DOT/EPA inter-agency partnership in 2009, the 
Sustainable Communities Partnership, more than a dozen 
meetings took place to discuss sustainable community 
building.  What emerged was a priority to ensure that the 
significant affordable housing investments and existing 
neighborhoods along the Claiborne corridor are linked to 
job centers, by leveraging infrastructure investments to 
connect a regional vision for redevelopment to catalytic 
projects along the spine of the Claiborne corridor. 
Recognizing that the Claiborne/elevated I-10 Expressway 
presents a physical and symbolic barrier to achieving 
connectivity and revitalization in adjacent low-income 
neighborhoods, the coalition is committed to study the 
future of elevated expressway (Claiborne Corridor Plan, 
1). 
 
In October of 2010, the City of New Orleans was awarded 
a federal grant for research on the city‘s Claiborne 
Corridor Plan. In order to be eligible for these federal 
funds, the city completed an application, the Claiborne 
Corridor Plan: Leveraging Infrastructure to Build Inter-
Parish Access and Equity.  In this application, the city 
requested a total of $3 million in HUD Challenge and 
DOT TIGER II Grant monies.  Despite not receiving the 
full amount requested, the city was awarded $2 million in 
federal funding and raised over $850,000 to be provided as 
the required minimum 20% match. 
 
The city‘s requested federal funding to analyze possible 
infrastructure investments that could improve transit, 
connect housing to jobs, schools, and healthcare, manage 
soil and water, and promote livable communities as 
economic development. This analysis is to be completed 
using interagency partnerships with strong community 
input. The application also speaks of a strong focus on 
environmentally sustainable development. It has been 
recognized that there is a need and desire to re-integrate 
neighborhoods across the physical Claiborne boundary, but 
current investment in the area is burdened by physical and 
institutional barriers that hinder the corridors 
transformation. The main physical barrier being the 
elevated expressway itself, which has caused depreciated 
property values and therefore lack of further private 
investment.  Also, disconnected planning efforts have lead 
to inconsistent development plans and resistant investors.  
 
The broad plans for funds addressed in the application 
included a study of the corridor challenges and 
opportunities to reunite a physically divided community, 
development of resident leadership to increase their 
planning and implementation capacity through technical 
assistance, and tying workforce and small business 
development to the corridor‘s investment opportunities.  
The application also discussed a gap analysis of all plans 
done since Hurricane Katrina to make sure investments are 
catalyzed to create sustainable communities.   
 
Within this broad set of goals, the city application 
describes two more specific projects. Project A is to 
promote livable neighborhoods - revitalized corridors 
through targeted planning interventions. Using federal 
funds, these planning interventions will develop 
neighborhood and economic development revitalization 
Figure 3.26: Option C2 Rendering. Source: Smart 
Mobility, Inc. and Waggonner & Ball Architects 
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strategies in addition to  Complete Streets and 
Infrastructure's policy and design prototypes to address 
storm water management, subsidence, multi-modal 
mobility, and urban design. The primary area of study for 
project A is the area between Napoleon Avenue and 
Elysian Fields, which includes the commercial heart of 
Claiborne and elevated I-10 Expressway and the 
surrounding historic neighborhoods. The secondary area of 
study will be East Claiborne Avenue in the lower ninth 
ward and in Hollygrove on the west end of the city. A 
future area for analysis will be Claiborne Avenue into 
Jefferson and St. Bernard Parish. 
 
Project B as discussed in the city application addressed 
expanded mobility to link housing and employment centers 
along the Claiborne corridor. This project required the 
execution of a comprehensive data and alternatives study 
to evaluate the future of Claiborne elevated Expressway.  
It also included conducting a regional transit line 
feasibility assessment along the entire corridor. This 
project will be integral for the city to reach one of its major 
goals, which is to create a future with vibrant regional 
transit system including pedestrian and bicycle 
infrastructure with Claiborne as the spine.   
 
Once the projects were outlined, the application then 
summarized the city‘s goals for the entire study. Along 
with each goal, they gave a brief description of the history 
and existing condition of the area in reference to that 
particular goal, as well as impediments to achieving the 
goal. The five goals listed in the application were briefly 
mentioned previously, but are worth listing again. They 
include: 
 
 Create connections between affordable housing 
investments and jobs 
 Study alternative futures of Claiborne elevated I-
10 Expressway 
 Strategically tackle blight and vacancy 
 Advance a culture of interagency and public-
private sector coordination 
 Manage storm water runoff and subsidence 
 
In the reminder of the city‘s application, they went into 
details about proposed outcomes and performance 
measures for progress and impact.  One significant section 
of the application addressed an emphasis on increasing 
citizen participation and decision-making, as well as 
capacity building and knowledge sharing between 
professional organizations and community stakeholders - 
an important aspect to the successful implementation of 
the planning interventions.   
 
Many plans have been completed since Hurricane Katrina, 
and the city is committed to working consistently with 
three existing plans. It is essential to build on the extensive 
work that has already been done in the city, and leverage 
that work through cohesiveness and consistency. The plans 
that the city will want to build consistency with include the 
New Orleans Master Plan 2030, Unified New Orleans 
Plan, and Louisiana Speaks Regional Plan.   
 
Part two of the application addresses the Work Plan. The 
city lays out a comprehensive list of tasks necessary to 
complete both projects. These plans include specific data 
collection objectives and community participation 
management goals. Also in part two of the application, a 
project completion schedule is outlined for their two years 
of budgeted time (Figure 3.28). 
 
Part three of the application addresses leveraging and 
collaboration.  The city raised $858,500 for matching grant 
funds, which was over the federally required 20%. The city 
also voiced its desire to ensure that the billions in current 
and planned investments along the corridor are integrated, 
and that their benefits are maximized. Cited in the nearby 
investments is the groundbreaking on the $2.2 billion VA 
and University Medical Center Complex and over $700 
million for the big four affordable and mixed income 
housing developments.   
 
The final section of the application addresses capacity.  
The research projects will be tackled with a three-pronged 
leadership approach. This includes a governance 
committee of 15 with decision-making authority, a lead 
consultant, and a project advisory committee compiled of 
different community stakeholders. The governance 
committee and project advisory committee will work 
together to set specific goals, objectives, and evaluation 
criteria. They will also ensure open access to governance 
committee proceedings to ensure that all disputes will be 
resolved in a transparent and equitable manner. 
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Figure 3.27: Project Completion Schedule. City of New Orleans. (2010) 
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This section addresses the current context of the Claiborne Avenue corridor, including the existing transportation network, land 
use patterns, the local economy, and local community characteristics and demographics. This data provides background for our 
analysis of the proposed expressway removal.   
4.1 Transportation System 
Highway and Expressway Facilities 
The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LaDOTD) maintains a publicly available database for annual 
estimated average daily traffic (ADT) counts for automobiles. These ADT estimates go back to 1994 or 1997 for different 
locations, with the most recent data available for 2010. The tables below, tables 4.1 through 4.4, summarize the absolute 
change and percentage change in estimated ADT volumes over time for the five LaDOTD count locations on the Claiborne 
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Figure 4.1: Estimated Average Daily Automobile Traffic, Claiborne Expressway 
Station 
ID 
Description 1994 1997 2001 2004 2008 2010 
222521 b/w Perdido St. and Gravier 
St. 
99,049 103,460 121,367 101,467 66,343 95,844 
222531 Near Bienville Ave. 118,940 121,464 99,531 91,600 69,466 109,923 
223051 Near Esplanade Ave. 111,635 117,681 96,782 113,847 67,633 100,329 
223061 Near Pauger St. 92,769 94,653 94,599 121,700 57,278 83,978 
220211 b/w Music St. and Arts St. 78,723 82,148 81,904 82,569 51,309 69,323 

















2010 as % of Peak  
222521 b/w Perdido St. and Gravier 
St. 
4.50% 17.30% -16.40% -34.60% 44.50% 79.00% 
222531 Near Bienville Ave. 2.10% -18.10% -8.00% -24.20% 58.20% 90.50% 
223051 Near Esplanade Ave. 5.40% -17.80% 17.60% -40.60% 48.30% 85.30% 
223061 Near Pauger St. 2.00% -0.10% 28.60% -52.90% 46.60% 69.00% 
220211 b/w Music St. and Arts St. 4.40% -0.30% 0.80% -37.90% 35.10% 84.00% 
Average % Change: 3.70% -3.80% 4.50% -38.00% 46.60% 81.50% 
Source:  Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development 
 
 
From tables 4.1 and 4.12, the following patterns emerge: 
- Traffic count sites on the western portion of the Claiborne Expressway (from Esplanade Avenue to the Central 
Business District (CBD)) peaked earlier, mostly in the late 1990s, than those in the eastern portion which peaked in 
2004.  
- Traffic count sites on the western portion of the Claiborne Expressway (from Esplanade Avenue to the CBD) 
generally have higher volumes than their eastern counterparts.   
- All traffic count sites experienced significant decreases from 2004 to 2008 during which the metropolitan population 
drastically declined because of the devastation from Hurricane Katrina. 
- All traffic count sites experienced significant increases from 2008 to 2010.  This is interesting because while the 
metropolitan population is similar to pre-Katrina levels, the City of New Orleans is sitting around 75% of its pre-
Katrina population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  
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Figure 4.2: Highway Traffic Counts Near the Claiborne Expressway. Source: Louisiana Department of Transportation and 
Development 
 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 summarize the absolute change and percentage change in traffic volumes over time for the highway 
count sites most immediate to the Claiborne Expressway. 
 




Route Description 1997 1998 2001 2004 2008 2010 
220161 LA3021 Elysian Fields Ave, north 
of Claiborne 
49,792 44,109 55,419 53,383 31,354 39,404 
220391 LA3021 Elysian Fields Ave, south 
of Claiborne 
28,274 27,370 29,113 25,204 23,034 21,137 
220381 LA0039 Claiborne Ave, between 
St. Bernard and Elysian 
Fields 
51,735 46,673 44,670 44,940 35,096 38,954 
223011 US0090 Tulane Ave, north of 
Claiborne 
22,265 25,049 19,562 36,261 17,467 19,185 
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Table 4.4: Percent Change in Estimated Average Daily Automobile Traffic for Nearby Highways 
 










2010 as % 
of Peak  
220161 LA3021 Elysian Fields Ave, north of 
Claiborne 
-11.4% 25.6% -3.7% -41.3% 25.7% 71.1% 
220391 LA3021 Elysian Fields Ave, south of 
Claiborne 
-3.2% 6.4% -13.4% -8.6% -8.2% 72.6% 
220381 LA0039 Claiborne Ave, between St. 
Bernard and Elysian Fields 
-9.8% -4.3% 0.6% -21.9% 11.0% 75.3% 
223011 US0090 Tulane Ave, north of 
Claiborne 
12.5% -21.9% 85.4% -51.8% 9.8% 52.9% 
Average % Change:   -3.0% 1.5% 17.2% -30.9% 9.6% 68.0% 
Source:  Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development 
 
 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the following patterns: 
 There is consistently significantly higher traffic on Elysian Fields north of the Claiborne Expressway as compared to south 
of the expressway. It should be noted that the northern Elysian Fields count site is within close proximity to Interstate 610.   
 The disparity between the northern and southern Elysian Fields count sites was greatest in 2008 when the southern value 
was 73.5% of the northern value. The 2010 data saw this disparity shrink to 53.6%.   
 All sites experienced decreases in traffic volumes between 2004 and 2008. The southern Elysian Fields site had a 
significantly lower decrease, in both absolute and percentage terms. However, it was the only site to decrease from 2008 to 
2010, though at a rate similar the previous time period (~8%). Such consistency in its ADT volumes over the years, 
especially relative to the other sites, is noteworthy.  
 2010 traffic volumes for the highways near the Claiborne Expressway represent, on average, a considerably smaller 
percentage of their peak volumes than those for the Claiborne Expressway.  
 Compare the 68% average to the 81% average of the Claiborne Expressway sites.   
 The Tulane Avenue site’s 2010 traffic volume as a percentage of its peak is extremely low compared to the rest of the 
highway sites. A possible explanation for this is the forced relocation of many residents that lived in the LSU and VA 
biomedical facilities footprints. 
Transit Facilities 
The Claiborne Expressway corridor is served by many 
transit routes. Four of these routes, at some point, run 
directly adjacent to the expressway, along Claiborne 
Avenue. Two bus lines, #51 and #52, make up the St. 
Bernard route which runs 7 days a week from Canal Street 
to the University of New Orleans. The other two routes 
that follow Claiborne Avenue are express busses to New 
Orleans East. These routes, the Morrison Express (#62) 
and Lake Forest Express (#64), also run 7 days a week and 
originate near Canal Street (Regional Transit Authority, 
2010). 
 
In addition to the adjacent bus routes, four more bus routes 
and one streetcar route pass under the Claiborne 
Expressway. The Tulane route (#39), Galvez route (#84), 
Jackson-Esplanade route (#91), and Elysian Fields route 
(#55) cross under the Claiborne Expressway at various 
locations.  Additionally, the Canal St. Streetcar passes 
under the expressway. All of these routes run 7 days a 
week (Regional Transit Authority, 2010). 
 
The Claiborne Expressway corridor is situated nearly 
equidistant between two of the four most popular bus 
routes. The Broad route (#94) and St. Claude/Jackson 
Barracks route (#88) have two of the highest levels of 
ridership in New Orleans. The Tulane route (#39), which 
crosses the Claiborne Expressway on Tulane Avenue, also 
has one of the top four ridership figures (New Orleans 
Master Plan, 2010).  
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Railroad facilities in New Orleans serve six out of the 
seven Class 1 railroads in the nation. Class 1 railroads are 
those with the highest revenue. The six Class 1 railroads in 
New Orleans are Norfolk Southern Railway, Kansas City 
Southern Railway, Canadian National Railway, Union 
Pacific Railroad, BNSF Railway, and CSXT 
Transportation, Inc.  (New Orleans Master Plan, 2010). 
Each of these railroad’s national systems can be seen in 
Figure 4.3. Such a large presence of railway operators 
makes New Orleans a national hub for rail transportation, 
for both freight and passenger rail. 
According the New Orleans Master Plan, railroad traffic is 
already a problem in New Orleans as there are 
considerable delays and bottlenecks attributed to the high 
number of at-grade crossings throughout the city 
(New Orleans Master Plan, 2010). The Claiborne 
Expressway passes over railroad tracks at only one 
location, near Florida Avenue in the St. Roch 
neighborhood. Since the expressway is elevated this 
crossing is grade separated, allowing railroad traffic to 
pass uninterrupted. In studying the feasibility of removing 
the Claiborne Expressway, railroad crossings should be 
addressed in a manner that does not further impede the 
flow of railway traffic.  
Regarding passenger rail service, Amtrak provides service 
in New Orleans with three direct routes heading West to 
Los Angeles, North to Chicago, and East to New York 
City (Amtrak, 2011). Amtrak routes in the area operate on 
freight right of ways, further contributing to railroad traffic 
delays (New Orleans Master Plan, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Railroads that Pass through New Orleans. Source: New Orleans Public Belt Railroad 
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New Orleans is expanding its network of pedestrian and 
bicycle facilities through the construction of designated 
bike lanes, shared bike lanes (sharrows), improving 
sidewalk conditions, and expanding the multi-use trail 
system in the city. The Lafitte Greenway, shown in Figure 
4.4, is one of the funded projects planned to improve non-
motorized transportation in New Orleans. The proposed 
Lafitte Greenway will stretch 3 miles from the French 
Quarter to Lakeview, passing through Tremé and Mid-
City. It also happens to cross the Claiborne Expressway 
along Basin Street/Orleans Avenue (New Orleans Master 
Plan, 2010). Given that this facility is intended to be the 
crown jewel of New Orleans’ multi-use trails and serve as 
an example for future trails, its intersection with the 
Claiborne Expressway should be taken into consideration.  
 
 Figure 4.4: The Lafitte Corridor/Greenway. Source: Friends of the Lafitte Corridor 
 
Planned Transportation Infrastructure Improvements 
Much of the discussion surrounding the feasibility of 
removing the Claiborne Expressway is founded on the 
premise that the expressway is in need of costly repairs to 
bring it into a state of good repair. Some argue that 
removal would be a less expensive alternative (Smart 
Mobility, Inc., 2010; New Orleans Master Plan, 2010). 
The Regional Planning Commission’s FY2011-2014 
Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) has three 
projects along the Claiborne Expressway corridor. All of 
these projects are deemed necessary by the Regional 
Planning Commission (RPC) in order to put/keep the 
facilities in a state of good repair. Figure 4.5 summarizes 
these projects, two of which directly involve the Claiborne 
Expressway and one which abuts it on Tulane Avenue 
(Metropolitan Transportation Plan, 2010). 
Assuming that the RPC’s TIP currently acknowledges all 
of the necessary repairs for the Claiborne Expressway, the 
total expenditures over the next four years total less than 
$2,000,000. The RPC’s Metropolitan Transportation Plan 
(MTP) estimates that reconstruction of at- grade facilities 
and transit along the I-10/Claiborne Avenue corridor 
would cost around $400,000,000. Therefore, removal of 
the Claiborne Expressway may not immediately save 
money. However, it is worth noting that the RPC has not 
assigned this project a number and has it listed as a Tier III 
project in Fiscal Years 2025-2040. Also, the cost 
projection of removing the expressway and constructing 
transit along the corridor is a preliminary estimate as the 
RPC has yet to conduct a formal study (Metropolitan 
Transportation Plan, 2010). 
Figure 4.5: Projects Planned by Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO). Source: Regional Planning Commission, 
Metropolitan Transportation Plan: New Orleans Urbanized Area, Fiscal Years 2011-2040 
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4.2 Land Use Patterns 
Existing Land Use Patterns 
The Claiborne Avenue corridor is historically a mixed-use, 
neighborhood-scale commercial corridor today dominated 
by a mix of retail and residential uses and a significant 
number of vacant properties, particularly surrounding the 
former St. Bernard traffic circle (see Appendix B: Existing 
Land Use Maps). Three blocks border the historic St. 
Louis Cemetery No. 2, and the newly redeveloped Lafitte 
housing project (as well as the future Lafitte Greenway) 
abuts the avenue at St. Peter Street. A rough geographic 
breakdown of current land use is as follows:  
Upper N. Claiborne: Tremé  
(Canal Street to Orleans Avenue) 
 Retail/office use dominates 
 Three blocks cemeteries 
 RV park 
 Vacant land 
 Park space and multi-family at Lafitte site 
Lower N. Claiborne: Tremé  
(Orleans Avenue to Esplanade Avenue) 
 Mix of office/retail and residential (single family 
and duplex) 
 A little light industrial/manufacturing 
 Lots of vacant properties fronting expressway 
 Several “unknown use” parcels 
Lower N. Claiborne—7th Ward  
(Esplanade Avenue to St. Bernard Avenue) 
 Mix of office/retail and residential (single family 
and duplex); commercial uses dominate 
 Lots of vacancy around St. Bernard Circle 
Future Land Use Patterns 
The New Orleans Master plan calls for North Claiborne 
Avenue within the study area to be entirely a 
“neighborhood commercial” corridor, with “medium-
density mixed-use” at St. Bernard Avenue (see Appendix 
C: Future Land Use Map). The master plan’s description 
of these land use categories, a classification within 
“Commercial and Industrial” land use and “Mixed Use” 
land use respectively, are as follows:  
Neighborhood Commercial Land Use: Description 
(New Orleans Master Plan 2010) 
 Goal: “Provide areas for small-scale, neighborhood-
oriented commercial development that enhances the 
pedestrian character and convenience of 
neighborhoods by allowing commercial 
establishments in select locations within walking 
distance to surrounding residential areas (p.14.11).” 
 Range of Uses: “Retail and professional service 
establishments serving local neighborhood area 
residents. Common uses include small groceries, 
restaurants, barber shops/salons, clothing boutiques, 
banks, pharmacies, and small health professional 
offices (p.14.11).” 
 Development Character: “Buildings are oriented to 
the sidewalk (parking in rear where possible) with 
maximum heights related to the character of the street. 
Landscape requirements for parking lots facing the 
street (p.14.11).” 
Mixed-Use Medium Density Land Use: Description 
(New Orleans Master Plan 2010):  
 Goal: “Create medium-density neighborhood 
centers to enhance walkability and serve as focal 
points within neighborhoods. Proximity to transit 
encouraged (p. 14.13).”  
 Range of Uses: “Medium-density residential and 
commercial uses. Limited light industrial uses 
(craft and value added industry and passive 
warehousing and storage) may be allowed in 
some areas (p. 14.13).” 
 Development Character: “Height/mass of new 
development varied to ensure proper transitions to 
surrounding lower density residential 
neighborhoods. Many structures will feature 
ground floor retail with residences on upper floors 
(p. 14.13).” 
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The $2 billion, 70 acre LSU Medical Center and VA 
Hospital complex, currently under development between 
Canal Street and Tulane Avenue in lower Mid-City will 
have a significant impact on land use in the vicinity of 
North Claiborne Avenue. The VA hospital is scheduled for 
completion in 2013, and the LSU Medical center is 
expected to open sometime in late 2014. In total, these 
projects will generate more than 7,000 new jobs in the 
area. The project involved the demolition of several 
residential blocks, and will result in substantial 
modifications of the street grid, reducing overall 
connectivity in the area, and changing the character of 
downtown New Orleans. 
 
Iberville Housing Redevelopment 
 
The Iberville public housing development, located at the 
edge of the French Quarter and stretching to Claiborne 
Avenue, is currently a finalist for a HUD Choice 
Neighborhood Grant. The development is the Housing 
Authority of New Orleans’ last conventional housing 
project, has long been discussed for redevelopment as a 
mixed-income community, and is expected to move 
forward regardless of the outcome of the federal grant. The 
redevelopment proposal submitted for grant consideration 
entails the preservation of roughly 1/3 of the existing 
1940s buildings and would result in a net increase in 
residential population in the area. In addition, the 
redevelopment will include new retail and restaurants.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: LSU/VA Hospital Footprint and Iberville housing 
development /Source: Times-Picayune 
Current Zoning Classifications:  
The study area’s current zoning is mixed, and includes 
general commercial district, central business district, 
neighborhood business district, light industrial district, 
multi-family residential district, and Historic 
Marigny/Tremé residential and commercial district 
classifications (see Appendix D: Zoning Maps). Curiously, 
the site of the planned Lafitte Greenway is currently zoned 
as C1-A “general commercial district.” These zoning 
classifications are likely to change with the development 





Figure 4.6: Claiborne Corridor Future Land Use /Source: 
New Orleans Master Plan 2010 
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Upper N. Claiborne: Tremé 
 C-1A General Commercial District  CBD-2 
Central Business District 
 CBD-2B Central Business District  
 RM-3 Multiple-Family Residential District  
 LI Light Industrial District  
Lower N. Claiborne: Tremé 
 B-1 Neighborhood Business District  
 HMC-2 Historic Marigny/Tremé Commercial 
District  
 HMR-1 Historic Marigny/Tremé Residential 
District  
 C-1A General Commercial District  
Lower N. Claiborne: 7th Ward 
 B-1 Neighborhood Business District  
 C-1A General Commercial District  
 C-1 General Commercial District  
 HMC-2 Historic Marigny/Tremé Commercial 
District  (at Esplanade Only) 
Future Zoning Classifications: 
The city’s new Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance has not 
yet been released; however, the New Orleans Master Plan 
states that:  
 “All land use actions must be consistent with, or 
at a minimum, not interfere with, the goals, 
policies and strategies of the Land Use element of 
the Master Plan and any future amendments to 
the Master Plan. This includes the 
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance and any other 
land development regulations and amendments, 
including preliminary or final approval of a 
subdivision plan, site plan, approval of a planned 
unit development, or a similar site-specific 
development plan” (New Orleans Master Plan 
2010, Executive Summary p.33) 
Therefore, we can presume that the corridor should be 
primarily zoned as “Neighborhood Business District,” 
though historic Marigny/Tremé district designations will 
likely remain in place to protect the area’s historic 
resources. 
In addition, the Master Plan outlines the following “Zoning 
Principles” for Neighborhood Business Districts (p.14.27): 
Tailor the commercial districts to the form, function and 
use of various commercial areas.  
• Revise the current commercial district structure so that 
district standards are responsive to their purpose and 
desired character. 
 Create a commercial district specifically designed to 
accommodate and encourage pedestrian-oriented, 
walkable shopping environments.  
• Create commercial districts where shoppers arrive 
primarily by auto to be pedestrian-friendly and 
functional, but where parking is not the most 
prominent land use.  
• Revise the current shopping center district standards 
to ensure a high quality of design and integration with 
other uses, as well as safety and comfort for 
pedestrians.  
• Map commercial areas on the Zoning Map, based 
upon the future land use map and Master Plan 
policies, to create compact commercial and mixed-use 
development.  
• Include design standards for each scale of commercial 
development. Districts like Magazine Street need 
different design approaches than commercial areas 
like the Bullard Avenue commercial corridor.  
• Locate mixed-use development on the Zoning Map 
within or near commercial areas. Mixed-use 
development can also function as a buffer between 
large-scale commercial development and adjacent 
neighborhoods. 
4.3 Local Economy 
Before the construction of the Interstate 10, North 
Claiborne Avenue was the commercial center for the 
downtown African-American communities of Tremé and 
the Seventh Ward. The area developed as such because of 
Jim Crow; segregationist laws forbid African American 
businesses and patrons from participating in the main 
commercial sectors of Canal Street and the Central 
Business District (CBD) during the 1930s, 40s and 50s 
(Samuels 33).  Today, the corridor does not carry the same 
significance but does represent an important employment 
center for the city.  
Employment  
Within two blocks of N. Claiborne Avenue, there are 
12,282 jobs divided between 340 registered employers 
(NORPC). Within five blocks of the avenue are 31,252 
jobs between 1,837 employers. In both cases, the single 
largest employer in the area is Louisiana State University 
Health Sciences Center, which employs 7,000 people. 
Figure 5.8 displays the number of jobs supported by each 
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of the five largest employers within two and five blocks of 
N. Claiborne Avenue.    
The numbers, however, are somewhat misleading. The 
LSU Health Sciences Center is within two blocks of North 
Claiborne Avenue but exists within the city’s biomedical 
district in the Tulane/Gravier neighborhood. This area is 
adjacent to the CBD and benefits from that proximity. The 
employment numbers increase substantially five blocks 
from the avenue because the commercial corridors of 
Loyola Avenue, North Rampart Street, and the upper half 
of Canal Street are included in the count. A look at both 
maps below show that employment is not concentrated 
directly on North Claiborne Avenue, but on the 
surrounding streets.  
The unemployment rates in Tremé, Seventh Ward, 
Tulane/Gravier, and Iberville are all significantly higher 
than state and national averages.  Table 1 shows a higher 
percentage of the population is not in the labor force when 
compared to national averages, with almost all areas 
having a population of 50% or higher not in the labor 
force.  This could indicate the areas around the Claiborne 
corridor have a significant retired and elderly population 
that is not actively searching for employment.   
As expected in downtown New Orleans, the largest 
percentage of the employed population works in the food 
service industry. Residents of the neighborhoods 
surrounding the Claiborne corridor play an important role 
in one of the city’s largest industries, which represents 
nearly 20% of industry employment distribution in both 
Tremé and Tulane/Gravier. Because the Louisiana State 
University Health Sciences Center is the largest employer 
in the area, health care and social assistance is the second 
largest employment industry for all four neighborhoods.  
Figure 4.8 shows the complete employment distribution 
for the Tremé, Seventh Ward, Tulane/Gravier, and 
Iberville neighborhoods.  
Real Estate 
 A good indicator of the economic health of a community 
is the housing vacancy rate. In the neighborhoods around 
North Claiborne, housing vacancy rates are very high.  
Iberville tops the list with 44% of all residences vacant.  
Tremé and the Seventh Ward have vacancy rates of 37% 
and 38% respectively. The high vacancy rates are partly 
because much of the population displaced by Hurricane 
Katrina has not returned, but unlike other neighborhoods in 
New Orleans, the North Claiborne area has not attracted 
many new residents either. This is not unique to the North 
Claiborne area.  Most neighborhoods in New Orleans have 
higher housing vacancy rates in 2010 than they did in 2000 
(GNOCDC, “Population Loss and Vacant Housing”). 
Detailed information on the number of vacant housing 
units is shown in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: Vacant Housing Units by Neighborhood - N. 
Claiborne Corridor 2010 
  
Neighborhood Vacant                  




Orleans                     
total,                    
2010 
Percent            




383 0.8% 44% 
Seventh Ward 2,641 5.5% 38% 
Tremé/Lafitte 1,124 2.4% 37% 
Tulane/Gravier* 656 1.4% 35% 
Source: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center 
  
Largest Employers Located Within 2 
Blocks of N. Claiborne 
Company # of Employees 
Louisiana State Univ Health 7,000 
Weiser Security Svc Inc 525 
Gurvich Detective Agency 375 
School of Allied Health 335 
Louisiana State Univ Health 300 
Largest Employers Located Within 5 
Blocks of N. Claiborne 
Company # of Employees 
Louisiana State Univ Health 7,000 
US Post Office 4,000 
Entergy Corp 1,000 
Catholic Charities Archdiocese 800 
Weiser Security Svc Inc 525 
Figure 4.8: Largest Employers within 2 & 5 Blocks of N. 
Claiborne Avenue. Source: New Orleans Regional Planning 
Commission 
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Figure 4.10: Racial Makeup of Census Tracts Surrounding the 
Claiborne Corridor.Sources:  (1) New Orleans Regional Planning 
Commission, 2010 U.S Census Orleans Tract Shape File. (2) US 
Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey, 5-year 
estimates, Table B02001 
4.4 Local Community and 
Demographics 
Ten Census tracts 1  surround the Claiborne Avenue 
corridor. Figure 4.9 outlines the relevant tracts in blue with 
Claiborne Avenue highlighted in green. The recently 
released data from the United States (US) Census 2010 
only contained population counts and race data so for all 
other information the 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey (ACS) data was used. Additionally, the 2010 
Census data contained no information for census tracts 58 
and 59 so the 2005-2009 ACS data was used for all 
information, including population and race. Also, the 
2005-2009 ACS data gives population estimates for census 
tract 44.02 whereas the 2010 Census reports the population 
as being zero. This discrepancy is due to tract 44.02 being 
the location of the Lafitte Housing Projects which was torn 
down in 2008 (Wulff, 2008, para 1). The population and 
race data which is reported below uses the 2010 Census 
data for tract 44.02 but for all information given the 2005-
2009 ACS estimates are used for that tract. 
Because the 2010 Census data did not include census tracts 
58 and 59, the figures reported below for the population 
counts and racial makeup of the census tracts surrounding 
the Claiborne corridor are based on the sum of the 2010 
Census data from the New Orleans Regional Planning 
                                                          
1 Census tract numbers: 34, 39, 40, 44.01, 44.02, 48, 49, 
58, 59, and 60. 
commission plus the 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey estimates for tracts 58 and 59. The total population 
in the area is approximately 10,916 people. The racial 
makeup of the area is approximately 73% Black, 20% 
White, 2% Asian, 2% Multi-racial, and 3% other (see 
Figure 4.10). 
The area surrounding the Claiborne corridor has a fairly 
equal age distribution if only considering residents 
younger than 65 years old. Approximately 26% of 
residents are younger than 18 years old, 30% of residents 
are between 18 and 39 years old, and 35% of residents are 
between 40 and 64 years old. The percentage of people age 


























Median Age in YearsFigure 4.9: Census Tracts Surrounding the Claiborne 
Corridor/Source:  U.S. Census 2006 Reference Map 
Figure 4.11: Median Age for Census Tracts along Claiborne 
Corridor. Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American 
Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table B01002 
New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:  




Figure 4.12: Means of Transportation to Work for all 
Claiborne Corridor Residents/Source: US Census Bureau, 
2009 American Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table 
B08301 
Census, 2009a). Despite the overall age distributions being 
relatively large for residents under age 65, the median ages 
within each census tract varied greatly. The range of 
median ages are from age 13 in the now demolished 
Lafitte Housing Projects of census tract 44.02 to 
approximately age 58 in census tract 59 (U.S Census, 
2009b). The median ages for each tract are shown in 
Figure 4.11.  
Along the corridor, almost half of all households (49%) are 
householders living alone. Approximately 9% of 
households are made of unrelated people living together. 
The remaining 52% of households consist of families. 
Approximately 28% of households surrounding the 
Claiborne corridor are made of female householders and 
their families with no husband present. Approximately 
13% of households are made of married couples with their 
families, and approximately 1% of households are made of 
male householders and their families with no wife present 
(U.S Census, 2009j). 
Regarding the workers ages 16 and older who live in the 
area around the Claiborne corridor, approximately 97% of 
workers work within the New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. Furthermore, approximately 
88% of workers from this Claiborne area work in New 
Orleans itself (U.S Census, 2009d). Of these workers who 
commute, approximately 63% of them will leave home to 
go to work between 6:00 A.M and 8:30 A.M (U.S Census, 
2009h). The majority of workers who live in the area 
(approximately 74%) will take less than 30 minutes to get 
to their jobs (U.S Census, 2009i), and the majority of 
people (approximately 57%) drive to work in a personal 
automobile, whether alone or in a carpool (U.S Census, 
2009g). For the remaining workers, approximately 19% 
take public transportation, approximately 14% walk, 
approximately 3% take a taxicab, and approximately 2% 
ride their bicycle (U.S Census, 2009g). The data regarding 
the modal split for workers is shown in Figure 4.12. 
As noted above, only about 19% of workers who reside in 
the Claiborne corridor take public transit to work. 
However, public transit riders make up 45% of the 
commuters who take longer than thirty minutes to get to 
work and are overrepresented among those with relatively 
long commutes. In contrast, people who drive to work 
(whether alone or in a carpool) make up about 58% of all 
commuters from the area but only constitute approximately 
48% of workers who take longer than 30 minutes to get to 
work. Similarly, people who take a taxicab, walk, or use a 
bicycle to travel to work make up about 22% of all 
commuters but represent only about 7% of the commuters 
who take longer than 30 minutes to get to work (U.S 
Census, 2009k). The burden of long commute times is 
spead unevenly across the population in the Claiborne 
corridor. Riders of public transit make up a 
disproportionately high amount of the the people who have 
long commutes while automobile and other non-public 
transit riders make up a disproportionately low amount of 
the workers with long commutes.  
In addition to having long commutes, public transportation 
users often face other difficulties. For workers from the 
area surrounding the Claiborne corridor, approximately 
80% of people who commute to work via public transit 
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public transit riders make more than $50,000 a year (U.S 
Census, 2009e). While relatively low incomes are not 
unique to workers who ride transit—84%, 71%, and 45% 
of walkers, taxicab and bicycle, and automobile 
commuters, respectively, earned less than $25,000 per 
year—public transit users face the double burden of low 
income and long commute times (U.S Census, 2009e). The 
wealthiest commuters are automobile commuters since 
approximately 95% of commuters who earn more than 
$50,000 commute by automobile, whether alone or in a 
carpool (U.S Census, 2009e). 
While public transit commuters from the areas around the 
Claiborne corridor tend to have longer commute times and 
have lower incomes than commuters who use other 
transportation modes, public transit users are not 
completely without choice. Approximately 83% of all 
workers age 16 and older who live in a household have 
access to an automobile, and approximately 25% of all 
public transit commuters have one vehicle available to 
them (U.S Census, 2009f).  
The area surrounding the Claiborne corridor is 
predominately low income: 52% of the households have an 
income less than $19,000. A full breakdown of household 
incomes in the households surrounding the Claiborne 
corridor is provided in Figure 4.13. Also 71% of the 
occupied housing units are renter occupied (U.S Census, 
2009).  
The area also has a large proportion of historic properties 
since 70% of the units were built in 1949 or earlier (U.S 
Census, 2009m). The area of the district between North 
Claiborne Avenue and North Rampart Street is subject to 
the full control of the City of New Orleans’ Historic 
District Landmarks Commission. The area above North 
Claiborne is subject only to control of demolition and 
demolition by neglect (Historic District Landmarks 
Commission, 2011). This can create administrative hurdles 
in renovating or building new units due to historic 
preservation rules. It would also create added renovation 
costs to the property owners and limit their development 
potential. At the same time, the number of historic units 
would create a unique neighborhood along the corridor and 
would bring support from preservation groups in 
revitalizing the corridor. Figure 4.14 presents an overview 
of the time period in which housing units in the Claiborne 
corridor area were built.  
With respect to the residents, 28% of the residents over 3 
years old are enrolled in school. The rate for females is 













Figure 4.13: Household Income for Claiborne Corridor 
Residents/Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American 
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Figure 4.14: Date of construction for Claiborne Corridor 
housing/Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American 
Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table B19013  
 
 
Figure 4.15 Level of Education Attained for Claiborne 
Corridor housing/Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American 
Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table B19013  
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those who are enrolled in schools, 89% are enrolled in 
public school (U.S Census, 2009k). These facts are 
important in order to see which investments can have a 
greater effect to the residents. In this case, programs in 
public schools must be considered to strengthen the 
benefits to the residents. 32% percent of the residents have 
obtained a high school degree or equivalent. And 20% 
have obtained some college education but not a college 
degree. Any plan for revitalization of the corridor must 
include jobs that match the skills of the residents. A 
disaggregated view of educational attainment is given in 
Figure 4.15. 
Comparing Expressway-Adjacent and 
Non-Adjacent Tracts 
The aim of this section is to compare automobile 
ownership and commuting patterns of census tracts 
adjacent to the Claiborne Expressway to the remaining 
non-adjacent census tracts in New Orleans. 
Data from Tables B08141 and B08301 of the 2005-2009 
American Community Surveys show a distinct difference 
between residents living in census tracts adjacent to the  
expressway and residents residing elsewhere in New 
Orleans. Upon isolating the adjacent census tracts from the 
rest of New Orleans’ census tracts, it becomes apparent 
that residents of the adjacent census blocks are much less 
likely than other New Orleanians to own an automobile or 
to commute to work by automobile.     
Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 below show the differences in 
vehicle ownership and means of transportation to work. 
 
 
Some points of interest are: 
 Approximately 27% of residents in adjacent census 
tracts do not have any vehicles available, a rate over 
three times that of non-adjacent tracts. 
 Non-adjacent residents are three times more likely to 
have three or more cars per household than adjacent 
residents.   
 Adjacent residents are about 20% less likely to 
commute to work by automobile than other non-
adjacent residents. This means they are more 
dependent on transit, bicycling, and walking. 
 Adjacent residents commute by public transit at rates 
twice that of non-adjacent residents  
 Adjacent residents commute by walking at rates at 
rates three times that of non-adjacent residents. 
 Commuting by bicycle is similar for both groups of 
residents. This is strange considering the high levels 
of other forms of non-motorized transportation for 
adjacent residents.  
 
     Vehicles Available per Household 
  
 
0 1 2 3 or more 
Adjacent Census Blocks, Aggregate 27.15% 42.85% 23.98% 6.03% 
Non-Adjacent Census Tracts, Aggregate 8.88% 33.74% 39.22% 18.16% 
            
Figure 4.16: Vehicle Ownership Rates, New Orleans, 2005-2009/Source:  US Census Bureau, 2009 American Community 











Bicycle Walked Other 
Worked at 
home 
Adjacent Census Blocks, Aggregate 59.6% 19.1% 1.9% 14.4% 1.9% 3.0% 
Non-Adjacent Census Tracts, 
Aggregate 81.3% 7.9% 1.4% 4.8% 1.1% 3.5% 
                
Note:  Automobile includes motorcycles and taxicabs 
Figure 4.17: Means of Transportation to Work, New Orleans, 2005-2009/Source:  US Census Bureau, 2009 American 
Community Survey, 5-year Estimates, Table B08301 
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5.1 Introduction  
This chapter identifies and describes concerns elicited during interviews with a variety of stakeholders affected by the proposal 
to remove and redevelop the Claiborne Expressway. A brief methodology explains our research design for this section. Upon 
analysis of interview responses, several reoccurring themes emerged. The sections that follow outline these primary themes and 
describe differences among interviewee responses.  The most noted theme of economic impacts includes how the project would 
affect the planned medical district, fears of gentrification of the greater Tremé area, the costs of removal and construction, and 
traffic impacts. The final section details concerns related to the larger social and cultural impacts of the project on local 
neighborhoods, the greater New Orleans area, and the region. 
5.2 Methodology  
Stakeholder interviews were conducted from March 29th through April 21st, 2011.  Our study group identified key individuals 
from the public, non-profit, and private sectors, who represent a range of interests involved in the proposal to remove and 
redevelop the Claiborne Expressway. Interview requests were made by phone and through email. Some stakeholders who were 
identified either were unreachable or unable to complete the interview. Twenty-five stakeholder interviews were completed. 
For a complete list of stakeholder names and affiliations, see Appendix G. Individual team members conducted stakeholder 
interviews in person, over the phone, or via email. Each interview took between 20 minutes to one hour to complete.   
The first question of the interview addressed the stakeholder’s role in the community and his or her interest in the Claiborne 
redevelopment project. Afterward, each stakeholder was asked to explain his or her thoughts and opinions regarding the 
following questions: 
 Do(es) you/your group support or oppose the freeway 
removal project? 
 Assuming the highway were removed and replaced with an 
at-grade boulevard, how would the removal affect your 
community/interests? 
 Who would you say champions the Expressway’s removal? 
 Who would you say are the major opponents of removal? 
 Do you think there are viable alternative routes to take other 
than the current Claiborne Expressway? 
 Would you consider public transit, bicycling or walking as 
real alternatives to driving along Claiborne Avenue? 
 If the proposal went through, what redevelopment efforts 
would you expect? 
 Do you or your community feel that the redevelopment 
project would accomplish those expectations? 
 
 
Interviewees provided personal opinions, recommendations, and 
thoughts on the removal and redevelopment of the Claiborne 
Expressway.  The results of these interviews are documented along 
the next sections of this chapter. 
  
I would expect to see family businesses 
return to the area. We would see varied 
services pop up along the avenue from a 
farmer's market and outdoor cafes to movie 
theaters and funeral homes. It would turn 
into a livable, walkable community where 
people could find a variety of services and, 
behind that, housing. I am thinking of the 
Embarcadero area in San Francisco where 
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5.3 Economic Impact 
Proponents and opponents alike anticipate significant 
economic impacts arising from the expressway removal. 
Observers on both sides of the debate often point to the 
decimation of Tremé’s residential and commercial fabric 
in the wake of the expressway’s construction. Some see in 
its removal the potential for making the businesses along 
the Claiborne corridor more visible and accessible to the 
traffic passing by. A long-time Tremé restaurant owner, 
for example, believes removing the expressway will result 
in more traffic from vehicles and pedestrians to his 
business and others along Claiborne Avenue.  
Leo Jackson, owner of Jackson Quality Used Cars, at 
Orleans and Claiborne, shares the belief that added car 
traffic in the area would help boost his sales. Although he 
believes most in his neighborhood are against the proposal, 
he said competent planning leadership and input from the 
community would help address concerns. 
A long-time Tremé restaurant owner, for example, believes 
removing the expressway will result in more traffic from 
vehicles and pedestrians to his business and others along 
Claiborne Avenue. 
Many interviewees predict significant new interest 
following the expressway removal in the property in and 
around the corridor, a section of the city now riddled with 
blight and vacancies. They envision new neighborhood 
retail amenities being attracted to the area, notable among 
them, a grocery store. 
Keith Scarmuzza, a landscape architect who lives in the 
Tremé neighborhood, points to the various commercial 
corridors in the vicinity of Claiborne Avenue that, in 
addition to the avenue itself, could benefit from the 
expressway removal. These include St. Bernard, Tulane 
and Orleans Avenues as well as Canal Street.  
“Since the expressway was put in, these commercial areas 
have become stagnant,” Scarmuzza said. “Right now, the 
downtown economy stops at Claiborne.” Should the 
expressway be removed, “they will become economically 
viable … like they once were.” 
He specifically points to St. Bernard Avenue as a historic 
commercial corridor that could flourish again if the 
expressway were removed. Although there is some 
commercial activity along the corridor now, “it would 
experience a rebirth if the expressway was gone,” he said. 
Kurt Weigle, president of the Downtown Development 
District, considers fallow properties between Crozat and 
Claiborne, now occupied by parking lots and abandoned 
buildings, especially ripe for redevelopment. Additionally, 
there is potential for redevelopment on land now occupied 
by expressway infrastructure.    
Residential development could also be substantial. 
Expressway removal proponents Bill Borah and James 
McNamara both recall the Lower Garden District’s 
comeback after the Camp Street up-ramp to the 
Pontchartrain Expressway was removed in the 1970s. That 
area now comprises prime New Orleans real estate.  
Weigle predicts the removal of the Claiborne Expressway 
could spur new interest in the old Charity Hospital 
building on Canal Street, a roughly 1 million square foot 
structure that sits vacant, and that he envisions potentially 
becoming a mixed-use residential and retail space that 
houses doctors, medical residents and students working in 
the area. 
But Jim Coningsby, director of Phoenix New Orleans 
(PNOLA), a nonprofit that provides rebuilding assistance 
to those affected by Hurricane Katrina, takes a more 
ambivalent view of the project. He cautioned that it may 
prove beneficial to the area, but worried that it could also 
go horribly wrong.  
“New Orleans has a lot of big dream developments that 
turn into nothing regularly: film studio, computer chip 
factory,” Coningsby said. “ … They could do something 
really special, but they will probably just turn it all into 
parking lots.”  
The following subsections relate to more specific 
economic effects anticipated from the project. These 
include the potential impacts on the new medical district 
and gentrification along with the affiliated removal and 
reconstruction costs.   
Medical District 
Weigle, whose district runs from Iberville to the 
Pontchartrain Expressway and from the river to Claiborne, 
believes the expressway removal would eliminate a 
physical and psychological barrier now dividing two 
otherwise similar sections of downtown. Furthermore, he 
believes it would help boost businesses on the riverside of 
the existing expressway, especially in light of the new 
medical district taking shape on the lakeside of Claiborne.  
“What we want is access to the 7,000 people in the 
medical district who can shop downtown, live downtown, 
and walk to work,” Weigle said. “If we make it a simple 
stroll to that part of Canal Street (on the river side of 
Claiborne) or other parts of downtown, I think it would 
support a lot more residential and retail along that area. It’s 
a few blocks’ walk, but right now it seems as if it’s on the 
other side of the moon.” 
Gentrification Fears 
While proponents argue that new development will 
translate to more amenities for residents, more business for 
existing outlets and increased tax revenue for the city, 
some worry that the expressway removal project will 
generate so much interest in the corridor that the existing 
low-income residents will be priced out. 
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Coningsby is among them. He believes others in the 
neighborhood will likely view the project through a 
negative lens. “I suspect most of the neighborhood would 
be suspicious,” he said. “When the overpass was first built, 
it tore much of lower Mid City and Tremé apart, and most 
people feel it was a racially-motivated decision to build it 
there to begin with.”  
Noting the displacement already occurring in Mid City in 
anticipation of the new LSU/VA medical complex, he said 
the expressway-removal project could provide yet another 
disruption to the area.   
Jeff Schwartz, an urban planner who favors the 
expressway removal, points to mechanisms available that 
can minimize the negative effects of rising property values 
on existing residents. These include options such as the 
creation of a land trust to assist those who don’t own their 
homes. 
Removal costs  
The relatively lower cost of tearing down the expressway 
as compared with maintaining it was another factor cited 
by proponents. They assert that it would be far less 
expensive to remove the expressway and construct a 
boulevard in its place than it would be to maintain the 
structure, which is nearing the end of its life span and will 
soon be in need of repair. “Why conduct a costly highway 
project that we know disrupted the surrounding 
neighborhoods … when we could build a good thing where 
a bad thing used to be?” said Patty Gay, director of the 
Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans.   
Some, however, question the validity of these price 
estimates and caution that further analysis is necessary to 
determine actual costs. Furthermore, as Weigle points out, 
whatever investment is required to take down the 
expressway is money that cannot be used toward another 
public project. Weigle additionally notes that the 
deconstruction of the expressway and construction of a 
surface-level boulevard could prove lucrative for area 
construction companies, but that it could also provide a 
substantial disruption for existing businesses in and around 
the project’s vicinity.  
One Tremé resident worries that the few existing small 
businesses along the Claiborne corridor would be 
especially vulnerable to business disruptions while 
Claiborne is removed.   
5.4 Commuter Impacts 
Removing the expressway would inevitably alter traffic 
flow. Some interviewees suggest that the resulting traffic 
patterns would be an improvement over existing 
conditions. For example, Borah argues that boulevards 
generally work very efficiently in terms of moving traffic. 
If a primary route is clogged, drivers may choose from 
numerous alternatives, something far more difficult on a 
limited-access interstate, he said. The grid pattern in place 
elsewhere in the city, he added, has served New Orleans 
well in terms of traffic flow.  
Some predict that removing the expressway would 
increase commuting times. An elected official interviewed 
pointed to congestion already plaguing the corridor. He 
believes removing the expressway would exacerbate the 
problem.  
Nick Malcovich lives Uptown but drives daily to the 
ammunition manufacturing facility he owns near the 
Stennis Space Center in Bay St. Louis.  He worries that 
even a ten-minute extension of his 51-minute, one-way 
commute would become annoying. “It increases the whole 
concept of randomness that doesn’t exist on the freeway,” 
Malcovich said, noting the possibility of a second line – or 
a shooting – disrupting flow on the grade-level avenue. 
“Randomness in commuting,” he said, “is never good.”  
 Mehdi Qalbani, a Tremé resident and psychiatrist who 
frequently commutes to work on the West Bank using the 
expressway, on the other hand, would welcome a longer 
drive in exchange for the expressway’s removal. “I’d have 
a longer commute for a better life,” he said. He added that 
rejuvenating the core of the city should be foremost in 
planners’ minds, even if it means adding to the commute 
times of those living outside the center of the city.  
Valuing the redevelopment of the city core over other 
neighborhoods angers some residents of New Orleans 
East, who see in the interest surrounding the removal 
project evidence that their neighborhood is being written 
off.   
“People don’t understand the economic value of New 
Orleans East to New Orleans,” said a vocal project 
opponent who lives in New Orleans East. Those involved 
in the commercial sector of the East, which serves as a 
major economic engine to the entire city, agree that their 
success is tied to the Claiborne Expressway, the woman 
said. She further asserts that removing the expressway 
would have a tremendous negative impact especially on 
“It’s a mistake to build any expressway in any 
city.  Highways should have been limited to the 
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 “The multi-layer opposition this community 
faces has worked in concert with the 
overpass to cripple entrepreneurship, 
development, and political and economic 
power.” Emily Danielson  
 
“Don’t let them tear it down, young man.” 
Tremé resident of 30 years  
the industrial companies that move their products between 
eastern New Orleans and the port.  
Another New Orleans East resident who commutes to her 
corner shop job near Esplanade and Claiborne cringes at 
the concept of the expressway removal. “With the bridge, 
traffic is heavy,” she said. “Without the bridge it could 
only get worse.”  
Another resident of eastern New Orleans, on the other 
hand, said she would support the removal project, but 
would like to see it done in conjunction with improved 
transit between downtown and her neighborhood.  
5.5 Social and Cultural Impacts 
Longtime Tremé residents and business owners recall a 
time when the oak-lined Claiborne Avenue neutral ground 
was a prime community gathering spot. As the owner of a 
40-year-old Claiborne Avenue business remembers it, prior 
to 1965, families gathered there every Sunday for 
barbecues. End-of-weekend festivities continued into the 
evenings, when music could be heard trickling out of 
neighborhood bars. 
These days, the business owner closes up shop around 6:30 
every night to avoid what he describes as the criminal 
element that now menaces the area. The neighborhood 
surrounding his establishment, he said, is riddled with drug 
dealing, guns, and violence.  
Some, including City Councilwoman Cynthia Hedge-
Morrell, suggest the full potential of the Tremé 
neighborhood will not be realized so long as the 
expressway remains.  
Removing the expressway would make for a more livable, 
pedestrian-friendly neighborhood, said Maggie Tishman, 
special programs developer for Providence Community 
Housing, which is working to redevelop the Lafitte 
Housing Project. The expressway’s teardown could create 
new space for community gatherings, encourage more 
bicycling and walking and open up space for new transit 
service, Tishman said.   
Qalbani agrees. “I think it would make the neighborhood 
more of a neighborhood,” he said, pointing to nearby 
Esplanade Avenue as a model for what Claiborne could 
become. He hopes the removal will allow in particular for 
the resuscitation of the shuttered Claiborne Avenue Circle 
Foods Store.  
But a Tremé restaurant owner is not convinced removing 
the expressway will translate to safer streets or a more 
cohesive neighborhood. The problem, he believes, lies in 
modern culture and not the expressway. It will take time, 
he said, to resuscitate the strength of community that once 
existed along the corridor. Others echoed this sentiment. 
As Weigle put it, removing the expressway alone will not 
“heal the wounds” of the neighborhood.  
Emily Danielson, a Tremé resident, is involved in 
researching and organizing around social justice issues 
related to the expressway. Although she fully supports the 
expressway removal, she believes certain externalities need 
to be accounted for in order to make the project a complete 
success.  
“If the overpass is taken down without any other programs 
or assistance, I doubt the street will become what it once 
was – a relatively safe, vibrant business and meeting 
space,” Danielson said. “The multi-layer opposition this 
community faces has worked in concert with the overpass 
to cripple entrepreneurship, development, and political and 
economic power. If the overpass is deconstructed and the 
street does not quickly represent its historical stature, the 
fault will be placed on Tremé/7th Ward and the black 
community of New Orleans.”  
Meanwhile, among some residents of the predominantly 
black neighborhood of eastern New Orleans, there is a 
sense that removing the expressway would perpetuate 
another injustice, this time at their expense. “Do two 
wrongs make a right?” one resident asked.   
Even in Tremé, not everyone is convinced of the merits of 
the removal project. Some grew up knowing the 
expressway as a community centerpiece – a place often 
used as a practice venue for brass bands, among other 
purposes. They worry ripping out the expressway will 
mark yet another wound inflicted on their neighborhood. 
One resident noted that there are no guarantees that 
removing the expressway would make Claiborne what it 
once was.  
“That’s our area,” said a Tremé resident of 30 years, found 
sitting on a porch in the neighborhood with his son. 
“That’s our shelter from the heat. If they rip that out, they 
rip out our community spot.”  
 “We grew up barbecuing there all the time,” his son 
interjected. “It seemed like every weekend we were 
grilling out.”  
Schwartz, meantime, points to various means of integrating 
the new ways in which the expressway is used by the 
neighborhood into the design of a surface-level roadway. 
He cited as an example a proposal for turning elements of 
the old expressway structure into a music-performance 
venue.   
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5.6 Topics for Further Study 
New Orleans residents recall a Claiborne Avenue of 50 
years ago that was a community-oriented street in a 
minority-dominated area. The street and neutral grounds 
were used for residential and commercial gatherings 
central to neighborhood and city bonds. Soon after, a 
federal expressway eviscerated the landscape. 
Removing the Claiborne Expressway is frequently held up 
as a project that would reverse an injustice imposed on 
Tremé decades ago and in the process help reinvigorate a 
historic section of the city experiencing a resurgence in 
public interest. This interest has been spurred in part by 
growing demand for downtown living and the introduction 
of the eponymous HBO television show.  
Proponents say the project would benefit the 
neighborhoods in its immediate vicinity by catalyzing 
business development, attracting new amenities, and 
helping to reduce the blight and crime that now plague the 
area. Given careful thought and strategic investment, the 
area has the potential to become socially and economically 
revitalized, they argue.  
Opponents, including some commuters from Uptown and 
New Orleans East worry about negative traffic 
consequence stemming from the removal.  The uncertain 
cost of the project and skepticism about the plan’s benefits 
are two other sources of concern.  
Several interviewees were uncomfortable taking a stand on 
either side of the expressway debate, citing a need for 
more information and further analysis of the project’s 
implications.  
The interviews themselves lead to further questions: How 
much inconvenience will commuters tolerate? How 
informed is the public about the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of the proposal? How substantially do these 
opinions vary by neighborhood? Additional studies are 
needed to address these topics before New Orleans 
residents can make an informed decision. 
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6.1 Methodology 
To better understand the community’s opinions regarding the future of the Claiborne Avenue corridor, a public survey was 
conducted. Given time and funding constraints, this survey was distributed and completed over the Internet. The limitations of 
this approach include the inability to capture responses from populations without regular Internet access and a low-likelihood 
that survey respondents reflect the same 
demographics of the city’s population.     
The questionnaire was distributed using 
Qualtrics, an online survey response 
tool. This tool, hosted through the 
University of New Orleans, allowed for 
respondents to fill in responses from any 
computer with an Internet connection. 
Survey respondents were sought using a 
variety of paths: 1) advertising the 
survey online, 2) directly soliciting local 
stakeholder organizations, and 3) 
directly soliciting people. Appendix H 
contains a full list of stakeholder groups 
sought out for survey responses.  The 
program included a feature that would 
not allow any computer to submit more 
than one response. This prevented 
“stuffing the ballot box.”  
 









Male 50.6 47 
Female 48.3 53 
Race 
White 87 32 
African American or Black 11 63 
American Indian and Alaska Native 2 0.2 
Asian 2 2.8 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific  
Islander 
0 0.1 
Some other race 0 1.1 
Ethnicity Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 5 4.3 
Education 
High school graduate or higher 100 82 
Bachelor's degree or higher 85 29 
Figure 6.1: Survey respondents by Zip Code 
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6.2 Demographics of 
Respondents 
Gender & Age 
The survey obtained 829 respondents over the age of 
20, with an almost even divide amongst males and 
females. The total number of respondents that 
completed the survey was 836.  For the most part, 
age distribution was normal, with the most common 
age bracket being age 25-29, accounting for 26% of 
respondents. The median age for our survey sample was 
34.3 years old, as compared to Orleans Parish’s median 
age of 36.7 years old. 
Race & Ethnicity 
Looking at racial composition, 87% of respondents 
identified themselves to be white, 11% identified 
themselves as African American or Black, and 4% 
identified themselves with a race other than these two. 
People were allowed to self-identify themselves with more 
than one race, but less than 1% did so. Looking at 
ethnicity, 5% percent identified themselves as to be 
Hispanic/Latino.  
Education Level 
The survey shows that respondents were well-educated 
with 42% holding a Bachelors degree, while 43% held a 
Masters or professional degree, for a total of 85% holding 
college degrees. 
Income 
Describing the average income of survey respondents 
proved difficult, as respondents fell into a clear bimodal 
distribution between two income brackets: $100,000 or 
more per year and between $30,000- $49,999 per year. The 
higher earning bracket certainly aligns with the higher 
educational attainment described earlier. Perhaps the 
strong response numbers from $30,000 - $59,999 earners 
can be aligned with the distribution method, as these 
respondents may represent the student and young 
professional population most likely to complete the survey.  
In addition, the median household income for the sample 
surveyed was of $60,793, which represents almost twice as 
much as the Orleans Parish’s median household income of 
$36,258.
6.3 Key Findings 
Usage of Claiborne Corridor 
Survey respondents use the corridor with varying 
frequency. Comparisons of usage between the interstate 
and street level portions shows respondents use the 
interstate slightly more (see Figure 6.1).  
Current perception and usage of 
neighborhood 
When provided a map of the five block area around the 
corridor, survey respondents overwhelmingly disagreed 
that the corridor area was safe and inviting, possessed 
attractive community facilities, and provided parks and 
open space.  
The majority of survey respondents did not live, work, or 
have family that lived within the corridor study area. 
Respondents were also asked if they shopped at stores, ate 
at restaurants, or drank at bars in the study area. Again 
respondents overwhelmingly did not use the area 
frequently, with a majority responding that they rarely or 
never spent money in the area in these capacities (see 
Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4). 
Table 6.2: Demographics Comparison between Survey Sample and and 
Orleans Parish 
  Survey Responses Orleans Parish 
Median Age  34.3 36.7 
Median household 
income* $60,763 $36,258 
*In 2009 inflation-adjusted dollars 
Figure 6.1: Survey Respondents Usage of Corridor Infrastructure 
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Opinions Regarding 
Expressway Removal & 
Future Revitalization 
The survey revealed that 57% of respondents 
support the removal of the expressway and 
17% oppose the removal (see Figure 6.5). 
Meanwhile, 21% are uncertain about the 
removal, and 6% are indifferent about the 
removal. Certainly if the removal project 
moves forward, more public education and 
additional analysis will be necessary as 21% of 
respondents expressed uncertainty. When 
asked how the removal of the expressway 
would change the corridor study area, 82% of 
respondents thought “it would be a change for 
the better.” Respondents appear to largely 
agree that the removal would improve the 
neighborhood in some way, but there are concerns 
associated with the change the removal might bring. As 
Table 6.3 shows, respondents agreed that property values 
would increase as a result of the removal. However, 
respondents did not agree that this property value increase 
would result in fewer housing options for low-income 
residents; in fact, more respondents disagreed than agreed. 
Similarly, respondents did not agree if the removal of the 
expressway would produce significant traffic delays 
elsewhere in the city. In fact, most respondents either 
disagreed or somewhat disagreed that the expressway 
removal would increase their commute by 1 to 10 minutes 
(47%) or more than 10 minutes (52%) (see Table 6.4).    
 
As Table 6.5 shows, opinions on the revitalization effects 
produced by the expressway removal are diverse. 
Respondents agree most strongly that revitalization in the 
Treme and 7th Ward neighborhoods will be aided by the 
expressway’s removal; however, respondents appear to 
believe in revitalization effects for several neighborhoods 
(including the CBD, Tulane-Gravier, and Iberville) 
surrounding the study area. The survey attempted to 
measure the demand for particular types of infrastructure 
necessary for the successful revitalization of the Claiborne 
Avenue corridor. Survey takers found certain infrastructure 
very important: sidewalks (87%), public parks and 
greenways (68%), bicycle lanes (67%), and a wide neutral 
ground with trees (63%). Interestingly enough, only 36% 
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Figure 6.2: Survey Respondent’s Perception of Community Attributes 
Figure 6.4: Survey Respondents Usage of Corridor Study Area 
Figure 6.3: Survey Respondents Consumption in Corridor 
Study Area 
Figure 6.5: Survey Respondents Favorability of Freeway Removal 
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Table 6.3: Removal of the expressway will… 





Don't Know / 
No opinion 
Result in higher property 
values in the area 46% 29% 4% 9% 12% 
Result in fewer housing 
options for low-income 
residents 11% 20% 20% 27% 23% 
Create significant traffic 
delays elsewhere in the city 21% 22% 18% 21% 18% 
Table 6.4: I am concerned that the removal of the Claiborne Expressway will increase my 
commute… 






/ No opinion 
10 minutes or more 19% 14% 8% 44% 15% 
1 - 10 minutes 16% 22% 6% 41% 16% 
Table 6.5: The removal of the Claiborne Expressway will help revitalize… 





Don't Know / 
No opinion 
Downtown New Orleans (the 
Central Business District) 38% 26% 8% 16% 11% 
French Quarter 27% 24% 15% 22% 12% 
Treme 51% 24% 5% 11% 9% 
7th Ward 45% 25% 5% 12% 13% 
Tulane-Gravier 41% 26% 7% 13% 13% 
Iberville Public Housing 39% 24% 8% 15% 13% 
     
Table 6.6: How important are the following elements to the 
successful revitalization of the corridor? 






Bike lanes 67% 25% 8% 
Sidewalks 87% 11% 2% 
Light rail / streetcar 56% 34% 10% 
Wide neutral ground with trees 63% 27% 10% 
Public parks and green space 68% 28% 5% 
Public art 40% 37% 24% 
Parking 36% 42% 21% 
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6.4 Examination of Key Findings 
A crosstabs analysis allows for a more detailed analysis of 
how particular subsets of survey respondents feel about the 
proposed freeway removal. The following section 
highlights several key findings and isolates characteristics 
of particular respondents such as where they work, live, 
and travel.  
When asked the level of support for removal of the 
expressway, a majority of respondents stated support for 
the project, regardless of their frequency of use of the 
Claiborne Expressway (see Table 6.7). However, among 
those respondents who stated that they use the expressway 
4-5 days per week (likely to be commuters), 28% of them 
were opposed to removal, 18% were uncertain, and 50% 
were in support. Those who use the expressway 6 or more 
days per week had a slightly lower level of support as the 
previous group (48%) and the same level of opposition 
(28%).  
Among respondents that claimed to live within 5 blocks 
the expressway (9% of the respondents), a strong majority 
(80%) are in favor of the removal (see Table 6.8). 
However, drawing conclusions as to actual neighborhood 
opinions will require additional survey work involving 
neighborhood canvassing instead of electronic surveys 
given the lack of response from residents in this area. 
Meanwhile, for respondents claiming to work within five 
blocks of the expressway (18% of the respondents), a 
smaller majority (59%) were in favor of removal. Only 
15% of workers in the immediate area stated removal 
opposition, while less than 20% of workers in the 
immediate area were uncertain of removal (17%). 
The survey also attempted to illuminate respondent’s 
primary concerns with potential removal. Respondents 
were asked to select as many concerns among the 
following options: “Longer Commute Time, Additional 
Traffic in the Neighborhood, or Gentrification.” Also, a 
fourth option allowing respondents to fill in other concerns 
was available. Among completed surveys, 168 respondents 
left additional concerns, which could be summed up, in 
nine major categories.  
The top three categories people expressed concern relate to 
traffic. These were “Longer Commute,” “Increased Traffic 
Near Expressway,” and “Heavy Traffic in Other Areas of 
the City.” Other frequently expressed concerns were 
gentrification, general impacts on neighborhood, and 
general concern with the project (see Table 6.9).
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Table 6.9: Concerns Regarding The Removal of the Claiborne Expressway 
  # Concerned 
Longer Commute Time 106 
Increased Traffic in Area Near Expressway 80 
Heavy Traffic in Other Areas of the City 47 
Gentrification 27 
Other Impacts on Neighborhood Near Expressway 27 
Too Great a Cost/ Where is Source of Funding 25 
New Project Must be Safe for Pedestrians and Bicyclists 13 
Removal Would Hinder Hurricane Evacuation 8 
Too Much Existing Crime in the Area 7 
Negative Economic Impacts on New Orleans 7 
Confusion of What Project Entails 7 
General Concern 27 
 
Table 6.7: Level of Support For Removal of The Claiborne Expressway Based On Frequency of 
Use. 
  
Support Removal of 
The Expressway 
Oppose Removal of 
The Expressway 
Indifferent About 
Removal of The 
Expressway 
Uncertain 
6 or more days 
per week 
48% 28% 5% 18% 
4 - 5 days per 
week 
50% 28% 4% 18% 
2 - 3 days per 
week 
51% 22% 4% 23% 
Once a week 58% 11% 8% 23% 
2 - 3 days per 
month 
63% 8% 7% 21% 
About once a 
month 
59% 13% 5% 23% 
Less often than 
once a month 
65% 9% 5% 21% 
Never 77% 4% 8% 12% 
Table 6.8: Level of Support For Removal of The Claiborne Expressway in Those 









Removal of The 
Expressway 
Uncertain 
Live Within 5 
Blocks of 
Expressway 
80% 9% 4% 7% 
Work Within 5 
Blocks of 
Expressway 
59% 15% 9% 17% 
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This section summarizes key findings developed during the course of this project’s background research, examination of best 
practices from other cities, stakeholder interviews, and survey efforts, and it evaluates the implications of these findings within 
the context of the proposed removal of the Claiborne Avenue Expressway. It also provides recommendations for future 
research as the City of New Orleans moves forward with its feasibility study on removing the expressway.  
7.2 Transportation Implications 
Traffic Impacts 
A full analysis of the proposed removal’s traffic impacts is 
critical. Opponents of the expressway removal perceive 
that the project will increase traffic congestion and 
commute times. Stakeholder interviews show that some 
people feel these detrimental effects will be substantial and 
prohibitive. However, only 33% of survey respondents felt 
that removal would result in commute time increases of 10 
minutes or more.  Conversely, proponents of the removal 
believe that traffic flows will actually improve if the 
expressway is removed. They pointed to benefits such as 
drivers being allowed to make full use of the street grid if 
Claiborne Avenue itself is congested. For the 
redevelopment of Claiborne Avenue to move forward, it 
must be demonstrated that traffic flow will not be 
adversely impacted.  Future traffic studies for the removal 
of the expressway should inventory nearby road facilities.  
For example, parallel roads such as N. Galvez, N. 
Rampart, N. Miro, N. Broad, and Basin Streets should be 
analyzed for capacity and quality in order to promote 
maximum efficiency of the grid network. 
Some of the expressway removal case studies in this 
report, like that of the Central Freeway in San Francisco, 
illustrate the concept of induced demand. In such 
scenarios, induced demand was created by the construction 
and/or expansion of expressways. However, as the case 
studies demonstrate, when replaced with a surface street, 
traffic congestion does not necessarily follow; lower 
surface street capacities do lower traffic volume, but do 
not negatively impact traffic flow. This phenomenon 
should be considered in any traffic studies conducted. 
Transit and Complete Streets Policy 
Highway redevelopment provides an opportunity for the 
construction of landscaped boulevards, multimodal 
facilities including infrastructure for active modes of 
transportation and transit, and infill development.  
Throughout the planning for the possible removal of the 
Claiborne Avenue Expressway, care should be taken to 
ensure that transit service in the corridor is maintained or 
improved during and after construction, minimizing impact 
to transit users and encouraging a greater proportion of the 
future corridor’s users to utilize transit.  
 
Failure to leverage public investment in this project—and 
in the RTA’s streetcar expansion program—by 
concurrently planning for transit enhancements, which 
facilitate transit use, would be a missed opportunity. These 
transit improvements may be immediate, such as the 
development of bus rapid transit (BRT) along the corridor, 
or may include redesigning the median in such a way as to 
accomodate the potential restoration of fixed-rail, such as 
streetcar or light rail in the future.  
In addition, the redevelopment of Claiborne Avenue 
should fully align with the state’s Complete Streets policy 
and include enhanced bike and pedestrian facilities. 87% 
of survey respondents found the provision of sidewalks to 
be very important to the revitalization of the corridor.  
Additionally, 67% of respondents found bicycle lanes to be 
very important to revitalization efforts.  
Access 
The decision to bring expressways into cities was intended 
to increase access for multiple user groups, particularly 
residents and freight. While such access may have 
contributed to the urban exodus of the mid 20th century, the 
relationship between inner-city expressways and freight 
access was not studied in this report as freight statistics 
were difficult to find.  However, freight accommodation is 
an important component of studying the impact of the 
removal of the Claiborne Expressway and should be 
included in future studies. 
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7.3 Economic Implications 
Construction Impacts 
The lengthy construction periods involved in most 
highway removal projects are a significant drawback and 
stakeholder concern, impacting nearby businesses. 
Professionals and residents alike expressed worry over the 
deconstruction of the expressway potentially harming 
existing businesses. However, measures can be taken to 
mitigate these impacts, such as pedestrian walkthroughs 
and increased signage for businesses. Construction periods 
can be minimized with careful planning to avoid mid-
project disputes and cost overruns. 
Economic Development 
Highway removal can reunite and reinvigorate 
neighborhoods - decreasing blight and crime, increasing 
pedestrian access, and attracting economic activity. 
Removal projects, like those of the San Francisco and 
Portland, have been shown to increase property values in 
the surrounding areas, thus increasing tax revenues for 
municipalities. Proponents of the expressway removal 
expect new businesses of diverse types, as well as new 
residential development to be drawn to the redeveloped 
Claiborne corridor.  
Value in terms of economic growth and development can 
be further leveraged through the development of special 
districts to encourage new development in the blighted 
blocks along and near the corridor. The city must develop 
a plan for how to maximize economic impacts of the 
project; the case studies demonstrate that building the 
infrastructure alone is not always sufficient. In particular, 
the retention and attraction of small businesses should be 
prioritized, and supported by programs providing access to 
capital for entrepreneurs as well as technical support for 
small business development. 
7.4 Community Impacts 
Neighborhood Revitalization and 
Gentrification 
Neighborhood revitalization is one of the driving 
arguments for the Claiborne Expressway removal; it is 
hoped that blighted neighborhoods now divided by the 
highway can be restored and reunited through the 
corridor’s redevelopment. The revitalization of Claiborne 
Avenue also has the potential to benefit low-income and 
working class residents through increased real estate 
wealth, economic investment, and new employment 
opportunities. 
 
However, infrastructure alone is not enough, and the city 
must ensure that the economic development impacts noted 
above genuinely benefit the affected neighborhoods and do 
not displace existing residents. There were concerns in 
most stakeholder interviews that gentrification could 
occur, harming the residents of the area.  
Some stakeholders believe that the removal would be 
harmful to the social and cultural integrity of the 
neighborhood. The area surrounding the Claiborne corridor 
is predominantly occupied by low-income households and 
is largely renter occupied. These factors must be 
considered in the expressway’s proposed removal in order 
to avoid displacement caused by higher property values 
and increased rental prices. Many others, however, believe 
that the removal has the potential to be a catalyst for 
positive change if it is supported by other programs and 
assistance to the area, such as the development of land 
trusts to ensure the continued existence of affordable 
housing.  
Coalition Building 
The removal of the expressway is consistent with goals 
identified by impacted communities during the various 
post-Katrina planning processes, as well as with the City’s 
new Master Plan. Yet, many stakeholders lack adequate 
information about the possible impacts of the expressway’s 
removal and are, therefore, uncomfortable forming an 
opinion on the issue.  21% of the surveyed respondents 
said they were uncertain about removal.  Therefore, the 
City’s upcoming feasibility study for the removal of the 
expressway and redevelopment of the area has the 
potential to have significant influence on public opinion 
through its process and findings.   
The case studies demonstrate that in order for highway 
removal projects to move forward and succeed, they must 
have the strong support of a wide cross-section of 
community members and other stakeholders. Citizen 
activism is a key component of highway removal. 
However, the identification of political champions to drive 
the redevelopment process forward and mitigate the 
political and logistical squabbles which lead to project 
delay is equally important. This may include a mayor, 
governor, or city council leaders.  The development of an 
organized coalition of project proponents to build 
community buy-in, correct misperceptions, fill public 
information gaps, and provide a strong voice for residents 
of impacted neighborhoods will be essential to the 
Claiborne Avenue redevelopment proposal’s 
implementation. 
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7.5 Recommendations for Further Research and Analysis 
The demographic make-up of the survey respondents were 
not reflective of the demographic make-up of New Orleans 
or the North Claiborne Avenue communities, and we did 
not have the time to statistically weigh the survey results 
so that they would better represent the city and 
communities which may be affected. Because the survey 
effort had over 800 respondents, the results should be 
weighted and the data should be reexamined on a weighted 
basis. 
In addition to the reexamination of our survey data, a full 
cost-benefit analysis and feasibility study of potential 
transit alternatives should be completed to provide 
communities and residents with a better understanding of 
possible alternatives to the expressway structure. This 
analysis should include, but not be limited to, streetcars, 
light rail and bus rapid transit – including both electric 
trolley buses and combustion powered vehicles, as well as 
cycling and pedestrian amenities. 
The redevelopment proposal’s possible role in ongoing 
storm water management master planning efforts should be 
considered. For example, Claiborne Avenue once had a 
canal that connected to the Bayou St. John via the 
Carondelet Canal and was used to help drain storm water 
from the surrounding neighborhoods. The reopening of 
that canal should be considered. Perhaps a water feature in 
the neutral ground with green space could complement the 
redevelopment of a boulevard along Claiborne Avenue. 
There is some skepticism of the claim that it will actually 
cost less to remove the expressway than to maintain it. 
Further studies to determine the actual costs of removing 
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1 Boston: Central Artery
1.1 History 
Boston, Massachusetts had one of the most congested 
highway systems in the United States. The primary culprit 
was an elevated highway called the Central Artery that ran 
through the center of downtown. Traffic on the Central 
Artery remained constantly jammed up with cars slowly 
lurching forward. The same problem plagued the two 
tunnels under Boston Harbor between downtown Boston 
and East Boston (Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation, 2006). In order to solve Boston's enormous 
traffic problem, a plan was constructed in the 1980s to 
build new infrastructure that was capable of handling the 
expected traffic flow. The plan was initially called the 
Central Artery Tunnel Project and later became known as 
“The Big Dig.” 
The Big Dig consisted of a series of construction projects 
reshaping the entire city. The Central Artery highway, 
consisting of six-lanes, was torn down and replaced with a 
ten-lane underground expressway directly beneath it. This 
would separate fast highway traffic from slower traffic that 
existed downtown. The vacant surface land would undergo 
beautification and have a large portion designated for 
public green space. 
The Big Dig also called for the Leonard P. Zakim Hill 
Bridge to be built. It is the world‟s largest cable-stayed 
bridge, carrying 10-lanes of traffic from the new 
underground expressway across the Charles River.  
The Big Dig also encompassed the extension of the 
Massachusetts Turn- pike I-90 to Logan Airport. To extend 
the turn pike, Ted Williams tunnel was built underneath 
Boston‟s Harbor (Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation, 2006). 
This mammoth project required countless man-hours, 
spent billions of dollars, consumed enormous amounts of 
resources, and took over a decade to complete. The Big 
Dig is truly one of the biggest, most complex projects in 
the United States. 
The Big Dig's most difficult challenge was to build the 
project in the middle of Boston without cutting off 
transportation. Special care was taken to maintain access to 
residents and businesses throughout construction. The city 
even waited until the underground expressway was 
operational before they started tearing down the existing 
highway. 
1.2 Travel Behavior Impacts 
Boston's horrendous traffic congestion created a huge 
burden on the city and its residents. Cars stuck in traffic, 
wasted fuel and emitted harmful pollutants like carbon 
dioxide into the city. Traffic congestion also meant 
more car accidents putting people's life at risk and 
draining revenue from the city (Massachusetts 
Department of Transportation, 2006). The Big Dig 
successfully fixed these problems by eliminating 
traffic congestion and by indirectly promoting 
public transit along with cycling.  
In 2004, with most of the traffic projects 
completed, Boston's Department of Transportation 
hired an independent company to assess the impact 
of the Big Dig. The study found that total Vehicle 
Miles Traveled (VMT) had risen thirteen percent 
from 1994 to 2004. This increase was expected and 
is due two factors: 1) the natural growth of traffic 
volume during this time period and 2) the slightly 
Table 1.1: Timeline for the Central Artery Project 
1985 Final Environmental Impact Statement. 
1986 Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff begins work on the design. 
1990 Congress allocates $755 million to project. 
1991 Federal Highway Administration gives final approval.  
Construction begins on Ted Williams Tunnel. 
1995 Ted Williams Tunnel opens to commercial traffic. 
1999 Overall construction 50 percent complete. 
2002 Leonard Bunker Hill bridge completed. 
2004 Dismantling of the elevated Central Artery Highway (I-93). 
2006 The Big Dig completed. 
Spectacle Island Park opens. 
2007 Restoration of Boston city streets. 
Construction of the Rose Kennedy Greenway and other parks. 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Transportation 
Figure 1.2: Construction of the Tunnel 
Figure 1.1: The Zakim Hill Bridge 
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Source: Economic Development Research Group, 2006 
Table 2.2: Changes in Volumes & Times: Central Artery 
longer mileage involved for those using the Massachusetts 
Turnpike Extension which is 0.3 miles longer than the old 
route going through the Central Artery. The study also 
found a drastic reduction in people's traveling time through 
the project area. Travel time in the project area was 
reduced on average by 62 percent, depending on the time 
of day. This means it takes people less than half the time it 
use to, to get from point A to 
point B (Massachusetts 
Department of Transportation, 
2006). 
The Big Dig created no 
infrastructure for bikes, but it 
indirectly created provisions for 
bikes through government 
mandates. In order to offset the 
carbon-dioxide emissions 
emitted from the construction of 
the Big Dig, the Federal 
Government and the 
Environmental Protection 
Agency required the City of 
Boston to curb carbon dioxide 
emissions and to increase public 
transit citywide (Ragovin, 2010). 
Immediately after the project was 
completed in 2007, the city 
started promoting cycling as a 
way to curb carbon-dioxide 
emissions. To accommodate 
cyclists, several bike racks were 
installed throughout the city, 
giving people a place to park 
their bikes. Miles of bike-only-
lanes were created, providing 
safety for cyclists by separating 
them from potentially dangerous automobiles. The city's 
efforts paid off, and there has been a huge surge in cycling. 
Although the Big Dig did not directly create this surge, it 
was the driving force behind it (Amiton, 2010). 
As part of the agreement for the Big Dig, the city increased 
the availability of public transit along with doing several 
things to promote public transportation. More light-rail 
stops have been created between existing stops and the city 
is running additional buses. Park-and-ride stations were 
constructed allowing residents to early park their cars and 
take light rail to work. New housing developments were 
built specifically around light rail stations to make light 
rail convent for people, thus encouraging ridership. Plans 
are currently underway to expand light rail services. For 
instance, the city plans on extending the Green Line by 
2014 to reach areas that house lower income 
neighborhoods. The city's effort to promote public 
transportation is working, and the Massachusetts DOT is 
seeing a gradual increase in ridership (Ragovin, 2010). 
1.3 Environmental Impacts 
The Big Dig created several positive changes to Boston's 
environment. Three-hundred acres of green space were 
created, over two-thousand trees were planted, and the 
city's carbon-dioxide emissions lowered. Boston became a 
greener city overnight. Besides these obvious 
environmental benefits, the project also helped the 
environment in less obvious ways, such as shoreline 
Figure 1.3: Spectacle Island, which was once a city dump. It is 
now a national park with miles of hiking trains.  
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restoration. Dirt removed in order to build the underground 
expressway was used to rebuild local shorelines that had 
eroded away. 
The area, where the central artery highway once stood, was 
redeveloped for people rather than automobiles. Seventy-
five percent of the new area was designated specifically for 
Boston residents in the form of parks and open space 
(Mass. DOT). This included public plazas, water fountains, 
park benches, and other amenities. The most well known 
open space is the Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway, 
which is a narrow tree lined boulevard, spanning over 
twenty-five blocks in the heart of downtown. 
1.4 Community Impacts 
The construction of the Central Artery created more 
development opportunities in Boston. Also, it has 
contributed positively in reducing travel time for residents 
traveling from south and west Boston heading to Logan 
Airport by 74 percent (International Tunneling And 
Underground Space Association [ITA], n.d.). Along with 
reducing travel time and increasing mobility, the project 
connected neighborhoods that were served by the elevated 
highway (ITA, n.d.).  
The former space that was occupied by the elevated 
highway was utilized as parks and open spaces for the 
residents of Boston. It contributed positively in connecting 
neighborhoods that were once separated by the elevated 
highway. The project introduced almost 45 parks and 
public plazas.  On the old path of the elevated highway 
from Chinatown through Wharf District and North End, a 
series of parks and fountains were introduced and are now 
knows as the Rose Kennedy Greenway (ITA, n.d.).  
During the early stages of the project, aside from the 
massive engineering difficulties, it was important to 
convince the public that this project will not harm the local 
residents. During the 1950s, the construction of the 
elevated Central Artery displaced thousands of residents. 
In the planning process of the project, it was planned that 
there will be no destruction of any family houses; 
however, a displacement of residents would affect the area 
indirectly (Goodnough, 2008). 
The increase in development opportunities would increase 
property taxes in the area, thus raising property taxes. This 
fear of gentrification was noticed in residents in areas 
adjacent to the Central Artery. Residents of the Chinatown, 
South Boston, and North End have been concerned of the 
consequences of such development as to be similar to the 
early case of gentrification in the South End after 
constructing expensive lofts and shops (Economic 
Development Research Group, 2006).  Some argue that the 
proposed 27-story residential development in Chinatown 
would impact the neighborhood‟s theme (Goodnough, 
2008).  
Along with the concerns that the increase in property 
values and taxes might price out local residents, another 
concern was foreseen. It was the concern that landowners 
might sell their lands as a result of the increase in its value 
to seek more profit. However, the city of Boston hired Ken 
Greenburg, a Canadian urban design consultant that was 
responsible to draft a future visualization of the city‟s 
future Greenway. The consultant saw the importance of 
keeping the current lifestyle and theme of the area through 
maintaining existing North End Italian atmosphere 
(Economic Development Research Group, 2006). 
As for the Greenway, it was seen as a massive open space. 
Jerold Kayden, an urban planning professor at Harvard, 
said to the New York Times that the parks have created an 
urban void (Goodnough, 2008). He adds on “It might have 
been more interesting to leave the highway intact as an 
elevated park …One would be hard-pressed to say this is a 
creative, cohesive, singular public space that will redefine 
the city of Boston…And that is too bad, when you have 
that much space” (Goodnough, 2008). 
1.5 Economic Impacts 
In 2006, after 14 years, the Big Dig was completed and its 
cost has been estimated to be $22 billion, accounting for 
interest payments on bonds, and it will not be paid off until 
2038 (Boston Globe, 2008). As stated before, this project 
was a great undertaking and cannot be easily described in 
how much steel, engineering plans, or labor it consumed.
 The most important description is the benefits this 
project brought to the Region of Boston. Since this project 
brought  
Figure 1.4: The Central Artery in the 1950s separated 
neighborhoods. Source: xtimeline.com  
Figure 1.5: Residents showing concern.  
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benefits that range from social, economic, and 
environment impacts, it is hard to extract a cost benefit 
analysis. Instead, this section of the report will only focus 
on the economic benefits of the project. The economic 
benefits will be categorized into two categories: Structural 
and Non Structural Economic Benefits. The Structural 
economic benefits are those related to real state, such as 
new development investments, wages from constructions, 
property price increases, and tax revenue from real estate. 
The non structural economic benefits are those related to 
Boston residents, such as time saved commuting and less 
fuel consumed.  
 
As of 2005, Boston holds the third highest Class A office 
rents in the country. In part, this is thanks to the Central 
Artery Project that began in 1982 (Ford, 2005). High rental 
rates increase property tax revenues and accelerate real 
estate development projects. 
The greatest economic benefit of the Big Dig was the $7.4 
billion in private investment due to new real estate 
development since 1990, shown in Table 1.4. 
This private development will translate into 
43,425 jobs as seen on the chart on the 
following page.  
These jobs will create additional indirect 
benefits, such as tax revenue from wages and 
additional economic activity to the area. Also, 
the construction of the development will add 
additional temporary jobs (Massachusetts 
Department of Transportation, 2006). 
As stated before, the Big Dig added green and 
open space to the new areas. It has been 
recorded that these additions would increase 
property value of the adjacent areas, and such 
was the case for the Central Artery Tunnel 
Project (Tajima, 2006). A study done on the 
effect of the green and open spaces 
created by the Project calculated the 
total change in property values was 
$1.3 Billion (Tajima, 2006). This 
number was calculated by looking at 
the increase in property values around 
Boston and the new green spaces, 
along with surveying people to see how 
much they would pay for close proximity to those new 
green and open spaces. The final results are listed on Table 
1.5. 
The removal of the elevated highway created the potential 
of 1,000 acres of new development, which accounts for a 
total of more than $4 billion in benefits if completely build 
out to the Boston Area, as seen in Table 1.6. 
Table 1.6 shows the low and high estimates of each 
scenario if the whole 1,000 acres are completely developed 
(Boston Redevelopment Authority, 2000). The study done 
by the Boston Redevelopment Authority shows that there 
is potential for yearly property 
tax revenue of $99 million to 
$122 million, which would go to 
the city. The study doesn‟t 
account for indirect benefits 
such as temporary constructions 
jobs or long-term growth in 
economic activity.  
The Big Dig succeeded in 
reducing the time commute of 
many travelers, as well as 
reducing the time they would 
wait in traffic (Massachusetts 
Department of Transportation, 2006). These reductions 
created two added benefits. The first one is that reduction 
in time commute can be translated into a monetary benefit 
by estimating each traveler‟s cost of time. The second is 
that a reduction in traffic congestion translates into savings 
in fuel consumed and also costs associated in operations of 
a vehicle. As we can see in Table 1.7, these savings added 
to $167 million annually, which is composed of $143 
million in timesaving and $24 million annual savings in 
Table 1.3: Describing Structural and Non Structural Economic Benefits 
Structural Economic Benefits Non Structural Economic Benefits 
New private development 
Property price increases 
Jobs from new construction 
New land available for development 
Commuters time saved 
Less fuel consumed 
 














Charlestown 101.4 141 0 213000 3000 0 
Chinatown 1991.5 3695 951000 1405000 136000 147000 
Downtown 2182.2 1075 1600000 4086000 254000 256000 
Kenmore 200 375 250000 0 0 0 
North End 304.3 683 33000 105000 48000 202000 
Seaport 2671.3 1721 3884000 3403000 249000 75000 
Totals 7450.7 7690 6718000 9212000 690000 680000 
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority, Massachusetts Turnpike Authority 
Figure 1.6: Number of Jobs From New Development  
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vehicle operating costs (Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation, 2006). It is important to know that this 
total savings does not take into account the reduction in 
accidents from the new highway, the delays during 
construction of the project, or the increase in traffic of 
subsequent years beyond 2010. 
It is difficult to describe and quantify every single 
economic benefit the Central Artery project brought to the 
city of Boston and to predict the continuation of those 
benefits in the years ahead. The economic benefits listed in 
this section are simply to demonstrate that the Big Dig 
brought changes in Boston. This section did not try to 
show a cost benefit analysis because of the many 
unquantifiable benefits such as improved quality of life or 




   
Table 1.5: Total Changes in Property Values 
Type of Property Total 
Other Residential $2,319,346 
Commercial $866,104,681 
Condos $448,493,976 
Source: On Top of The Big Dig Economic Analysis of the Urban 
Parks Created by The Boston Central Artery/Tunnel Project  
Table 1.6: Potential Economic Benefit of New Development 
Potential Build Out 
 Low Estimate High Estimate 
Office 4200000 5400000 
Hotel 6000000 6000000 
Residential 5000000 8000000 
Retail 500000 750000 
Industrial 500000 1250000 
Total 16200000 21400000 
Potential Construction Costs 
 Low Estimate High Estimate 
Office 1033200000 1328400000 
Hotel 1500000000 1500000000 
Residential 1180000000 1888000000 
Retail 123000000 184500000 
Industrial 125000000 312500000 
Total 3961200000 5213400000 
Potential Property Tax after build out 
 Low Estimate High Estimate 
Office 33764976 43412112 
Hotel 49020000 49020000 
Residential 8532580 13652128 
Retail 4019640 6029460 
Industrial 4085000 10212500 
Total 99422196 122326200 
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority, Seaport Public 
Realm Plan and interviews 
Table 1.7: Change in Value of Time and Operating Costs (in millions) 
Category Pre Construction Post Construction Savings 
Traveler Time Cost 198 56 142 
Vehicle Operating Cost 76 52.1 23.9 
Total 167 
Source: The Economic Impact of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority 
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2 Milwaukee: Park East Freeway
2.1 History
The highway movement that was sweeping the nation in 
the 1950s and 60s also took hold of Milwaukee. In the 
1960s, the city hatched the grand scheme to create a loop 
of freeways surrounding their entire downtown. In 1958, 
the plans for the Park East Freeway were drawn. The 
original plans called for the freeway to go from I-794 to 
Lake Michigan.  In 1965, the city began to acquire 
property for the freeway. They then began to demolish the 
houses and businesses that would become the Park East 
Freeway. In 1971, the Park East Freeway opened for use, 
though it was only one mile long stretch. Old Park East 
Freeway was a remnant of the original plan of a freeway 
system to surround the city, which did not achieve 
complete build out. 
From the start of construction, a campaign began to stop 
the construction of the freeway by environmentalists and 
surrounding neighborhoods. Ted Seaver was the leader of 
the campaign against the Park East Freeway, along with 
the rest of the freeways in Milwaukee. The greatest 
argument against the Park East Freeway was that it would 
run through Juneau Park. The people didn‟t want the park 
to be cut off from the lakefront. The elected officials 
eventually joined the activists with attempting to stop the 
freeway (The Preservation Institute). 
In 1972, Mayor Henry Maier vetoed the funding for the 
relocation of the utilities. The mayor‟s greatest argument 
was the cost to the city to finish the construction of the 
Park East Freeway. He said, “America is the only nation in 
the world to let her cities ride to bankruptcy on a 
freeway….My city has discovered that the freeway is not 
free” (The Preservation Institute, 2007). Since the Park 
East Freeway was never completed, it was an under-used 
one mile stretch of freeway (The Preservation Institute). 
In 1988, the city of Milwaukee elected Mayor John 
Norquist. One of Norquist‟s major objectives was the 
removal of both the Park East Freeway and the southern 
part of the I-794 loop (Napolitan and Zegras, 2008).  He 
hired Planning Director Peter Park who helped develop the 
Downtown Plan with guidelines for the removal of the 
Park East Freeway and the integration of a surface level 
boulevard in its place (The Preservation Institute).  Park 
was an urban planning professor at the University of 
Wisconsin, and in 1995, he had one of his classes study the 
possibility of replacing the freeway with a boulevard.   
Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson and the 
Department of Transportation did a traffic study of the 
Park East Freeway. They found that with the low traffic 
volume, a boulevard would not be needed and that 
restoring the local street grid and building a new bridge 
over the Milwaukee River would suffice (The Preservation 
Institute). 
The process of removing the Park East Freeway took many 
years due to a group of people, called the Save Our Spur, 
which did not want the freeway to be demolished. George 
Watts was the biggest advocate against the destruction of 
the freeway, claiming that the freeway system “is the life 
blood of the city” (The Preservation Institute). He tried 
many tactics to try and stop the removal of the freeway, 
including spending almost all his money to run for mayor 
against Norquist so that he could have been a part of the 
decision making process. He contested the information 
given by the traffic engineers and threatened suits against 
the city to delay the destruction of the freeway. An article 
written by him in a column of the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel stated that “sixteen downtown businesses would 
be damaged if the freeway were to be removed” (The 
Preservation Institute).  Gary Grunau, a developer, talked 
with fourteen of the business owners. Ten said they 
supported the removal of the freeway, and four thought 
that it would not affect them (The Preservation Institute). 
In 1999, the County Board decided to remove Park East 
Freeway with a vote of 20-2. Following that meeting, the 
Public Improvement committee of the Milwaukee 
Common Council approved the removal of the freeway 
with a vote of 5-0. Watts finally sued the city saying that 
the traffic studies were incorrect and the environment 
impacts would be severe. The study was ordered to be 
redone, and the findings are half of what was anticipated.   
Finally a U.S. District Judge, Charles Clevert, sided with 
the city of Milwaukee. The demolition of the Park East 
Freeway began in June of 2002 and was completed in 
April 2003 (The Preservation Institute). 
The proposal to tear down the East Park Freeway had a lot 
of elements in its favor, and the final decision ended up 
being made in convincing manner. First, the highway was 
in need of repairs, despite lack of heavy use, which were 
estimated around $100 million. Demolition estimates came 
in around $25 million, of which the Federal government 
had committed 80% through ISTEA funds. Second, the 
Spur was only a small part of a larger proposal and 
therefore had never carried its engineered capacity. Many 
considered it simply a mile-long off ramp, even though it 
had been engineered to carry well above its daily traffic 
volume of 35,000. Because of this, studies and modeling 
showed that a boulevard was not needed for displaced 
traffic; simply restoring the street grid would be adequate 
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2.2 Environment and Travel 
Behavior Impacts 
With the removal of the Park East Freeway and the 
redevelopment of the land in its footprint, there are many 
positive environmental impacts to be had. Because 
redevelopment in the actual footprint has not occurred to 
date, the full environmental impacts of the removal of the 
freeway in this area are not yet realized.  However, a few 
impacts can be measured currently. Furthermore, the future 
redevelopment of this area downtown will have the 
potential to meet many sustainable transport goals as 
outlined by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute, such as 
limiting pollution emissions, reversing climate change, 
preserving natural land and habitats, and maintaining a 
livable aesthetic (Litman, 2011). 
The Environmental Assessment of the removal project, 
conducted by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
indicated no major environmental impacts during the 
construction process for the removal of the Park East 
Freeway. Similarly, the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional 
Planning Commission completed an evaluation of current 
and future traffic impacts in July 1998 entitled, "Analysis 
of Existing and Year 2020 Traffic Impacts of the 
Termination of the Park East Freeway at N. 4th Street."  
Their analysis concluded very minimal traffic effects or 
increased congestion. At the time, much of the land 
surrounding the freeway was used for parking. Some 
parking would be lost in the reconstruction project, but 
there would be no taking of businesses or residences in the 
removal project and reconfiguration of the area 
(Amendment to the Regional Transportation Plan, 2001).  
The Commission stated that the evaluation of the 
environmental impacts indicated no substantial socio-
economic, natural environment, physical environment, or 
cultural environment impacts were anticipated 
(Amendment to the Regional Transportation Plan, 2001).  
The primary motivation in the removal project was the 
redevelopment of the land within the freeway's right of 
way, as well as the redevelopment of the surrounding area 
downtown.  A major component of sustainability is “land 
efficiency,” meaning conserving valuable land resources 
by limiting sprawl, and in the case of transportation, 
minimizing land used for transportation infrastructure 
(Litman, 2011). The Park East Freeway was built through 
the historic downtown. In the 1960s, much land was 
cleared in the downtown area to make room for the 
multiple freeways in plan. As a result, thousands of homes 
were displaced and torn down, thereby encouraging 
growth in outlying areas (Bessert, 2009).  The Park East 
Freeway comprised almost 30 acres of downtown land.  
Removal reclaimed 11 developable blocks (Milwaukee 
Downtown Plan, 1999). The removal project and 
subsequent redevelopment of the center of Milwaukee 
encourages a more conservative and sustainable use of 
land. The 1999 Milwaukee Downtown Plan called the 
removal a “re-annexation” of land that could be used for 
other purposes besides transport, such as residences and 
business, and would remove obstacles to pedestrian 
activity. In addition, the creation of the on grade boulevard 
has provided more green and more permeable spaces to the 
area than there were before. Minimizing impervious 
surfaces helps to maintain adequate water quality and 
replenishes groundwater stock.  Also, the lesser proportion 
of pavement in the area can potentially mitigate heat-island 
effects caused by excessive concrete in urban 
environments. 
Before its removal in 2003, the Park East Freeway crossed 
the Milwaukee River at two points. Since its removal, the 
two overpasses crossing the river were replaced with a 
vertical lift bridge and helped to reinstate the river as a 
visual feature of Milwaukee. This replacement does much 
to enhance the waterfront aesthetics, another component of 
sustainability. Tearing down the freeway allows for better 
development along this natural resource.  
Besides enhancing the aesthetics of the waterfront, the 
removal of the overpass also aesthetically enhanced the 
land in its surrounding areas. Before, the Park East 
Freeway was perceived as a physical barrier in the 
downtown region. This freeway, as well as the I-794 
overpass just south of the Park East, both going in east-
westerly directions, acted as 2 linear divisors that split 
downtown Milwaukee into 2 regions. Although there were 
sidewalks provided around and under the infrastructure, 
the lack of direct sunlight and the lack of green 
landscaping created a psychological barrier and dissuaded 
pedestrian trips through the area (Milwaukee Downtown 
Plan, 1999). Its removal brings back the sense of 
connection between the downtown districts. As more 
development occurs in the Park East footprint, more 
pedestrian activity will be encouraged. 
The new formed-based zoning envelope of the area allows 
for much mixed use development including housing, retail, 
office, and entertainment uses, as well as different height 
variances (Norquist, 2011).  The form-based code outlines 
the standards for uses and design in the newly reclaimed 
area. On McKinley Avenue, in particular, most blocks 
require a minimum of 3 or 4 story buildings and a 
maximum of 12 stories. Some blocks allow large venue 
buildings and require special features, such as unique 
shapes and facades, in order to continue entertainment and 
commercial uses in the neighborhood. The code allows for 
the following uses on all blocks: residential, office, 
retail/service, entertainment/accommodations, and 
institutional. It defines street edges and corners to create a 
pedestrian friendly public area (Park East Redevelopment 
Code, 2004).  This is another example of efficient use of 
land resources. In fact, on February 24, 2011, ground was 
broken on the new apartment and condominium tower that 
will house 203 apartments and 14 condominiums 
(cityofmilwaukee.gov). 
Adding mixed use districts in the downtown Milwaukee 
area could potentially encourage more walking trips, 
thereby decreasing the city's overall vehicle miles traveled 
(Milwaukee Downtown Plan, 1999).  Since 2000, overall  
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vehicle miles traveled in Milwaukee have decreased 
almost every year.  
Besides redevelopment of the downtown, another major 
objective of the Park East Freeway removal and 
reconfiguration was the reinstatement of the grid traffic 
pattern in the area. This initiative also has beneficial 
impacts on the environment. Before, there were only 3 
exits off the Park East Freeway into downtown. As a 
result, many auto travelers would have to overshoot their 
destination and back track, increasing their VMT. Also, the 
3 arterials that collected the exit traffic would become 
more congested. The reinstatement of the grid allows for 
more efficient and direct travel in the area. It disperses 
traffic as well as decreases idle times. 
In 1999, the Park East Freeway carried approximately 
54,000 vehicles on an average weekday (Congress for New 
Urbanism).  The freeway spur was 0.8 of a mile, so the 
removal accounts for a reduction of 43,200 vehicle miles 
traveled each day. This also translates into 41,904 pounds 
less of CO2 being emitted each day on account of travel on 
the freeway, and approximately 15 million less pounds of 
CO2 being emitted each year (EPA.org). How those 
vehicle miles have been dispersed on other routes is not 
known. Transit ridership in Milwaukee has not seen an 
increase in trips since 2003 and the removal of the 
freeway. The National Transit Database recorded 
64,033,885 unlinked trips in 2002 just before removal and 
only 47,972,057 unlinked trips in 2009. There are 5 bus 
routes that intersect the new on-grade boulevard built in 
place of the freeway. Transit decline may have more to do 
with transit policies made under the current mayor and 
may have no relationship to the freeway's removal. 
Overall, significant changes in travel behavior in the area 
have yet to be realized. As the footprint begins to be 
developed, it is likely that changes in behavior will be 
more apparent. 
2.3 Economic Impacts 
Although only a small portion of the freeway was ever 
built, the right of way for the entire planned freeway was 
purchased and cleared. By 1969, 99% of the land in the 
right of way had been acquired, and 1,590 homes had been 
cleared at a cost of $22 million (Bessert, 2009). The 
process of clearing a large amount of land through the 
central part of an established traditional neighborhood in 
downtown Milwaukee created a drastic decrease in 
surrounding property values as well as a loss of former and 
future tax revenues. In addition to lowering the value of 
the surrounding land, the spur also resulted in causing the 
primary land use directly surrounding it to become surface 
parking, even though some of the land was directly on the 
Milwaukee River and seemingly desirable plots. These 
highway/freeway projects were thought to be big 
investments to improve downtowns by giving the 
automobile easy access into their core; in reality, most 
created easy access for residents to flee while 
simultaneously leading to further blight and disinvestment 
by the private sector. The economic effects after the 1968 
completion in Milwaukee‟s Park East section of downtown 
were no different.  
The Park Freeway was just a part of a larger network of 
freeways, many of which never came to fulfillment.   
Therefore, due to the cancellation of two other proposed 
freeways that would have completed the loop, the Park 
East Freeway survived with little purpose making it a less 
controversial issue when the discussion came to tear it 
down.   
During the 1980s, neighborhoods lying just beyond the 
freeway spur started to experience a resurgence of 
investment. Happening at least twelve years after the spurs 
completion, it was determined that the resurgence and 
development was in spite of the freeway and not due to it.  
This lead to the decision for a major redevelopment project 
on the land cleared for the continuation of Park East 
Freeway to Lake Michigan. In the 1990s, this sizeable area 
was redeveloped into a community of residential and retail 
land uses reconnecting the traditional neighborhood called 
East Pointe (Norquist, 2011). The development called East 
Pointe Commons was an $85.3 million project that initially 
created 122 apartments and 62 townhomes, with plans to 
eventually reach 700 total apartments (Daykin, 2005). 
After the initial plan for tear down was agreed upon, the 
city expanded the amount of the spur pinned for 
demolition by one block leading to an increase in the 
teardowns cost.  The raised cost for the project came to 
$37 million with separate plans for redevelopment 
planning and infrastructure costing an additional $8 
million (Daykin, 2005).  Many new development plans and 
propositions came were presented to the city. According to 
a 2006 statement by Michael D‟Amato, chairman of the 
Common Council‟s Zoning, Neighborhoods and 
Development Committee, the $45 million tear down 
project would bring $800 million of new construction, 
which would have been double the total value of new 
construction in all of Milwaukee for 2005 (Daykin, 2006).  
Local planners had more conservative estimates than the 
$800 million suggested by Mr. D‟Amato.  Based on their 
projections, they expected the assessed values in the entire 
64 acre redevelopment area to increase from $58 million to 
$500 million at build out (Knapp and Wiewel, 2005).   
With the completion of the removal of Park East Freeway 
in 2003, the city of Milwaukee now had a prime 64-acre 
redevelopment site. The city created several planning and 
development guidelines, including implementing a form-
based code that included specificity in design and 
developer guidelines that mandated the use of union wage 
pay for construction worker done on county owned parcels 
(Daykin, 2006). Some believe the county‟s strict 





Source: Wisconsin DOT 
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guidelines have hindered the redevelopment process on the 
footprint of the Park East (Hiebert, 2011). However, the 
downtown plans propose many improvements for these 
potential redevelopment sites including improving and 
adding to housing stock, adding entertainment venues, 
providing travel connections to other downtown 
destinations, and creating a mixed use pedestrian oriented 
design.   
Some of the projects proposed early on in the 
redevelopment include the following, which were cut from 
a 2006 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel newspaper article: 
The North End, planned by Mandel Group Inc., at 
the 8-acre site of the former Pfister & Vogel 
tannery, overlooking the Milwaukee River along 
N. Water St., mainly south of E. Pleasant St. 
Mandel eventually plans to have 395 condos, 88 
apartments and 20,000 to 25,000 square feet of 
street-level retail space on the site, which the firm 
bought nearly five years ago. Mandel plans to 
begin demolishing the former tannery this fall and 
begin construction on The North End's first phase 
in early 2007, said Richard Lincoln, senior vice 
president of development. The firm's executives 
continue to talk with city development officials 
about obtaining financial assistance for the project 
(Daykin, 2006). 
Park East Square, planned by Chicago developer 
Richard Curto for 4 acres east of N. Water St. and 
north of E. Ogden Ave. Curto wants to build a 125-
room boutique hotel and a 140-room hotel catering 
to business travelers; 120 apartments, 270 condos 
and over 215,000 square feet of retail and 
restaurant space. Curto's firm, RSC & Associates, 
has until October to exercise its options to buy the 
vacant parcels from Milwaukee County and is 
continuing to work on its plans (Daykin, 2006). 
A 44,000-square-foot office building proposed by 
MLG Development Inc. for a small parcel bordered 
by N. Water, N. Edison and E. Knapp streets. MLG 
has a purchase option for the county-owned site 
(Daykin, 2006). 
Terraces at River Bluff, a 160-unit condo 
development planned for south of E. Ogden Ave., 
between N. Broadway and N. Milwaukee St. Big 
Bend Development LLC bought the site in 2005, 
demolished the former Milwaukee Center for 
Independence facility and is completing design 
work for Terraces at River Bluff, said Randy 
Scoville, Big Bend partner. The firm hopes to 
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break ground within six months, he said (Daykin, 
2006). 
Ruvin Development Inc. and Dallas-based 
Gatehouse Capital Corp. are proposing a $104 
million project, including a 175-room hotel, 70 
condos, 55,000 square feet of offices, 31,000 
square feet of retail space and a 330-car parking 
structure. Rana Enterprises wants to build a $34 
million project, featuring a 202-room hotel, a gas 
station/convenience store, 14,000 square feet of 
offices, 9,000 square feet of additional retail space 
and a 400-car parking structure (Daykin, 2006). 
Reaching build out has become a longer process than 
initially thought. The Park East community in downtown 
Milwaukee has run into some bad timing. As the freeway 
fell, so did housing prices. This coupled with the credit 
crunch caused developers to postpone, change, or cancel 
many projects due to trouble obtaining adequate financing.  
Since the down market began, many developers have been 
approaching the city to ask for funding help. These pleas 
for financing assistance were meet with mixed emotions, 
especially those that looked to be more speculative (2007 
Daykin). In 2007, the City Development Commissioner 
said the city would not help finance developments that 
were too speculative and that he didn‟t want to potentially 
hurt existing downtown developments (2007 Daykin).  
Although the city wouldn‟t help some speculators, they did 
act as a conduit for bond sales in order to acquire cheaper 
financing for some development projects. 
Currently much of the 24 acres of the Park East Freeway 
footprint still lay vacant, but there were a couple of 
significant advances in the Park East District. First, the 
Moderne finally received financing for a 30 story, $70+ 
million development that includes condos, executive 
residences, and retail, and although it has yet to officially 
break ground, site preparation has already started.   
Secondly, The North End Phase II project received 
funding, though it is still working with the City of 
Milwaukee to complete the project‟s financing. Finally, 
Milwaukee School of Engineering (MSOE) proposed the 
building of a parking garage/athletic facility in the Park 
East, which seems to be on the fast track. So, with an 
improving economy it looks possible that the Park East 
project will be able to get back on track in 2011 (Reid, 
2011). 
The city‟s new commissioner for the Department of City 
Development has stated that the continued redevelopment 
plan will not be “mega-block buildings” but small 
construction that will need city financing (Daykin, 2007).  
His development plan envisions a number of three to four 
story office, retail, restaurant, and living space buildings.  
Obviously, the difficulties implementing some of the large-
scale redevelopment projects have had an effect on the 
commissioner. But regardless of what direction the city 
attempts to steer further redevelopment efforts, the razing 
of the Park East Freeway has lead to a tremendous amount 
of private investment and will continue to be an economic 
boon to the city and downtown. 
2.4 Community Impacts 
The Milwaukee Park East Freeway was built on a stretch 
of land that consisted of houses and business. In total, 
there were 26 acres of houses and businesses that were 
demolished to make room for the freeway. Because only 
one mile of the freeway was built, the remaining land 
remained vacant and turned into surface parking lots (The 
Preservation Institute). 
The Milwaukee Park East Freeway was initially welcomed 
in the community, but soon after construction began, the 
controversy began. The freeway divided the downtown 
area from the neighborhoods, which made walking from 
downtown Milwaukee to the surrounding neighborhoods 
unpleasant. The freeway route was going to run through 
Juneau Park and separate it from Lake Michigan. The 
cherished open space caused the construction of the 
freeway to end (The Preservation Institute). 
Before the Milwaukee Park East Freeway was demolished, 
the land surrounding the freeway and surface parking lots 
became blighted, which was an eyesore as people were 
headed toward the downtown area. After the demolition of 
the freeway, the roads surrounding the freeway were 
restored to the original street grid to handle to traffic. The 
redevelopment of the area created three new 
neighborhoods: McKinley Avenue District, Lower Water 
Street District, and Upper Water Street District (The 
Preservation Institute). 
The McKinley District is planned for office development, 
retail shops, and entertainment. The district is set up for 
large sites and waterfront access, making the area ideal for 
restaurants and clubs (The Preservation Institute). 
The Lower Water Street District is planned for offices near 
the water front, with some retail businesses and residential 
buildings. The east part of the district is predominantly 
residential area, which is adjacent to an existing 
neighborhood (The Preservation Institute). 
The Upper Water Street District is planned for some office 
buildings, but the majority of the area will be mixed use 
buildings. The emphasis is on residential development, 
which has already started (The Preservation Institute). 
The building of the areas that was previously demolished 
for the Milwaukee Park East Freeway has connected the 
downtown Milwaukee to the surrounding neighborhoods.   
The walk from the downtown area to the neighborhoods 
has become safer. The improvements of turning vacant, 
blighted land to buildings have made the area more 
appealing for the residents in the area. Not just the Park 
East footprint, but all surrounding areas downtown have 
seen improvements since the removal project. 
The city of Milwaukee has approved the use of art to draw 
people into the new neighborhoods. The art was done to 
try to beatify an area that is not beautiful. The art was done 
to create a sense of value to the real estate in the area.   
The art was also done to bring awareness of how important 
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the Milwaukee River is to the community (Schultze, 
2009).  
Though the development of the area has been slow, the 
neighborhoods are no longer full of blight.  They now have 
a better physical connection with the downtown area 
without the congestion that was previously feared. Many 
other cities are in similar situations and can learn a lot 
from the actions taken from demolition of the Milwaukee 
Park East Freeway. The redevelopment of the area has 
increased the property values in the area and increased tax 
revenue for the city. Between 2001 and 2006, the average 
assessed land values per acre in the footprint of the Park 
East Freeway grew by over 180% and average assessed 
land values in the Park East Tax Increment District grew 
by 45% between 2001 and 2006. This growth is much 
higher than the citywide increase of 25% experienced 
during the same time period (Case Studies for the I-81 
Challenge, 2011). 
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3 Oakland: Cypress Freeway 
3.1 History 
On the 17th of October 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake, 
at 7.1 on the Richter scale, shook Oakland to the point that 
a key component of its highway infrastructure, the upper 
level of the Cyprus viaduct, collapsed and killed 42 and 
injured 108 people. Although the section of the viaduct 
that collapsed was only 1.5 miles, 160,000 cars per day 
were left with no other choice but to disperse amongst the 
heavily used Oakland freeways and streets. This further 
added to the city‟s existing traffic congestion. The excess 
congestion from the removal of this section of I-880 had 
serious implications on the shipping industry and other 
employment centers throughout the city. 
Reconstruction of the infrastructure was initiated with an 
Environmental Review in January 1990. California 
Department of Transportation or Caltrans proposed 
rebuilding the project in the same location as the original 
Cypress Freeway. Community leaders opposed this plan as 
the previous freeway in 1955 blighted and divided the 
community of West Oakland. At that time, the 
predominately black community of West Oakland was 
split in two by the double deck section of interstate leaving 
the area beneath for storage of equipment. The blight, 
noise, and pollution caused by the Cypress Freeway were 
an eyesore and drove away businesses leaving behind 
gangs and violence (Nadel 2011). The Community 
Environmental Relief Team charged with evaluating 
placement of the project instead proposed moving the 
freeway east toward the bay where it would run near the 
more industrialized port of Oakland and the military base.  
Caltrans accepted this alternative and finalized the freeway 
location in September 1991. The Oakland community was 
included in a decision the city made for them; in the past, 
their opinions were largely ignored (Brett, 1998) (CDOT, 
1999). 
Actual construction of the project did not commence until 
January of 1994. The new stretch of freeway and 
connectors span 5.2 miles in length accommodating traffic 
and providing additional connections. Service to key 
economic areas and through routes for vehicle users were 
to be improved by connecting I-80 with the San Jose and 
East Bay Area. The new Cypress Freeway, at 6 lanes, has a 
lower vehicle capacity than the original 8-lane freeway. By 
providing High Occupancy Vehicle, or HOV, lanes to 
promote carpooling and public transit, Caltrans believed 
they could operate the freeway more efficiently (Audit, 
1998) (Brett, 1998). Even with HOV lanes, connecting 
metropolitan areas proved to be the project‟s greatest asset. 
The main community revitalization proponent of the plan 
was the connection of I-80 to I-880. Caltrans believed that 
it would alleviate the majority of congestion running 
through the adjacent arterial streets.  
The Cypress Freeway Project was scheduled for 
completion by March 1997 though delays pushed back the 
opening until November 1998. The freeway replacement 
project faced several delays in acquiring a right-of-way on 
I-880 providing financial difficulties (Audit, 1998) (Brett, 
1998). Redeveloping the site of the previous freeway 
continued with the construction of Mandela Parkway from 
2004-2005. Developers have shown interest in building 
mixed use projects throughout West Oakland though much 
debate continues over concerns of gentrification. 
3.2 Economic Impact 
Freeway closures have unprecedented economic impacts. 
A year after the Loma Prieta Earthquake shut down the 1.5 
mile stretch of highway; the cost amounted to $22.5 
million in added travel times for motorist, delays in 
shipment of products, and higher vehicle operating costs 
(LA Times, 1990). The cost associated with the destruction 
of structures amounted to $5,287,716 for the 9 county San 
Francisco Metropolitan Area. This is aside from the cost of 
the collapsed freeway (Kroll, 1991), giving some idea of 
the earthquakes magnitude in respect to financial damage. 
By 1994, $1.106 billion in Federal relief funds had been 
allocated to the repair of the I-880 freeway. $650 million 
was spend on construction, $350 million on right of way 
acquisition, and another $56 million in costs remained that 
were not eligible for federal funding and left for the state 
level to contribute. Before the project was complete, 
Figure 3.1: Location of Cypress Freeway Project in 
Relation to Cypress Viaduct Source: Caltrans 
 
Appendix A: Oakland: Cypress Freeway 
A-14 
Oakland lost $491,000 in toll revenue from the Oakland 
Bay Bridge.  
Not all aspects of Oakland suffered greatly economically 
from the freeway collapse. The San Francisco Bay Area 
retail sector was not really affected. Access to retail proved 
to be an economic priority of the San Francisco Bay 
residents. A survey conducted in January 1990 with a 
rating system of 1-no problem to 5- very severe, consumer 
access after the earthquake ranked a 3.5 for the City of 
Oakland. This rating implied that accessibility may have 
been reduced but not necessarily sales. A deterrent to 
consumer spending was an indirect implication of the 
closure of the I-880 highway. The provision of adequate 
infrastructure is central to the economic success of an 
urban community or what can be inferred from the 
research into Oakland. (Audit, 1998) 
Negotiations over the project design between Caltrans, the 
City of Oakland, and West Oakland community groups 
produced promises of many favorable economic outcomes. 
One such provision was a direct off ramp on the new 
freeway offering a means to service the Port of Oakland in 
turn removing the presence of heavy freight trucks 
traveling through residential neighborhoods. $25 million 
was spent on adding this interchange to the newly 
constructed portion of the highway. In terms of economic 
development, this feature would enhance the port‟s 
competitiveness amongst other west coast ports as well as 
facilitate employment opportunities. Taking local 
businesses concerns of limited access into consideration, 
Caltrans refrained from removing the existing off-ramp on 
Market Street. The preservation of the Market Street off-
ramp maintained accessibility to local businesses thus 
directly boosting the revenues of community and business 
groups. Caltrans claimed the replacement for the Cypress 
freeway, the Mandela Parkway project, would enhance the 
quality of life in Oakland and in turn raise property values 
through the enrichment of Oakland.  The remediated 
highway design included green space, bike paths and 
pedestrian trails as well as an opportunity of 
redevelopment in the heart of West Oakland. (CDOT: 
1999) 
Another investment into the economic livelihood of 
Oakland was the establishment of a community outreach 
venue. The Oakland Private Industry Council was set up to 
provide Oakland residents with the training necessary to 
become involved with the freeway reconstruction project. 
The center was an extremely effective utility towards 
alleviating unemployment with an 82% job placement rate. 
Caltrans believed that this would stimulate a unity between 
West Oakland and Oakland. As of 1999, 700 people 
graduated from the center and 82% were placed in 
construction related employment in northern California, 
though only 65 graduates worked on the Cypress Freeway 
Replacement Project.  
Oakland City Council approved the Freeway Performance 
Agreement in 1993. It encouraged investment from 
disadvantaged and local contractors to generate 
employment. The initiative primarily focused on hiring 
minorities, women and local residents.  According to the 
agreement, contracts and jobs from the relocation of the 
highway were allocated in the following ways: 35% 
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise participation or 
businesses owned by women or minorities, 20% Local 
Business Participation, with the 45% remaining 
employment consisting of local residents, women, and 
minorities. Over 1000 people received employment 
through this project (CDOT, 1999). In order to enforce 
complacence of the Agreement, Caltrans later sent 
associates out to monitor the projects compliance with the 
stated employment targets and found that, although 
employment goals are being achieved, minorities were 
under represented in the resulting hiring initiative. Despite 
some flaws, this project performed an economic revival of 
Oakland with awarding $90 million in contracts to local 
businesses in its construction phase (Kroll, 1991). 
3.3 Environmental Impacts 
The environmental impacts of removing and relocating the 
Cypress Freeway had both negative and positive 
environmental impacts including: contaminant exposure, 
noise/visual pollution, community reunification, and 
cultural wealth. The most detrimental environmental 
impact of replacing the Cypress Freeway was the re-
construction process, which mostly took place in an 
industrial corridor. Much of the site was formerly the 
location of Southern Pacific‟s railroad yards and industrial 
shops. The facilities on site included paint shops, vehicle 
washing facilities, foundries, gas works, fuel storage, 
battery shops, etc. which are known producers of 
hazardous byproducts like hydrocarbons, solvents, heavy 
metals, and asbestos (Snyder, 1992).  Of course, 
contaminants were eventually discovered and 
environmental remediation of such contributed to a final 
project cost nearly double the original plan (Miami Herald 
1997). 
32 contaminated sites were identified in the footprint of the 
new freeway. Contamination was found in both the soil 
and groundwater and included the following contaminants: 
asbestos, lead, petroleum hydrocarbon, Polynuclear 
aromatics, VOCs (Toulene, Vinyl Chloride), DDT, and a 
semi-VOC (Benzopyrene). The contaminated soil was 
either shipped to a disposal facility or remediated and 
reused in embankments while the contaminated water was 
treated and used for construction, dust abatement, or 
simply discharged into the ground (Caltrans, 1999). The 
vinyl chloride contamination posed the largest problem as 
it caused months of delay while the EPA deliberated the 
proper process of dealing with the carcinogen. Ultimately, 
it was decided that the level of contamination was below 
what was deemed unsafe. Still, construction avoided 
excavating in these contaminated areas, and the U.S. EPA 
filtered the groundwater (Jackson, 1998). 
Addressing noise and visual pollution for the new freeway, 
Caltrans installed noise barriers on freeway structures and 
embankments in addition to installing sound walls and 
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dense landscaping along residential portions of the corridor 
(Caltrans, 1999). 
The environmental impact of replacing the Cypress 
Freeway was positive in many ways for the local 
community, such as its relocation away from major 
residential areas, cultural excavations, and seismic 
upgrades.   
Relocation of the freeway resulted in significantly lower 
noise pollution and vehicle emissions for the former 
corridor, which affected a larger residential population.  It 
also allowed for the redevelopment of the median into a 
landscaped, multi-use pathway called the Mandela 
Parkway (Caltrans, 2004). Many residents of West 
Oakland attributed their higher incidences of certain health 
issues to vehicle exhaust, a notion supported by health 
officials. Therefore, removal of the freeway should also 
lower rates of related health concerns. These 
environmental improvements in the former corridor likely 
contribute to its improved economic development as well.  
Unfortunately, a small residential area in the extreme west 
of West Oakland, known locally as the “Lower Bottom,” 
was severely impacted by the new route of the Cypress 
Freeway. Residents of this area entered a legal battle to 
locate the new freeway completely away from residential 
areas but ultimately settled for increased mitigation 
measures (USDOT). 
During the demolition phase of construction, archeologists 
discovered large quantities of historical artifacts from the 
1800‟s. Most of these were related to the African-
American heritage of West Oakland and its railroad 
industry. These artifacts were placed in exhibits and 
museums locally and nationally (USDOT). 
The improvement of the seismic resistance of the new 
freeway is another beneficial environmental impact. The 
old freeway was known to be fatally flawed, and 
reconstruction allowed for utilization of the newest and 
most seismic-sensitive construction methods. Light-weight 
embankments were constructed so as to not put 
unnecessary pressure on the local soil, Bay Mud.  
Precautions were also taken to avoid the rusting of steel 
and concrete and to withstand an earthquake of 7.4 
magnitude (Caltrans, 1999). 
Overall, the beneficial environmental impacts seem to 
outweigh the negative impacts. The issue with vinyl 
chloride in the “Lower Bottom” is unfortunate but has 
been resolved. 
3.4 Travel Behavior Impacts  
The relationship between travel behavior patterns and the 
impact of removing the Cypress Freeway is best 
understood when broken into three post-Loma Prieta 
Earthquake phases: Reactionary Phase, Liminal Phase, and 
Terminal Phase.   
 Reactionary Phase: the immediate travel patterns 
resulting from the collapse of the Cypress Freeway.  
These patterns only persisted until debris was 
removed and non-controversial infrastructure was 
repaired.  
 Liminal Phase: the travel patterns between a 
restoration of non-controversial travel infrastructure 
and the ultimate transportation system outcome 
(relocation and reconstruction of the Cypress 
Freeway). This phase is characterized by planning and 
construction. It is subject to high degrees of variability 
because of the construction process and sheer length 
of the project. 
 Terminal Phase: the travel patterns after 
reconstruction is complete, i.e. reconnection of I-80 to 
I-880 via the relocated Cypress Freeway. This phase is 
defined by two significant events: the completion of 
the new Cypress Freeway and the creation of the 
Mandela Parkway. 
As per the request of the local community, the destroyed 
portion of I-880, known as the Cypress Freeway, was to be 
relocated to the periphery of West Oakland, allowing the 
reunification of the community of West Oakland. This 
portion of I-880 was heavily traveled as it linked Oakland 
and surrounding communities with San Francisco, 
Berkeley, and the South Bay.  Prior to the Loma Prieta 
earthquake, an estimated 160,000 motorists used this 
facility every day (Jackson, 1998). Needless to say, the 
absence of the original Cypress Freeway would alter travel 
patterns, especially amongst motorists. Even once the new 
freeway was completed, its capacity was estimated to be 
116,000 vehicles daily (Miami Herald 1997). 
The immediate impact of the collapse of the Cypress 
freeway was rather interesting. As could be expected many 
motorists simply re-routed their travel patterns by 
detouring through nearby I-580 and I-980. This re-route 
resulted in an increase in traffic on these facilities and 
additional travel time (Fernandez, 1998). However, in the 
days immediately following the earthquake, during the 
reactionary phase, there was a simultaneous decrease in 
automobile use and significant spike in transit use. While 
surface transportation facilities were devastated by the 
earthquake, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) rail 
system survived relatively unscathed. Residents of the East 
Bay were essentially limited to travel by rail or water to 
get to San Francisco. During the week following the 
earthquake, daily ridership figures increased by over 50%, 
from 218,000 to 342,000.  This spike put pressure on the 
BART system, so ferry service between San Francisco and 
the East Bay was expanded during the month-long closure 
of the Bay Bridge. Perhaps as result of these post-disaster 
travel behaviors, BART ridership has steadily increased 
over the years and commuting by ferry has become a 
“mainstay of the North Bay commute market” (SPUR, 
2010). 
In the nine year liminal phase that followed the reactionary 
phase, new traffic patterns emerged. However, due the 
intermittent completion of reconstruction, these patterns 
were relatively in flux and difficult to come by. In addition 
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to the use of I-580 and I-980 as alternate routes, many 
motorists began to navigate through local roads in West 
Oakland to avoid traffic on the now heavily congested 
freeways (Jackson, 1998). The reconstruction process was 
essentially completed in 3 portions: the2.5 mile main line 
running along the Southern Pacific Railroad and skirting 
West Oakland, a 1.3 mile connection to the Bay Bridge to 
the west, a 1.4 mile connection to I-80 in Emeryville to the 
north. Caltrans decided to complete the connection to the 
Bay Bridge first as an economic study concluded that 
every month without that connection would result in a loss 
of $2.5 million per month in travel time and vehicle 
operating expenses for the public. Unfortunately, the 
construction process ran into considerable delays, 
especially regarding HOV lanes (USDOT, 1998). 
 
The terminal phase marks the completion of construction.  
It should be noted that the new Cypress Freeway has a 
lower capacity than its predecessor. The two connection 
facilities are each 4 lanes total. It was the hope of highway 
planners that by including a High Occupancy Vehicle 
(HOV) lane, the capacity of the new freeway would match 
that of the old. Much to their chagrin, HOV lanes were 
eliminated from all portions of the Cypress Freeway 
project except for the 1.3 mile connection to the Bay 
Bridge. This was done in response to the cost of restoring 
other earthquake-damaged infrastructure in the region.  
Still, the project did considerably reduce congestion in the 
immediate area, especially West Oakland. By providing 
better connection to the Port of Oakland, the Oakland 
Army Base, and certain industrial and commercial areas 
via new interchanges, much of the truck and industry 
related traffic in West Oakland was reduced (USDOT, 
1998). 
It should also be noted that a multi-use pathway, The 
Mandela Parkway, was created in the footprint of the old 
Cypress Freeway. Aside from revitalizing a corridor, it 
also provides bike lanes and a pedestrian trail (Caltrans, 
2004). This could lead to more pedestrian, bicyclists, and 
transit users in the immediate area. 
Because this project deals with highway removal and 
relocation as opposed to mere removal, its overall travel 
behavior impacts are expected to be minimal and localized.  
The key impact is that traffic was relocated to the 
periphery of a community that abhorred its omnipresence.  
Also, the collapse and devastation of highway 
infrastructure in the area could be attributed to overall 
gains in transit and ferry ridership. 
3.5 Community Impacts 
The history of the West Oakland community runs deep.  
Many of today‟s social conditions can be traced back over 
100 years. In the 19th century, wealthy residents of the San 
Francisco Bay area settled in the hill, leaving the middle 
and lower classes to live along the alluvial plain that is 
now the city of Oakland.  Racial divides, both implicit and 
explicit perpetuated this divide into the early 20th century.  
West Oakland became notable after a group of African 
American rail workers unionized and bargained for higher 
wages.  For the first time they were able to own homes and 
many settled in the neighborhood closest to the rail yard-
West Oakland (Nadel, 2011). After WWII, lower costs and 
taxes lured much of West Oakland‟s industry south leaving 
little more than an elicit economy (Nadel, 2011) 
(Praetzellis & Praetzellis, 2004). In 1955, the city of 
Oakland decided to build the I-880 Cypress Freeway 
through this neighborhood taking advantaged of 
disenfranchised residents with little resources to fight and 
low right of way costs due to the depressed property values 
and widespread abandoned buildings. 
After Caltrans selected the alternate site for the I-880 
exchange closer to the industrial area of West Oakland, 
they enlisted the help of the Anthropological Studies 
Center at Sonoma State University (ASC) to conduct a 
study of the area.  As part of compliance with the National 
Historic Preservation Act, they were charged with 
examining the area of potential effects of 22 city blocks.  
Since the freeway was being built so close to the San 
Francisco Bay, large footings were required that they knew 
would destroy artifacts of the area‟s 100+ year old history.  
The Cypress Archaeology Project that resulted produced 
an extensive historical overview of the early years of West 
Oakland. Caltrans then compiled the artifacts into a 
traveling exhibit called “Holding the Fort: An Exhibit of 
African American Historical Archaeology and Labor 
History in West Oakland.” This study and resulting exhibit 
help shed light on the formation of West Oakland‟s 
culture, and the authors hoped their report would act as a 
source of historical knowledge and pride for the present-
day community (Praetzellis & Praetzellis, 2004). 
Figure 3.2: Status of the Cypress Freeway.  
Source: Caltrans 
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In 1989, residents seized on an opportunity to reunite their 
community after the Loma Prieta earthquake destroyed the 
Cypress Freeway.  A team of community and civic leaders, 
Caltrans, and interested citizens were formed as a 
Community Emergency Relief Team, or CERT, which 
gave the citizens an unprecedented voice in the rebuilding 
of their community. The charts below show a snapshot of 
West Oakland in 1990. As the 1990 census data shows, the 
predominantly African American West Oakland 
community had higher poverty rates, lower incomes, lower 
home ownership, and higher rental vacancies than the city 
of Oakland (U. S. Census, 1990). 
Eleven years after the 
earthquake, the I-880 had been 
rebuilt but debate continued on 
the fate of the previous site of the 
Cypress Freeway. The 2000 
census reported several changes 
in the community (see Figure 
3.3) though overall, West 
Oakland still lagged behind the 
rest of the city. A 36.29% growth 
in average income along with a 
3.7% decrease in poverty from 
1990 to 2000 indicates some 
improvement in the area‟s 
economy. Housing indicators 
show a possible gap developing 
between those who can buy and 
many who can barely afford to 
rent. Average income for 
borrowers rose 32% to $95,600, 
well over the average family 
income of $38,600.  At the same 
time rental housing units 
decreased by 300 even as 
vacancy rate stayed constant and 
of the 8,700 housing units in 
West Oakland, 18.4% were either 
overcrowded or severely 
overcrowded (U. S. Census, 
2000). 
 Even with the obvious need for 
economic development, debate 
over what to do with the former 
Cypress Freeway site delayed 
economic and community 
improvement.  Local businesses 
petitioned the city to make the 
wide median an extensive 
parking lot, but many in the 
community wanted a linear tree-
lined park.  Again, community 
members won, and the Mandela 
Parkway project with winding 
sidewalks and green spaces, 
decorative lighting, and benches 
was completed between 2002 and 2005.  (Caltrans, 2004) 
Redevelopment in West Oakland has been a struggle as 
well. One notable mixed-use development, Mandela 
Gateway at the corner of Mandela and 7th Street includes 
“168 [affordable] residential rental units, 14 for sale 
townhomes, and 6,500 sq. ft. of retail space” (Oakland 
Housing Authority, n.d.). Located across from the West 
Oakland BART station and close to the Oakland Main Post 
Office, the development is the only mixed use 
development on Mandela and will most likely stay that 
way (Nadel, 2011).  Other efforts to bring higher income 
Figure 3.3: Demographic Change in West Oakland  
Source: Census 
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housing developments or rezone abandoned industrial 
facilities for mixed use high density 
residential/commercial/light industrial have been denied as 
threats of gentrification. West Oakland‟s Councilwoman 
Nancy Nadel says would rather preserve the zoning to 
maintain the historic manufacturing tradition of West 
Oakland. Efforts to attract new industry have not yet 
succeeded, though the local high school will be 
implementing a manufacturing focus to train the next 
generation of West Oakland‟s youth (Nadel 2011).  
Given the crime rates from 1969-2008, the earthquake 
probably had little impact with minor exceptions (see 
Figure 3.4).  Notable exceptions include total larcenies, 
felony assault, murder, and robbery which showed 
substantial decreases throughout the 1990s. Whether or not 
the I-880 rerouting had any effect is hard to say as there 
may be a variety of forces at work (No data was provided 




Figure 3.4: Summary of Crime Offenses, 1969 - 2008 
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Figure 4.2: Robert Moses’ Proposed Harbor Drive 
Freeway Source: www.PortlandMercury.com 
 
4 Portland: Harbor Drive Freeway
4.1 Introduction
Portland has long been progressive in their efforts for 
urban renewal. Nearly forty years ago, Portland, led by the 
efforts of Governor Tom McCall along with strong public 
support, razed Harbor Drive freeway to replace it with a 
large park and reclaim their waterfront. While the nation 
was still going strong in their efforts to build veins of 
highways linking cities, Portland was the first to remove a 
freeway from an urban area and hasn‟t looked back since.1  
4.2 History 
In winding back the clock to discover the genesis of the 
Harbor Drive Freeway, it‟s not necessary to look any 
further than the “master builder” Robert Moses. In the 
early 40s, the City of Portland invited Moses to lead 
guidance in writing the town‟s road construction plan. 2 
After a couple months and with the aid of his team, Moses 
released his report that included blueprints on what he 
thought best for the town in order to thrive in what he saw 
as a concrete-laden and sprawling future. Among the roads 
and routes drawn in the blueprint and carving up the 
                                                          
1 Seattle Department of Transportation. (2008). Seattle 
Urban Mobility Plan: Case Studies in Urban Freeway 




2 Mirk, S. (2009, September 24). The Dead Freeway 
Society: The Strange History of Portland‟s Unbuilt Roads. 
The Portland Mercury 
cityscape were I-84, I-5, I-405, I-205 and the Harbor Drive 
Freeway3. 
Funded by the Roosevelt Administration, Harbor Drive 
was a ground-level four-lane highway following the 
western side of the Willamette River, essentially walling 
off downtown Portland from the waterfront. It was termed 
as an expressway even though it was not built to the 
modern freeway standards of the time because it was a 
“limited access road, closed to pedestrians and to cross 
traffic, with access through freeway interchanges.”4 Upon 
completion in 1942, the three mile long route was carrying 
25,000 vehicles per day. 5  By 1950, the Harbor Drive 
Freeway could still be classified as limited access and 
carried US Route 99W.6 
As the US entered the 50s and with the passage of the 
Federal Highway Act in 1956, many more highways were 
planned for Portland but none would technically qualify as 
a limited access road.7 By 1964, I-5 was completed and 
spanned the east bank of the Willamette, running in the 
same cardinal directions as Harbor Drive and built to 
highway modern standards- now two highways hugged the 
Willamette.8 
During the late 60s and early 70s, Portland was also 
fighting urban blight and the barrier between the 
downtown and the river in the form of Harbor Drive was 
only exacerbating a rough situation. By 1968, in 
anticipation of rapid growth and to aid in their bid to host 
the 1968 Olympics, Portland and Oregon as a whole 
                                                          
3 Mirk. 
4 The Preservation Institute.  (2007). Removing Freeways – 
Restoring Cities. Berkeley. Retrieved from 
http://preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysHarbor.html 
5 Seattle, 6B-1. 
6 Congress For the New Urbanism. (2010). Portland’s 
Harbor Drive. Retrieved from 
http://www.cnu.org/highways/portland 
7 Seattle, 6B-1. 
8 Preservation. 
Figure 4.1: Portland, Oregon. Highlighted portion shows 
area of Former Harbor Drive Freeway. Source: Google 
Maps. 
Appendix A: Portland: Harbor Drive Freeway 
A-21 
Figure 4.3: Harbor Drive Freeway prior to closure, 1974. 
Source: Portland City Archives 
 
further attempted to bolster their infrastructure 9. During 
this process, the State Department proposed widening the 
existing Harbor Drive expressway from four lanes to six. 
More politicians and citizens were finding their voices in 
letting their displeasure of widening the road be heard.10 
Thus began a long, winding battle for the removal of 
Harbor Drive. 
As a corollary, the 60s were a period of upstart and grass 
roots activism. The young visionaries and generally 
younger politicians that were beginning to populate offices 
were more prone to hear the citizens‟ voices. In 1968, 
groups of citizens began calling for closing down Harbor 
Drive and developing the land as a park instead. 
Simultaneously, as the state began purchasing land around 
Harbor Drive in an effort to expedite the widening process, 
a citizen alliance against the expansion found an audience 
with the Governor, Mayor, and County Commissioners.11  
Then-Governor Tom McCall was the primary proponent of 
getting the road removed. These politicians sided with the 
alliance as they argued against traffic engineers of the 
time, who said that closing the freeway would be a 
disaster. In turn, the alliance argued that the overflow 
traffic from shutting down the highway would find 
spillover lanes or follow I-5 in order to move north and 
south within the city.12 By 1969, the governor had formed 
a task force to hold public hearings on the future of the 
expressway. The task force came up with three options: 
1) Widen the lanes from four to six; straighten them. 
2) Sink the expressway and cover it with parks. 
3) Widen the road to six lanes AND relocate it one 
block away from the riverfront. 
Nowhere in the options was closing Harbor Drive 
considered. 13 Traffic Engineers claimed that the 
expressway was essential to the community and must 
remain open since a projection at the time showed that 
they would have 90,000 trips per day on that span by the 
year 1990.14 
The chair of the task force, Glenn Jackson, recognizing the 
outcry of a public feeling left out, gave his word that the 
public‟s input would carry actual weight with the final 
decision. He also urged the hiring of an independent 
contractor to study the feasibility of removing the 
expressway altogether and recommended that the state 
work far more closely with the citizens15.  Subsequently, a 
committee of citizens was implemented as a result of 
Jackson and McCall‟s urging. The citizens‟ committee 
held their first meeting two months afterward and 






14 Seattle, 6B-2. 
15 Preservation. 
coordinated with the consulting firm to research the 
various Harbor Drive options.16 
The independently contracted consulting firm issued a plan 
that would route existing traffic on two newly designated 
one way streets. Engineers, the citizens, and the Governor 
were all against this plan, as was Glenn Jackson, who led 
the taskforce to adamantly oppose it. 17  A local planner 
argued Front Avenue alone could handle a good portion of 
the spillover traffic if the lights were improved, a median 
constructed, and better pavement put in place to support 
additional weight18 
In response to this plan, Governor McCall pushed for the 
closing of Harbor Drive altogether so a park could be put 
in its place. Traffic engineers remained unconvinced and 
fought against the closure of the freeway. 19  To achieve 
closure, the Governor and Task Force needed to convince 
the City Council that traffic can be safely and efficiently 
routed to the surrounding roads and highways. 20  They 
recommended closing Harbor Drive upon the completion 
of I-405 in 1973 in addition to providing ample notice to 
the public of the impending closure, so alternative routes 
could be discovered as the most beneficial to the city.21 
On the day in 1974 Harbor Drive finally closed, traffic 
engineers saw not a “ripple” in the traffic patterns that day 
as other roads handled spillover and drivers found 
manageable alternate routes.22 Following the removal of 
Harbor Drive, there were very few negative impacts. This 
was in part due to the existing traffic grid pattern and also 
the traffic management of downtown Portland.23 All streets 






21 Seattle, 6B-2. 
22 Preservation. 
23 Seattle, 6B-2. 
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Figure 4.4: Tom McCall Waterfront Park, 2009. 
Source: Event.com 
 
in the downtown area were converted to one-way streets 
and the traffic lights were synced to ensure smooth travel 
through the downtown area. As a bonus, the one-way 
pattern allows for a better walking and bicycling 
environment.24  
4.3 Economic Impacts 
Prior to the removal of the Harbor Drive Freeway, 
Portland was a struggling city that had both mounting 
environmental and economic problems. Like many other 
cities during that era, Portland was coping with suburban 
sprawl and decay of its urban core. The creation of the 
Downtown Waterfront Plan and the lack of the support of 
the community and politicians for the expansion of the 
Harbor Drive Freeway in 1968 led to the removal of the 
freeway and the revitalization of the city‟s under-utilitized 
and undervalued waterfront property. In 1974, the freeway 
was closed completely, and the park that was designed to 
replace it was opened in 1978.25 In 1984, the park was 
renamed Tom McCall Waterfront Park, after one if its 
staunch supporters. Tom McCall Waterfront Park not only 
functions as an accessible and walk-able buffer between 
Downtown Portland and the Willamette River, but also as 
a catalyst for economic growth and contributed to the 
revitalization and resurgence of the city as well. 
Local support for the use of Tax-Increment Financing 
(TIF) to pay for Tom McCall Waterfront Park and the 
establishment of the Downtown Waterfront Urban 
Renewal Area (DTWF URA) surrounding the park has 
perpetuated continuous growth and development in the 
area since it was created. The development has lead to a 
substantial increase in property tax revenue for the city. 
Since its development, roughly 62 development projects 
(retail, mixed use housing, office space) have been 
successfully implemented.26 Some of the most profitable 
an economically viable of these projects include the 
development of the Pioneer Place commercial building, 
RiverPlace retail and housing development, and The Yards 
at Union Station. Continued interest in development within 
the district (Revitalization of Old Town/Chinatown, 
Ankeny/Burnside, and the Portland Saturday Market) 
illustrates that the land that once was a three-lane highway 
and Brownfield site is still thriving. 
Once local leaders decided that they were going to 
officially close down the freeway in 1974, the Portland 
Development Commission (PDC) officially designated the 
area as the Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Area 
(DTWF URA). The Portland Development Commission 
designated this land as an urban renewal district in order to 
                                                          
24 Seattle, 6B-2. 
25 Preserve. 
26 Portland Development Commission. (2010) Downtown 
Waterfront Projects Map. Portland Development 
Commission. Retrieved from 
http://www.pdc.us/pdf/maps/dtwf/dtwf-ura-projects-
map.pdf/ 
fund large-scale projects through tax-increment financing 
(TIFs). Tax-increment financing is a process where 
assessed value of real property is frozen within a 
designated urban renewal. As the other investors and the 
city continue to invest in the area, property values increase. 
The increase in property taxes above the frozen amount is 
then reinvested into the development. After 20- 25 years, 
property taxes are unfrozen, and the city benefits with 
massive influx in new property tax revenue.27  
In the case of the DTWF URA, the use of TIFs has been 
quite successful. According to the Portland Development 
Commission, property values in the DTWF URA have 
increased by 10.4% annually between 1974 and 2008, 
from $466 million to roughly $1.6 billion. 28  When the 
urban renewal district was first created in mid 1970s, most 
of the properties within its boundaries were worth the same 
or less than the value of the land. Since 1975 property 
values in the area have tripled and as of 2002, the DTWF 
URA was growing at a 7% faster rate than the rest of 
Portland. 29   Much of the success of the DTWF URA 
should be accredited to the vitality and popularity of Tom 
McCall Waterfront Park, the first and most important 
developments within the boundaries of the urban renewal 
district. 
                                                          
27 Arambula, Crandall. Tax Increment Financing: 




28 Portland Development Commission. Downtown 
Waterfront Home. Portland Development Commission. 
Retrieved from http://www.pdc.us/ura/dtwf/dtwf.asp 
29Seattle, 6B-2.  
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Figure 4.6: Pioneer Place, 2008. 
Source: Flickr.com User: Yuichir0 
 
Figure 4.5: Annual Revenue generated by Festival/Market 
 
Tom McCall Waterfront Park is a 36.59-acre open park 
that stretches from RiverPlace to the Steel Bridge that 
comprises of 13 tax lots.30 The park continues to attract 
both locals and visitors into Downtown Portland and the 
Waterfront. Though much of the economic benefits of 
Tom McCall Park are reflected by increased property 
values of nearby housing and retail shops, many of the 
festivals and the Saturday Market in Ankeny Plaza do 
generate a substantial amount of money for the local and 
state economy. In 2008, the Oregon Brewers Festival 
generated more than $1.5 million dollars for the state of 
Oregon.31 In 2010, the Safeway Waterfront Blues Festival 
raised roughly $600,000 for the Oregon Food Bank, a 
festival record. 32  Tom McCall Waterfront Park is also 
home to the famous Portland Saturday Market, which 
annually attracts close to 750,000 visitors and generates 
roughly $8 million.33 There are also a number of privately 
run hotels and restaurants that generate a great deal of 
revenue and have high valued property taxes as well. 
The RiverPlace development project is one of the first 
large scale mixed-use projects in the Downtown 
Waterfront Urban Renewal Area. Located adjacent to Tom 
McCall Waterfront Park, Harbor Drive, and River 
Parkway, the RiverPlace development project was initiated 
in the early 1980s and completed over three phases from 
                                                          
30Portland Parks and Recreation. (2002) Waterfront Master 




31 Portlandbeer.org. (2008, August 2). Oregon Brewers 
Festival Bucks the Economic Downturn, Celebrates 
Banner Year with Record Attendance and Sales. 
PortlandBeer.org. Retrieved from 
http://www.portlandbeer.org/blog/tag/press-release/page/2/ 
32White, Ryan. "Waterfront Blues Festival Day 4: Is the 
Blues Dead, or Has It Moved to Sweden?" The Oregonian. 
OregonLive.com, 6 July 2010. Web. 
http://www.oregonlive.com/music/index.ssf/2010/07/water
front_blues_festival_day_3.html 
33 Oregon Uncovered Portland Saturday Market. World 
News. Retrieved from 
http://wn.com/Portland_Saturday_Market/ 
1985 to 1995.34 After the final phase of the project was 
completed in 1995, the site featured a mix of residential, 
retail, and office space, resulting in 480 condos, 6,000 
square feet of retail, and 42,000 square feet of office 
space. 35  Of the total $84.3 million dollar cost, $60.8 
million dollars were funded through private contributions; 
the PDC funded the rest through TIF money. 36  Of the 
money allocated for this development, more than half went 
towards development of residential housing units and 
$33.8 million dollars went into developing adequate 
commercial infrastructure.  As of 2002, the assessed 
value of the RiverPlace is $67 million dollars and has 
generated roughly $1.45 million dollars in property 
tax revenue. 37  Due to its ideal location near the 
Esplanade of Tom McCall Waterfront Park and close 
proximity to Downtown, housing occupancy at 
RiverPlace is nearly 150% higher than other housing 
developments in other parts of the city.38 
In 1990, the Pioneer Place office tower and 
commercial center was created in the Downtown 
Waterfront Urban Renewal Area. The commercial 
center comprises of a 16-story office tower that 
contains 316,884 square feet of office space, 215,196 
square feet of retail space, and an 830 space parking 
garage that cost roughly $147 million to build. 39  As of 
2002, the assessed value of the property was  
                                                          
34 Portland Development Commission. RiverPlace: At A 
Glance Portland Development Commission. Retrieved 
from http://www.pdc.us/pdf/dev_serv/pubs/riverplace-
casestudy.pdf 
35 Portland Development Commission, RiverPlace. 
36 Portland Development Commission, RiverPlace. 
37 Portland Development Commission, RiverPlace. 
38 Buntin, Simmons B. (2005) Unsprawl Case Study: 
Portland's RiverPlace. Terrain.org, 2005. Retrieved from 
http://www.terrain.org/unsprawl/7/ 
39 Portland Development Commission. Pioneer Place: 
Phase 1. Portland Development Commission. Retrieved 
from http://www.pdc.us/pdf/dev_serv/pubs/pioneerplace-
casestudy.pdf 
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at $70 million and has generated $1.26 million in property 
tax revenue.40 Pioneer Place continues to be one of the 
most attractive retail destinations in the city and brings in 
visitors from the surrounding local and outside areas. 
Pioneer Place is also located in close proximity to the 
Pioneer Courthouse Square, a public space that is also the 
origin of multiple light rail lines in Downtown Portland. 
Development has not been limited to expensive housing 
and retail in the DTWF URA. A mixed income, multi-
family development designed to accommodate more than 
650 residents in heart of the River District Neighborhood, 
The Yards at Union Station were completed in two phases 
(Phase 1 in 1998 and Phase 2 in 2000) using a variety of 
funding sources. The funding sources used to construct the 
$50 million project included: Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits (LIHTC), developer equity, city funds for public 
improvements, PDC Loans, tax abatements, and tax 
exempt bond financing from the Oregon Housing 
Authority.41 
Half of the 158 affordable rental units built during the first 
phase of the development were reserved for individuals 
earning less than 60% of median income. 42  During the 
second phase of development, 56 apartments were for sale 
at market value, while 40% of the 321 available for rent 
were reserved for individuals earning less than 60% of the 
local median income, and another third was designated as 
affordable housing.43 The development is one of the first 
housing projects in the River District (adjacent to the 
DTWF URA). The Yards requires only .75 parking spaces 
per unit as a means of minimizing congestion of 
automobiles and increase in public transit with its close 
proximity to the light rail. 
These large-scale developments projects have had 
significant economic impact on Portland in the area near 
the former Harbor Drive Freeway. The Portland 
Development Commission is currently working on several 
other large-scale projects that will have a positive impact 
on the local economy vitality of Downtown Portland. 
                                                          
40 Portland Development Commission, Pioneer  
41  Portland Development Commission. River District:  
The Yards at Union Station. Portland Development 
Commission. Retrieved from 
http://www.pdc.us/pdf/dev_serv/pubs/dev_proj_fs_yards.p
df 
42 Portland Development Commission, River District. 
43 Portland Development Commission, River District. 
These projects include improvements to Tom 
McCall Waterfront Park, the revitalization of 
Old Town/ Chinatown, Ankeny/ Burnside, and 
the establishment of the permanent Saturday 
Market. According to the PDC Waterfront 
Development Opportunities Project, there are 
13 blocks available for redevelopment, an 
estimated $4.5 million in estimated annual tax 
revenue, and roughly $200 million in market 
value increase as well. 44  
The Portland Development Commission has also already 
started creating plans for the revitalization of two blocks in 
Old Town/ Chinatown as a means of increasing tourism in 
the somewhat depressed area. The PDC is also working on 
creating a permanent, year around, public market in 
Ankeny Square. Based on the financial success of the 
existing Saturday Market, this project seems as though it 
will be very successful in the near future.  
All in all, the tearing down of the Harbor Drive Freeway 
has created a plethora of economic opportunities for the 
Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Area and the city 
of Portland. The removal of the freeway not only was 
historically significant for anti-freeway activists, but also 
was a huge catalyst for economic development and 
sustainability for the city Portland as well.  
  
                                                          
44 Lewis, Bowers, and Amy Dowell. PDC Waterfront 
Opportunities Project. Rep. Emmons Architects. 
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4.4 Environment 
In the 70s, before Harbor Drive closed, the road still 
averaged around 24,000 vehicles per day. At a total 
distance of three miles, that is roughly 72,000 vehicle 
miles daily on the Harbor Drive Freeway. 45  Based on 
today‟s emission standards at .0465 mile per gallon, that 
was about 3,348 gallons used on that stretch alone every 
day.46 For CO2, at 72,000 total miles per day and at .916 
pounds emitted for every mile, that is an estimated 65,952 
pounds a day. 
Similarly, if the Portland traffic engineers‟ estimates held 
true from 1969, and there really did end up being 90,000 
vehicles per day in 1990, then the above numbers increase 
greatly. 47  The gallons burned would reside at 12,555 
gallons per day, and the CO2 emissions increase to 
247,320 pounds coughed up daily. 
Roughly 12,839 days have passed since Harbor Drive 
became a park and in that amount of time, had numbers 
remained unchanged since 1970 and if all cars previously 
driving that route were to continue driving that exact route, 
42,984,972 gallons of fuel would have been spent in total.  
Furthermore, an additional 846,757,728 pounds of CO2 
would have been released into the air. 
However, things did not remain constant as The Harbor 
Drive Freeway was torn down in Portland. Robert Cervero 
found before and after comparisons for Harbor Drive 
showing 9.6% fewer vehicle trips on surrounding roads.48 
Based on the above numbers, that significantly decreases 
them both. It also suggests that by removing the road and 
thereby reducing the number of trips, that the removal of 
the expressway was an overall better and healthier 
alternative than keeping it. 
Reducing roadway capacity reduces the overall number of 
auto trips. While that sounds somewhat commonsense, the 
benefits derived from this reduction are not. These benefits 
include “decreased energy usage and carbon emissions; 
improved air quality and [overall] public health; increased 
safety for motorists…; and a reduction in fumes and noise 
pollution.” 49  In fact, ozone and particulate matter 
stemming from exhaust have both been connected to lung 
development issues and asthma within children. 50  The 
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46 US EPA. (2000). Emission Facts: Average Annual 
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47 Seattle, 6B-2 
48 Cervero, R. (2006). Proceedings from the International 
Symposium for the 1st Anniversary of the 
Cheonggyecheon Restoration: Freeway Deconstruction 
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Korea. 
49 Seattle, 6A-1 
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9.6% reduction in trips goes a long ways in lessening the 
effects of these ailments.  
Additionally, Portland has seen a 65% decrease in crime in 
the area surrounding the former freeway as compared to 
just a 16% drop for the rest of the city (Seattle Urban 
Mobility Plan). Factor that into the overall improvement in 
quality of life, increase in nearby property values, and 
generally healthy growth in the area, and it proves to be a 
generally healthy environment. 
4.5 Travel Patterns 
Despite skepticism by transportation experts and civil 
engineers, the removal of the Harbor Drive Freeway in 
1974 has had minimal negative impacts on travel patterns 
throughout the city of Portland. The creative urban design 
of downtown streets, the successful diversion of traffic to 
alternative freeways, bridges and roadways, and the 
development of an extensive intermodal public transit 
system have contributed to the alleviation of congestion, 
environmental degradation, and automobile dependency 
surrounding the former Harbor Drive Freeway and 
throughout the rest of the city as well.  
As has been stated above, city planners and traffic 
specialists understood that they needed to redesign the 
street grid pattern in Downtown Portland in order to 
accommodate more automobiles after the Harbor Drive 
Freeway was closed. To alleviate some of the hysteria and 
frenzy caused by this removal, civic leaders gave proper 
notice of the road closure to Portland residents. Certain 
modifications were made to street grid patterns in the 
Downtown District as well. Planners redesigned the streets 
to be one-way, altered traffic signals to allow for more 
fluid flow of traffic, and speed limits were reduced as a 
means of increasing safety for pedestrians and bicyclists.51 
The development of the Naito Parkway along the Tom 
McCall Waterfront Park served as a wide boulevard that 
provided as an adequate replacement for the Harbor Drive 
Freeway to drivers for whom this route was unavoidable. 
The Harbor Drive Freeway was eventually closed when 
the construction of the Fremont Bridge had been 
completed which connected I-405 to I-5. There was a 
substantial increase in the number of drivers on I-5 and I-
405, but some of the congestion was minimized by the 
development of the Fremont Bridge. The creation of the 
bridge improved the connectivity between the two major 
freeways. A change in attitude by residents and civic 
leaders against freeways also contributed to minimal 
growth in congestion on existing freeways of the time. 
Anti-freeway activists were gaining support of Portland 
citizens, which could have contributed to less congested 
freeways. 
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Figure 4.8: Map of Tri-Met MAX Light Rail Lines.  
Source: http://trimet.org/maps/railsystem.htm 
 
 The most significant change in travel patterns that has 
occurred since the removal of the Harbor Drive Freeway is 
the massive increase in the number of commuters choosing 
to use public transit services rather than drive private 
automobiles. The development of Portland‟s sophisticated 
transit system, Tri-Met, has caused gradual decline in 
automobile trips near the former Harbor Drive Freeway 
and throughout the entire Metro region as well. Many of 
the citizens, whom advocated for the removal of the 
Harbor Drive Freeway, were in favor of minimizing the 
environmental impacts of the automobile, increasing 
pedestrian mobility, and investment in adequate public 
transit. Citizens were able to divert funds allocated for 
other highway projects in Portland and to create the cities 
first light-rail line. Since the 1980s, four different lines 
have been built with 85 total miles and as of 2008, serving 
roughly 118,200 riders per day on all lines. 52 
Affordable fares, efficient service, and easy access to 
multiple lines from various locations have perpetuated 
continued growth of ridership in all areas of the city, 
especially in the Waterfront and Downtown 
neighborhoods.  The Red and Blue MAX lines run near the 
former Harbor Drive Freeway, and most likely function as 
alternative transit for those who would have utilized the 
Harbor Drive Freeway if was still in existence. In 2008, 
21.91 million riders used the MAX Blue line (average 
60,027 per day), while the Red Line saw 8.83 million trips 
(roughly 24,191 per day).53  Less than half a mile from 
Tom McCall Waterfront Park (former site of the Harbor 
Drive Freeway) is several Green, Yellow, Blue and Red 
                                                          
52 Redden, Jim. (2008, July 12). Tri- Met Ridership Sets 
New Records. Portland Tribune. Retrieved from 
http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=
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53 Tri-Met. About Tri-Met, History of Max Lines. Tri-Met. 
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MAX line stations as well. Individuals living near the 
Waterfront and downtown have plenty of access to all 
modes of the Tri-Met network. 54  Congestion and 
overcrowding on other major highways and the grid-street 
pattern near the site of the former Harbor Drive Freeway 
has been greatly avoided, due to high ridership rates on the 
MAX and other Tri-Met transit systems.  
4.6 Community Impacts 
Looking at community impacts from the removal of 
Harbor Drive Freeway, one sees that the few that have 
lasted are largely positive. As opposed to other highway 
deconstructions that have taken place around the country, 
the Harbor Drive Freeway was not taken down because of 
safety concerns or an estimated high cost of expansion 
versus demolition. Interests to the public and making 
downtown Portland a more inviting place for all people 
directly fueled this project. 
In terms of negative impacts, there were more present 
when the highway was still in operation than after it had 
closed. For one, the I-405 Freeway, which ran around the 
downtown, was not easily accessible to trucks heading to 
the industrial district in Northwest Portland resulting in 
them using Harbor Drive.55 As result of this, truckers were 
one of the voices in the community speaking up against the 
removal of the freeway according to former chair of the 
Portland Development Commission Elaine Cogan, “The 
only people who really objected were the truckers, because 
they said, „We can't get to North Portland.‟ And that's how 
                                                          
54 Tri-Met. Stops and Stations. Tri-Met. Retrieved from 
http://trimet.org/go/cgi-bin/cstops.pl 
55 Baldwin, Bob interview with Ernie Bonner, December 
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I-405 came about. That was a way of saying, „Okay, we'll 
give you another route.‟”56 
This freight corridor clearly made for a very unfriendly 
environment for pedestrians and bicyclists to try and 
negotiate with, only to get to the small existing waterfront 
park. A 1969 report by the Portland City Club stated:  
The present combination of Harbor Drive and 
Front Avenue along the river leaves only a narrow 
green strip and islands of grass and trees, which 
are more pleasant for the passing motorist than 
asphalt paving, but do nothing to attract people to 
the area. Pedestrian access across Front Avenue is 
so difficult and the fast traffic on Harbor Drive is 
so dangerous that little use is made of the area 
except when the fleet is in during the annual Rose 
Festival and policemen supervise traffic.57 
The other leading group against the removal was the local 
traffic engineers. The engineers, led by Don Bergstrom, 
justified the need to expand the freeway by citing the 
projection of 90,000 trips a day by 1990 and that closing it 
would cause massive traffic congestion as mentioned 
above.58A critic of this viewpoint, however, was Richard 
Ivey (director of the downtown plan partnership for 
engineering firm CH2M) who predicted, “If you let people 
know well ahead of time that you're going to close Harbor 
Drive, people who use it now will use I-405 which is 
under-used right now, some of them will cross the river 
and take both bridges because they're headed for the 
Northwest district to go to work. The river is a 
psychological barrier, but the fact is that the distance 
involved isn't much more.”59 This did prove to be the case 
as roads and bridges around the freeway saw a reduction of 
9.6% after the closure.60 
Residents and local businesses were largely in favor of the 
removal of the freeway both because of the proposed 
increased access to the waterfront, and the parallel I-5 on 
the other side of the river. 61  A public interest group 
founded by community activists and architects, Riverfront 
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Neighborhood Revolution: Planners, Power Brokers, and 
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For People, was instrumental in getting the community 
voice heard in the process, by their peaceful picnics in the 
area where the freeway was to be expanded. 62  These 
helped to encourage the governor to schedule a public 
hearing on the expansion project.63 The resulting hearing 
featured an outpouring of community voices both against 
existing proposals for the freeway and in favor of 
eliminating the route altogether.64 
One positive impact the community saw was a new sense 
of empowerment against the current model of highway 
expansion. The same year that the Harbor Drive Freeway 
was closed, residents won a lawsuit effectively killing the 
Mount Hood Freeway from continuing to develop and 
instead the city used federal money to develop its light rail 
system. As Gregory Thompson identified, it was a crucial 
victory for the city in, “regaining control over the design of 
its transportation system from technocrats in the state 
capital and in DC.” 65 
The single loudest voice for removal as well as community 
involvement was Oregon‟s Governor at the time, Tom 
McCall. McCall who, was an environmentalist and created 
a documentary prior to taking office about the Willamette 
River (Disaster in Paradise), pushed for the removal of the 
freeway and increased waterfront access, largely to benefit 
the public. At a meeting in October of 1968, he stated, 
“We cannot afford to spawn, through inattention and 
inaction, a sort of a Berlin Wall of layer upon layer of 
cement and high- speed traffic which would bar our 
citizens from what should and must be one of the most 
attractive, livable and useful sections of the core city.”66 
Former Oregon Land Conservation and Development 
Commission Director Arnold Cogan remembered, 
“[Governor McCall] didn't have a specific idea of what it 
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65 Thompson.  
66 Portland City Club.  
Figure 4.9: Free Community Bike repair station, Tom McCall 
Waterfront Park, 2010. Source: Author. 
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should be, he just knew that Harbor Drive shouldn't be 
there, and that it ought to be an open green space.”67 
One of the biggest impacts on the community is what sits 
in the footprint of the former freeway. A report issued in 
1969 outlined the final project should, “be varied so as to 
provide for and encourage activities at all seasons of the 
year and over a large number of hours of the day […] Easy 
and attractive access to the river itself should be provided 
to pedestrians for scenic and recreational purposes.”68 
Today the 36.59-acre Tom McCall Waterfront Park and 
greenway allows visitors and residents alike to take 
advantage of views of the Willamette River and 
recreational opportunities. Among its ample bicycle and 
pedestrian paths and green space, the park hosts many 
different festivals and public events. It is home to the 
Portland Saturday Market, which moved to its current 
location in 1976, and is open every weekend from March 
through December earning it the title of, “Largest 
continually operating outdoor arts and crafts market in the 
nation.”69 The park also served as a campaign rally for 
President Obama in May of 2008, hosting 75,000 people 
including some in kayaks watching from the river, a task 
that could never have happened were the freeway still in 
use. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The removal of the Harbor Drive Freeway was in the best 
interest of the environment, the public, and future growth 
of Portland. Like many other things that Portland has done 
and continues to do, this project has served as a model in 
city planning both nationally and internationally with cities 
as far away as Seoul, South Korea following suite. When 
Robert Moses came to Portland after World War II, he 
suggested two things: create massive parks and a 
sprawling concrete highway system. As history has shown, 
Portland made the correct choice in which of the two 
directions to follow, and in turn end up leading the rest of 
the world. 
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Figure 5.2: The southern portion of the Central Freeway 
loomed over Octavia Street. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Map of San Francisco showing Civic Center, 
Golden Gate Bridge, Golden Gate Park, I-80, Market, Fell, 
and Oak Streets 
 
 
5 San Francisco: Central Freeway
5.1 History 
California's Division of Highways decided that San 
Francisco needed highway connections both outside of the 
city and also routes throughout the city.  By 1945, the state 
had laid out a plan of freeways. However, as plans were 
made and construction started, the ugliness of the plan 
became clear. Citizens soon saw the demise of dense 
residential neighborhoods. 
One of these routes - the Central Freeway - was planned to 
bring about a web of freeways within the city. The original 
plan for the freeway was broken up into two parts. One 
part would go past the Civic Center and continue through 
the city and connect to the Golden Gate Bridge. The 
second part would go half-way through Golden Gate Park 
and also end by connecting to the Golden Gate Bridge 
(Figure 5.1). 
Construction began in the 1950s, and the first phase of the 
Central Freeway opened in 1959. At first, the only part that 
was built was a freeway spur to the west of San 
Francisco‟s Civic Center. The double-deck concrete 
structure demolished a wide right-of-way through houses 
along Division and Octavia Boulevards (Figure 5.2).  Over 
the next five years, other neighborhood groups realized 
that the same thing was planned for their neighborhoods, 
and they revolted, otherwise known as the San Francisco 
Freeway revolt (Big Disasters, 2001).  
In 1959, due to this revolt and city-wide protests to protect 
cherished neighborhoods, city‟s supervisors voted to kill 
seven of the ten planned freeway projects in the 1951 plan.  
Thirty thousand residents signed a petition to shut down 
the construction (Big Disasters, 2001).  Their voices were 
heard; construction stopped. This left the freeway 
incomplete. The portion of the Central Freeway continuing 
up Van Ness to the Golden Gate Bridge was halted, as 
were plans to build several other cross-town routes. It went 
from I-80 across Market Street and through the Hayes 
Valley neighborhood. When the project was stopped, 
ramps connected to Fell and Oak Streets (Figure 5.1). It 
was a one way route but helped move traffic effectively.   
In the early part of 1960, the freeway planners tried 
resurrecting the freeway that would go through Gold Gate 
Park through a place called the Panhandle. In 1964, Sue 
Bierman organized a campaign against this proposed plan.  
Politicians ignored this initially, but not after they noticed 
that voters were becoming influenced. Mayor Shelley was 
a firm supporter of the freeway because its construction 
created jobs. However, the day before the vote, Bierman 
was walking in Golden Gate Park with Supervisor Jack 
Morrison, who was planning to vote for the freeway 
project, though he was known as an anti-growth activist. 
As they walked, she pointed out the trees that would be 
removed in order to build the freeway. Morrison was quiet 
for a long time, and then he made the decision to vote 
against the freeway (Preservation Institute, 2007). If it had 
not been for his last minute change of heart, the freeway 
would probably have been built.  
In 1989, while millions watched the World Series that was 
being held in San Francisco, the Loma Prieta earthquake 
damaged the northern portion of the Central Freeway so 
badly that experts said it could not be rebuilt (Preservation 
Institute, 2007). It was removed in 1992, and the Board of 
Supervisors voted to ban any new freeways north of 
Market Street (Figure 5.3). This ban made it impossible to 
replace any part of the Central Freeway, and the area 
would now be used for housing. There was a remaining 
stretch of freeway north of Market Street that ran above 
Octavia Street. In 1995, the city task force suggested the 
freeway should be replaced by a surface boulevard, named 
Octavia Boulevard. This would help local traffic to move 
quicker. 
The State of Department of Transportation decided that 
this freeway was worth saving. The freeway was reopened 
to traffic and plans were made to demolish its upper deck 
and provide growth to the lower deck. In the fall of 1996, 
they began demolishing the upper deck. 
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Meanwhile, Patricia Walkup and Robin Leavitt were 
leaders of the movement for highway removal. They 
wanted to replace the freeway with Octavia Boulevard.  
Mayor Willie Brown was in favor of this plan but residents 
of the western part of San Francisco wanted the freeway 
rebuilt for their benefit. In 1997, Mayor Brown was 
convinced by his western San Francisco constituents to 
reopen the lower deck of the freeway to traffic. He 
eventually withdrew his support for the Octavia Boulevard 
plan. The plan to rebuild passed, and designs for the new 
freeway began to be created. However, in 1998, the 
opponents of the freeway, led by Walkup and Leavitt, 
rallied supporters and placed the issue on the ballot once 
again. This time, the removal of the freeway was settled in 
favor of the freeway opponents (Preservation Institute, 
2007). Debate went back and forth about which parts of 
the freeway should be demolished. Environmentalists 
wanted to demolish the southern part, and there was 
additional pressure to keep the freeway overpass over 
Market Street, which would allow it to connect with 
Octavia Boulevard.  Finally, an agreement was reached in 
which there would be no overpass over Market Street, but 
instead, a route would be built through a light-industrial 
district south of Market Street. Once the plan had been 
developed to remove certain parts, they now faced the task 
of removing the lower part of the Central Freeway.   
The proposed boulevard was designed by a team led by 
Allan Jacobs, formerly San Francisco Planning Director 
and a professor at UC Berkeley (Preservation Institute, 
2007). The boulevard would be one hundred thirty-three 
feet wide with four lanes for traffic, a grassy median, and 
two bicycle and pedestrian lanes.  Buffers would be made 
to make the road less noisy for nearby residents. The San 
Francisco Planning Department developed a plan for 
transit and a new park near the end of the freeway. The 
center lanes towards the end were not needed so they have 
been replaced by a park and playground. The final stretch 
of the Central Freeway was removed in 2003 almost 
fourteen years after the Loma Prieta earthquake (Figure 
5.3). Octavia Boulevard was finally completed in 2005.  
The Central Freeway south of Market was completed in 
2006 (Figure 5.4). 
The area brought about great economic opportunities.  
Interesting restaurants and shops began to appear on Hayes 
Street and attract people who worked in the Civic Center. 
In June 2006, the Octavia Boulevard was given the 
Freeway Project of the Year award by the California 
Transportation Foundation. The park at the end of the 
Figure 5.3: Demolishing San Francisco's Central Freeway 
(Preservation Institute, 2007) 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Central Freeway (south of Market Street) 
leading to Octavia Boulevard 
 
Figure 5.5: A timeline of historical Central Freeway events (http://www.sfcta.org/content/view/655/431) 
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freeway was named after activist Patricia Walkup who 
died just a few days after the project completion. 
The San Francisco Freeways were failures in planning, 
engineering, and design. The plans failed because they did 
not take into account the new problems they might create. 
There was no consideration to integrate freeway traffic or 
to build a transit system that might better fit in with the 
areas. It all resulted in huge costs to the city in depressed 
land values, increases in crime, and urban decay (Big 
Disasters, 2001).   
The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake began a transformation 
that lead to the opening of the Octavia Boulevard/Central 
Freeway in 2005 and the adoption of the Market and 
Octavia Better Neighborhood Plan in 2008. The Octavia 
Boulevard project redefined traffic engineering planning 
with sensitive solutions. The Octavia Boulevard project 
provides neighborhood access to a regional freeway while 
providing an attractive public space. A timeline of key 
Central Freeway/Octavia Boulevard events is shown here 
(Figure 5.5). 
5.2 Community Impacts 
As previously stated, the San Francisco Freeway system 
was a failure.  Planners and state officials did not consider 
the problems a freeway system would create. There should 
have been more consideration to build a transit system that 
benefits the whole San Francisco community. Negative 
impacts arose for several neighborhoods that the Central 
Freeway passed through.  The freeways lead to an increase 
in neighborhood crimes, urban decay, and depressed land 
values in the communities of Hayes Valley and Market and 
Octavia Streets. However, since the removal of the Central 
Freeway, these areas have rebounded and are continuing to 
prosper. 
The destruction of the freeway made city officials look at 
several issues and options for the new transit system.  
First, did San Francisco want to build new facilities, 
seismically retrofit existing facilities, or replace structures 
with slower moving at-grade facilities? Second, while 
fixing the transit system, did the city want to open up 
access to waterfronts, remove physical obstructions, and 
redevelop economically stagnant neighborhoods? City 
officials listened to their citizens. Officials elected to build 
a new surface level transit system that will lead eventually 
to the redevelopment and betterment of crime-ridden 
and/or economically depressed neighborhoods. San 
Francisco communities such as Hayes Valley and the 
Market/Octavia neighborhoods have prospered since the 
freeway was removed. 
San Francisco tore down several miles of the Central 
Freeway. Figure 5.6 shows the northern stub of the Central 
Freeway before removal. Central Freeway was replaced 
with a beautifully landscaped boulevard, a new and 
improved transit system, bikeway and pedestrian facilities, 
as well as new public community areas. San Francisco 
helped pave the way for a reform in the way people view 
urbanization. Cities and communities, like San Francisco‟s 
Hayes Valley Neighborhood, that have opted to build at-
surface boulevards in the place of freeways have 
experienced a transformation or “renaissance” for the 
better.  Figure 5.7 is an after-shot of the northern end. 
According to Marnie Hunter of CNN, the Hayes Valley 
neighborhood was “crime plagued” before the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake damaged the freeway overpass in 1989 
(Hunter, 2007). Home to prostitutes and drug dealers, 
Hayes Valley was a place to avoid. After the Loma Prieta, 
the city put in a tree-lined boulevard instead of rebuilding 
the freeway. Hayes Valley is now filled with “stylish 
shops, restaurants, and galleries” (see Figure 5.8).  
Businesses have been continually moving into the 
neighborhood‟s “colorful storefronts” and Victorian 
buildings, helping to drive out the crime of the past.  
The demolition of the Central Freeway supported the 
development of the Market & Octavia Plan. The Market & 
Octavia Plan is a comprehensive land use and 
transportation strategy for almost 400 acres of the San 
Francisco community and Hayes Valley area. Planning 
professors Allan Jacobs and Elizabeth Macdonald from the 
University of California, Berkeley, designed the Octavia 
Boulevard to meet the needs of the local community‟s 
traffic (Blackwell, 2006). Figure 5.9 shows the Octavia 
Boulevard design plan.  The affected area begins at Market 
Street, stretching nine blocks till Hayes Street. 
Figure 5.6: The northern stub of the Central Freeway 
before highway removal. 
 
Figure 5.7: The northern stub of Octavia Boulevard 
after highway removal. 
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Another important point is the creation of many new 
public spaces and public parks for citizens to use. For 
example, revenues from the sales of the freeway‟s parcels 
were used to fund construction of a 16,500 square foot 
park (City of Seattle, 2008). This 16,500 square foot park 
is otherwise known as Patricia‟s Green, named after 
community activist Patricia Walkup. Patricia‟s Green is 
located at the intersection of Octavia Boulevard and Hayes 
Street‟s retail strip. A second example of more public 
green space includes Octavia Boulevard itself. The 
boulevard was designed as somewhat of “linear park.”  
The street is lined with sidewalk cafes, shops, and 
beautifully landscaped green space for citizens and visitors 
to enjoy. 
5.3 Economic Impacts 
Demolition of the Central Freeway presented substantial 
redevelopment opportunities. Seven acres of land 
contained 22 parcels. The city‟s General Plan and the 
Better Neighborhood Plan for the Market and Octavia 
Neighborhood indicate that approximately half of the 
parcels were used for affordable and senior housing (SF 
Planning Dept, 2008).  The other parcels were sold by the 
city to private developers for high density mixed use 
projects (Ocuillbo, 2007).  The City of San Francisco made 
around $35 million from the sales of the old Central 
Freeway land lots to make investment on transportation 
and affordable housing (Wang, 2009). 
Two adjacent parcels around the Hayes Valley intersection 
were transformed into a creative compound, including 
restaurants and galleries. Table 5.1 compares the occupied 
and vacant numbers of housing units in 1990 and 2000 in 
Census Tract 168 where contains Octavia Boulevard, 
formerly the elevated Central Freeway. From 1990 to 
2000, the percentage of vacant housing units in the area 
has decreased by 58%. 
Since the removal of Central Freeway, the Market & 
Octavia neighborhood has gone through a complete 
transformation like the Hayes Valley neighborhood.  
Houses and condos in the area were renovated and 
upgraded. Vacant land and blighted buildings were 
purchased and developed for residential and commercial 
purposes.   
The transformation of Hayes Valley into a hip, stylish area 
has also helped to increase real estate prices in Hayes 
Valley and in San Francisco. From 1996 to 2006, the 
average sales price of a Hayes Valley condo nearly 
quadrupled. The average sales price of a Hayes Valley 
condo rose over half a million dollars, from $203,000 to 
$760,000 (City of Seattle, 2008).  Hayes Valley‟s average 
condo prices were 66% of the average for all of San 
Francisco in 1996. By 2006, average condo prices 
increased to 91%. 
  
Table 5.1: Occupancy Status 
 Year 1990 Year 2000 
  Tract 168.98, San 
Francisco County, 
California 
Census Tract 168, 
San Francisco 
County, California 
Occupied 3030 3194 
Vacant 285 119 
Total 3315 3313 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2000 Census 
of Population and Housing 
Figure 5.8: Photo by Ingrid Taylar © 2007. Hayes Street is the 
main artery of Hayes Valley – a neighborhood that until the late 
80s suffered for a noisy freeway ramp and a reputation for crime 
and drug-related problems (about.com). 
 
Figure 5.9: Design Plan for the Octavia Boulevard 
(www.octaviacentral.org) 
Figure 5.10: Twenty-two parcels were available for 
redevelopment along Octavia Boulevard 
(http://www.socketsite.com/archives/Octavia%20Parcels.jpg) 
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5.4 Environment and Travel 
Behavior 
Urban designer Elizabeth Macdonald (2006, P6) 
writes about the possible traffic impacts of 
boulevards that replace freeways, “Focusing on 
every potential traffic conflict or possible bad-
driver behavior and trying to solve each by adding 
greater lane widths, wider turn radii, great tree 
setbacks, or more movement restrictions is a 
misapprehension of the complex manner in which 
good boulevards operate.” Yes, the removal of the 
freeways would reduce the capacity of the roadway 
in the short term. However, studies found that 
traffic and congestion was diverted and spread 
more evenly throughout other roadways.  Yes, the 
traffic congestion and car-pedestrian accident 
levels may increase.  This will most likely happen, 
since Octavia Boulevard was designed to be bike 
and pedestrian friendly.  So, since the removal of 
the Central Freeway, how did commuters respond 
to the changes?  Did motorists switch to 
carpooling, bicycling, or walking?  Or maybe they 
choose not to make their commute anymore? 
According to Billheimer, etc. (1998), a 1996 travel 
behavior survey shows 76% of the 8,000 drivers 
who previously used the freeway had shifted their 
commute to another freeway, while 11% used city 
streets for their entire trips, 2.2% switched to 
public transit, and 2.8% said they no longer made 
the trip previously made on the freeway. The 
survey also revealed that nearly 20% of the survey 
takers made fewer trips since the freeway closure 
(Figure 5.11).  There is no evidence that closing of the 
Central Freeway had any significant impact on carpooling 
propensities in the Area. 
With the completion of Octavia Boulevard in 2005, the 
residents‟ travel behaviors changed. San Francisco's 
Octavia Boulevard is a four-block-long multi-way 
boulevard. It has narrow one-way access roadways on each 
side for slower traffic and parking, and finally, at the 
edges, tree-lined sidewalks. Although only a few miles 
long, Octavia Boulevard is the first true multi-way 
boulevard built in the United States since about the 1920s 
(Macdonald, 2006).  Octavia Boulevard has been honored 
at the local and national level, including an award from the 
American Planning Association. The boulevard begins on 
the north side of Market Street, across from broad ramps 
leading to and from Highway 101. The Octavia Boulevard 
which replaced the elevated Central Freeway is not perfect, 
but it keeps cars moving while making the surrounding 
neighborhood a better place for people (King, 2007). The 
old ramps of Central Freeway carried about 90,000 cars a 
day, and the new Octavia Boulevard has the similar use, 
while the design of the Octavia Boulevard roadway is to 
disperse traffic. People will have more choices (Gordon, 
2005). 
From the 5-year estimates of the 2005-2009 American 
Community Survey, there are 47% residents in Census 
Tract 168 area choose public transportation for the means 
of transportation to work, and 16.5 % walk or ride a 
bicycle to work. Only 26% residents drive to work (Table 
5.2). Compared to the citywide average of 33% taking 
buses plus 12% walking or bicycling, the percentage of 
people transit to work in this area is high (Table 5.3). 
  
Table 5.2: Commuting Characteristics by Sex in Census Tract 168 
Subject Total Male Female 
Workers 16 years and over 4,230 2,497 1,733 
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO 
WORK 
   
Car, truck, or van 25.7% 29.6% 20.0% 
Drove alone 21.7% 26.2% 15.2% 
Carpooled 3.9% 3.4% 4.7% 
Workers per car, truck, or van 1.1 1.06 1.21 
Public transportation (excluding taxicab) 47.0% 43.1% 52.6% 
Walked 9.8% 8.3% 11.9% 
Bicycle 6.7% 6.7% 6.6% 
Taxicab, motorcycle, or other means 1.5% 1.8% 0.9% 
Worked at home 9.4% 10.4% 8.0% 
Table 5.3: Commuting Characteristics by Sex in San Francisco 
Subject Total Male Female 
Workers 16 years and over 431,900 233,992 197,908 
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO 
WORK    
Car, truck, or van 46.7% 48.2% 45.1% 
Drove alone 38.9% 40.4% 37.0% 
Carpooled 7.9% 7.7% 8.0% 
Workers per car, truck, or van 32.4% 29.8% 35.5% 
Public transportation (excluding taxicab) 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 
Walked 2.6% 3.2% 2.0% 
Bicycle 1.9% 2.4% 1.3% 
Taxicab, motorcycle, or other means 6.7% 6.8% 6.5% 
Worked at home 431,900 233,992 197,908 
Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009 
Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009 
Figure 5.11: Source of traffic shifts following removal of San 
Francisco’s Central Freeway, Cervero, R. (2006) 
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5.5 Conclusion 
By removing the Central Freeway, the city of San 
Francisco showed its commitment to community, 
economic, and environmental sustainability, while setting 
an example for other cities to follow. Removal of the 
Central Freeway presented the world with a new form of 
urban reprioritization. The benefits of the freeway‟s 
removal have greatly outweighed the negative impacts.  
Benefits of the Central Freeway‟s removal include a 
decrease in crime, an increase in the average sales price of 
real estate, an increase in public green space, and a 
greener, more sustainable transportation system. San 
Francisco was able to improve its citizens‟ quality of life, 
without significantly sacrificing the city‟s transportation 
performance. 
5.6 Works Cited 
6 Case Studies in Urban Freeway Removal, January 2008, City of Seattle: 
http://www.cityofseattle.net/transportation/docs/ump/06%20SEATTLE%20Case%20studies%20in%20urban%20freeway%20r
emoval.pdf 
Big Disasters: The San Francisco‟s Freeways- A disaster of design, engineering and planning August 20, 2001 
http://www.roughlydrafted.com/RD/Urban/5A3D5EE6-1954-4106-B32F-D73B523643C7.html 
Billheimer, J., Juliet M., Doug S., & Gerald R. (1998). "Public Information Activities To Mitigate the Impacts of Closing San 
Francisco‟s Central Freeway." Transportation Research Record, 1632: 68-77. 
Blackwell, M. & Award, G: San Francisco Street Renaissance, November/December 2006 
(http://www.mtc.ca.gov/news/transactions/ta1106/octavia.htm) 
Cervero, R. (2006) Freeway Deconstruction and Urban Regeneration in the United States. Paper prepared for the International 
Symposium for the 1st Anniversary of the Cheonggyecheon Restoration, Seoul, Korea.  
Cervero, R. Kang, J. and Shively, K (2007) From Elevated Freeways to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic, and 
Housing Price Impacts in San Francisco. Working paper for University of California, Berkeley Transportation Center 
Gordon, Rachel.  September 2005 San Francisco Chronicle 
Hastrup, S. (2006). Battle for a Neighborhood. Places, 18(2): 66-71 
Hunter, M. San Francisco's Hayes Valley a hot spot for cool design. 9 November 2007. 21 February 2011 
<http://www.cnn.com>. 
King, John. An Urban Success Story--Octavia Boulevard an Asset to Post-Central Freeway Area in San Francisco, January 
2007, San Francisco Chronicle (www. SFGate.com) 
Macdonald, E. (2006) Building a Boulevard. Access, 28: 2-9. 
Market and Octavia Neighborhood Plan, San Francisco Planning Department, Better Neighborhoods Program. May 2008, 
http://www.sf-planning.org/index.aspx?page=1713 
Napolitan, F & Zegras, P (2007) Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States 
http://web.mit.edu/czegras/www/Napolitan_Zegras_FreewayRemoval_Final.pdf 
Ocuillbo, R (2007). Housing in Hayes Valley: A Shifting Profile. Urban Action 
Preservation Institute (2007) San Francisco, CA Central Freeway http://www.preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysCentral.html 
Selna, Robert. 2 Parcels in Hayes Valley May Get a Quick Fix, August 2010, San Francisco Chronicle 
U.S. Census Bureau: http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en 
Wang, A. Goodbye Parking Lots: Central Freeway Land to Go March 2009. 
http://sf.curbed.com/archives/2009/03/31/goodbye_parking_lots_central_freeway_land_to_go.php
  
Appendix A: San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway 
A-37 
6 San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway 
6.1 Introduction and History 
In 1991, the City of San Francisco demolished a 1.2 mile 
stretch of elevated expressway. The Embarcadero Freeway 
had a distinctive past and was the object of much disgust 
over its 32 year lifetime. Its past, its removal, and the 
impacts of that removal are the subjects of this case study. 
With the removal of the Embarcadero Expressway, the city 
reclaimed its downtown waterfront. The city experienced 
real estate price increases, residential communities created, 
the rejuvenated connectivity of its downtown‟s to the 
water, environmental protection, increased accessibility to 
transit opportunities, and various positive economic 
impacts.  
During the post-war era, the expansion of interstate and 
expressway infrastructure around the country helped the 
automobile become the dominant mode of travel in the 
United States. In San Francisco, City Supervisor Leo 
McCarthy recalled that “the momentum behind freeway 
construction was extraordinary … The Federal 
Transportation Department and the California Department 
of Transportation had the kind of power that comes with 
having hundreds of millions of dollars to spend annually” 
(McCarthy, 1996). The interstate system was making 
efficient and cost-effective automobile travel between 
cities a reality. However, the system originally designed to 
create high-speed transport infrastructure in between cities 
had subtly and significantly morphed into high-speed 
transport infrastructure inside cities.  
The perception in San Francisco was that highways could 
accommodate commuters coming in from suburban areas 
and would maintain downtown as the retail and financial 
hub of the region by helping it compete with newer 
suburban regional shopping centers (McCarthy, 1996).  In 
this way, freeways inside San Francisco metropolitan areas 
were supported by the chamber of commerce, the 
contractors, the building trades unions, the downtown 
merchants, and the aforementioned Federal and state 
stakeholders (McCarthy, 1996).  The governor, along with 
state and local agencies and planners, promoted a 1948 
plan to crisscross San Francisco with a network of 
freeways (see Figure 6.1). Implementation of this plan 
began with two north/south highway corridors traversing 
underutilized industrial land south of the city. Eventually 
the construction of these highways reached more 
residential areas where the community, local newspaper, 
and several elected officials revolted against this attempted 
destruction of their neighborhoods. 
One highway in particular, the Embarcadero Freeway 
(labeled Interstate-480 in those 1948 plans) was originally 
intended to connect the Bay Bridge and the Golden Gate 
Bridge (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008; 
Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007). However, with the vocal 
uproar of citizens and the assistance of several city 
supervisors, the city was able to wield one of its few 
powers against the ongoing process of freeway 
construction - it had to give permission for the federal and 
state construction to cross city streets (McCarthy, 1996). 
With a 1.2 mile stretch was completed in 1959, the rest of 
the project was canceled, along with 7 other freeways in 
the 1948 plan (The Preservation Institute, n.d.). By halting 
the Embarcadero Expressway completion, the city 
forfeited $280 million in Federal funds (National Research 
Council, 1980, p. 103). The completed section was 
controversial because it disrupted connectivity between the 
Market Street part of downtown and the waterfront. Had it 
continued, the freeway would have gone through 
Telegraph Hill and Russian Hill, two well-known 
neighborhoods. Members of these communities, along 
with Sunset, Potrero, Polk Gulch, and Haight-Ashbury 
neighborhoods, successfully organized in the late 1950s to 
stop freeway construction (see Figure 6.2). This well-
documented protest is known as the original “freeway 
revolt” (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007; Carlsson). This 
community action sparked a series of similar freeway 
revolts around the US reacting to highway construction 
occurring inside the urban cores of US cities. 
A minority of San Francisco residents continued their 
displeasure with the remaining Embarcadero Expressway. 
In 1986, Mayor Dianne Feinstein brought referendum  
Figure 6.1: 1948 San Francisco Freeway Plan (Source: The 
Preservation Institute) 
Figure 6.2: Freeway protestors in 1964. (Source: Carlsson) 
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measures to the citizens of San Francisco regarding the 
demolition of the expressway and construction of 4 lanes 
of surface level street infrastructure complete with light 
rail and bike paths in its place. The two measures were 
defeated by voters by a margin of two to one at the 
recommendation of Supervisor Richard Hongisto (The 
Preservation Institute, n.d.). Despite direct support from 
the mayor, several elected officials, and several 
neighborhood groups, the freeway would remain. The 
movement to transform the Embarcadero from elevated 
highway to a multi-use boulevard was based upon 
community activism and political will, but it had gone to a 
vote of the people and failed. However, in 1989, an 
earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale struck San 
Francisco, causing $6 billion in damages and killing 42 
people. The Loma Prieta earthquake exposed problems in 
the way highways were built, frightened many Bay area 
drivers, and changed perceptions of transportation around 
the region. Several area double decker bridges collapsed 
and other highway infrastructure were severely damaged. 
Meanwhile, the Embarcadero Freeway was severely 
damaged, thereby making removal a more palatable 
solution. 
Community activism once again led the charge against the 
freeway. Proponents of repairing the damaged structure 
included business interests in the Chinatown Merchants 
Association and the Northshore Business Association. 
Concerned about a drop in visitors due to traffic 
congestion without the highway, the Chinatown Merchants 
Association organized against the removal in a similar 
manner as the other community groups (Yip, 1997; Seattle 
Department of Transportation, 2008).  Immediately after 
the earthquake, the repair of major elevated highways 
bridges was a primary concern and consequently the traffic 
using the Embarcadero was rerouted. Therefore, 
commuters were forced to take surface streets and 
alternative routes. This time the movement to remove the 
Embarcadero Freeway was led by key decision makers, 
including Mayor Agnos and several City supervisors 
agreed that removal was a good option (Wicker, 1991). 
City planners, the Board of Supervisors, and two mayors 
all took initiative to approve of the removal (The 
Preservation Institute). Famously, Mayor Art Agnos called 
the Embarcadero “the world‟s longest off-ramp” (Carlsson, 
n.d.). While there was much popular support, the business 
associations and the state transportation department 
favored the repair or replacement of the expressway, while 
the mayor supported a subsurface expressway removing 
the eyesore that blocked the scenic waterfront views. For 
the better part of a year after the earthquake, these two 
sides waited as cost estimates for all options were prepared 
(see Table 6.1). Eventually, more than a year after the 
Loma Prieta earthquake, the Chinatown and other business 
groups opposing the removal of the freeway threw their 
support behind the proposals claiming that it would be the 
fastest way to get customers back to their business 
districts. Finally in September 1990, the San Francisco 
board of supervisors voted 6 to 5 to remove the elevated 
expressway and replace it with either a surface street or a 
subsurface expressway. Later these options were clarified 







Table 6.1: 1991 Board of Supervisors Decision Options 
Elevated Expressway Repair Estimate $69.5 million 
Sub-surface Expressway Estimate (no Federal match) $135 million 
Removal and surface street replacement $93.7 million 
                Extension of Light Rail Service $52.6 million 
Source: San Francisco Board of Supervisors  
Table 6.2: Embarcadero Transportation Timeline 
 1959 Embarcadero Freeway Opens 
October 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake severely damages structure; freeway closed 
June 1990 Responding to complaints of lose of Chinatown and Northshore 
neighborhood business, Mayor Agnos distributes maps providing routes to 
inaccessible neighborhoods 
September 1990 Supervisors vote 6-5 recommending “replacing freeway with either surface 
level or subsurface artery.” 
February 1991 Destruction of Embarcadero Freeway begins 
March 1991 San Francisco Redevelopment Agency gives $2 million to Chinatown 
Merchants Association 
October 1991 Freeway Construction completed; Surface street construction begins 
 2000 Embarcadero construction complete; streetcar service begins 
Source: San Francisco Chronicle articles: 1990-2004 
Figure 6.3: Embarcadero Freeway Demolition. May 9, 1991 
Appendix A: San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway 
A-39 
6.2 Community Impacts 
Now that the Embarcadero Boulevard has been completed, 
the affected areas have benefited from neighborhood 
revitalization in the creation of new public spaces. 
Merchants had seen a decline in business while the 
freeway was closed after the earthquake and were worried 
about this becoming permanent with the highway gone. 
However, the waterfront areas around Chinatown now 
feature more jobs and residences, potential customers in 
Chinatown, and the district continues to be one of the top 
attractions in San Francisco (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 
2007). 
Although the current roadway takes up a similar footprint 
to the freeway, several new neighborhoods have been 
formed due to the removal. Existing areas that featured 
some development added thousands of offices and 
residences. These neighborhoods also gained an identity, 
Rincon Hill and South Beach (Siegel, 2007). These areas 
are now known for some of the best locations to live and 
work in the city (Congress for the New Urbanism, n.d.). 
The most noticeable addition to the area formerly occupied 
by the freeway is the public spaces. The boulevard does 
feature travel lanes for automobiles, but streetcars, bike 
lanes, and a large pedestrian promenade are all fellow 
travelers. New public plazas and the promenade draw users 
to the area and are cited as a reason for the economic 
development of the waterfront (Congress for the New 
Urbanism, n.d.). The original footprint of the elevated 
highway is memorialized by a series of plaques, but the 
character of the area is completely changed (Eckerson Jr., 
2006). The former industrial piers have also become an 
attraction for visitors, housing shops and other public 
amenities (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008). 
 With any freeway removal project, the concept of 
gentrification must be addressed. Before the construction 
of the freeway, there wasn‟t a neighborhood to be 
bulldozed; instead, the area was generally industrial and 
commercial. The freeway‟s construction caused many of 
the buildings that lined the elevated expressway to be built 
without consideration of street interactions as monolithic 
structures (Eckerson Jr., 2006). With the removal of the 
elevated expressway, the surrounding area‟s character 
changed dramatically; dense land use patterns of 
residential and commercial properties began to replace the 
largely industrial and commercial warehousing patterns 
witnessed before the freeways 
construction. The changes in property 
values because of the removal could 
be classified as a gentrification effect, 
but the area beforehand was not 
primarily residential (Carlsson, n.d.; 
Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007).   
Industrial facility jobs and investment 
along the waterfront had been 
precipitously declining since the end 
of World War II - 1947 saw 7.8 
million tons of shipping, which fell to 5.2 million in 1964 
(the year of the highway revolt), and to 2.3 million tons in 
1977 (National Research Council, 1980, p. 103). This 
decline mirrored the increase in usage of the Port of Long 
Beach and the Port of Seattle as major freight ports for the 
Pacific Coast of the US (National Research Council, 
1980). This phenomenon of industrial decentralization 
follows patterns seen around the US as the industrial 
warehousing economy of San Francisco morphed into a 
more service and finance oriented urban industrial city. 
A good measure of success for the Embarcadero Freeway 
removal is to examine how public sentiment has changed 
about the area. Approval of the transformation into a 
boulevard is almost unanimous, with freeway proponents 
being almost nonexistent (The Preservation Institute, n.d.). 
People have also voted with their feet and dollars, showing 
up in large numbers to live, work, and play in the area. The 
waterfront is now more accessible for people, no matter 
what mode of transportation they are using. Even in 
Chinatown, the merchants begrudgingly concede that “the 
vista is beautiful” (Seattle Department of Transportation, 
2008). 
6.3 Environmental and Travel 
Behavior Impacts 
As we have discussed, the Embarcadero Freeway, 
completed in 1959, was originally supposed to connect the 
Bay Bridge to the Golden State Bridge via downtown San 
Francisco, but protests to the plan by neighborhood 
residents limited construction to a 1.2 mile double decker, 
elevated highway (The Preservation Institute, n.d.).  
Because of the halt in construction, the highway stopped at 
the Broadway off-ramp which directed traffic into North 
Beach and Chinatown (The Preservation Institute, n.d.). 
At its peak, the Embarcadero Expressway carried over 
60,000 cars per day (Seattle Department of Transportation, 
2008) and served as a connecting highway between the 
Bay Bridge and downtown San Francisco. In 1989, the 
Loma Prieta Earthquake severely damaged the freeway 
structure and forced the city to close the roadway for 
safety reasons (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007). With the 
freeway suddenly closed, San Francisco drivers found 
alternative routes, with much of the traffic being absorbed 
by other roadways (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007).  
Surface roadways were never overwhelmed by additional 
traffic, and commuters also took to transit in record 
Table 6.3: Means of Transportation to Work 2000 & 2009 
Mode 2000 Percent 2009 Percent % Change 
Drive Alone 40.5 38.9 -1.6 
Carpool 10.8 7.4 -3.4 
Public Transit 31.1 31.8 +0.7 
Taxi, Motorcycle, other 1.6 1.8 +0.2 
Bicycle 2.1 3 +0.2 
Walk 9.4 10.3 +0.9 
Worked at Home 4.6 6.8 +2.2 
Source: SFMTA, 2010 
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numbers (Marquez, 1989). This situation persisted until the 
opening of a new, six-lane surface boulevard in 2000.   
The new Embarcadero Boulevard was designed as a 
complete street, incorporating auto, pedestrian and transit 
into its design (The Preservation Institute, n.d.).  The six-
lane boulevard was designed and built to handle a 
significant amount of traffic without cutting the waterfront 
off from downtown (The Preservation Institute). In the 
middle of the boulevard, a historic streetcar line was built 
(Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008).  
Furthermore, the removal of the freeway allowed for the 
creation of a number of waterfront parks and pedestrian 
plazas that served to increase the walk-ability of the area 
(Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007).  One such amenity is 
the Herb Caen Way, a 3.2 mile pedestrian promenade that 
follows the waterfront next to the Embarcadero from South 
Beach to Fisherman's Wharf (The Preservation Institute, 
n.d.). 
Overall, the removal of the freeway has resulted in 
significant traffic reductions and increases in usage of 
public transit on the Embarcadero. The boulevard currently 
carries about 26,000 cars per day (Seattle Department of 
Transportation, 2008), while the streetcar line handles 
about 18,000 daily riders (San Francisco Metropolitan 
Transit Authority). Assuming the 18,000 transit riders 
would have driven on the freeway had it still been up, the 
removal of the freeway and the opening of the streetcar 
line reduced approximate CO2 emission in that corridor by 
18,062 pounds per day (18000 riders x 1.2 miles of 
freeway/23.2 avg mpg x 19.4 lbs CO2 per gallon gasoline) 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2005). Twenty years 
later, the freeway removal could have saved 66 thousand 
tons of CO2. 
Since the reopening of the Embarcadero, auto usage has 
gone down and transit usage has increased along with 
cycling and walking in the entire city (San Francisco 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 2010). City-wide auto 
usage has dropped from 51.3% to 46.3% of mode share 
going to work while transit, cycling and walking has 
increased from 42.6% to 45.1% in the first nine years (see 
Table 6.3) (San Francisco Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
2010). While we certainly cannot attribute this change 
entirely to the Embarcadero, the removal of the freeway 
certainly did play a role. 
The Lomo Prieta earthquake in 1989 was a major reason 
the freeway was torn down. If it was never severely 
damaged, the roadway may still be up today. The 
earthquake also brought forward a serious concern with 
elevated highways in the San Francisco Bay Area – even 
though the freeway had been retrofitted in the early 1980s 
for earthquake safety, and the freeway did not collapse, 
portions of the freeway structure did fall, injuring a 
number of people below (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007; 
The Preservation Institute, n.d.). The decision, therefore, to 
tear down the damaged freeway in 1991 actually increased 
the hazard resiliency of the area, simply by removing the 
possibility of a structural collapse rendering a major 
thoroughfare impassable during a disaster. As far as 
resiliency goes, Rod Diridon, chairman of the Metropolitan 
Transportation Committee, may have said it best - “what 
we found out from this experience is that transit survives- 
highways don‟t” (Diriniger, 1989).  A similar sentiment 
was shared by Jim Knox, a statewide transportation 
planner, saying, “If we had no transit right now, the Bay 
Area would be closed. It would be shut down” (Diriniger, 
1989). 
Today, the Embarcadero is a bustling, multi-use boulevard 
that has helped reconnect downtown San Francisco to the 
waterfront (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008).  
The removal of the double-decker freeway has opened up 
the Northwest San Francisco waterfront to a host of 
transportation modes and in the process also helped 
improve the overall air quality by reducing automobile 
dependency and promoting transit, walking, and cycling 
(Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007; Seattle Department of 
Transportation, 2008). 
6.4 Economic Impacts 
From an economic perspective, the Embarcadero Freeway 
removal and redevelopment is generally viewed by 
business interests as a very successful project. The sheer 
quantity of real estate investment is telling enough, but 
statistics and a number of studies also help to measure the 
success of the Embarcadero. One author summarizes much 
of the data and research saying: “All day long the area, 
particularly around the Ferry Market building is teeming 
with locals and tourists alike… On game days, the 
southern end is inundated with sports fans and ticket 
scalpers” (Sussler & Daniel, n.d., p.6).    
 
Waterfront business along the Embarcadero Freeway prior 
to the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake was essentially 
nonexistent. With nearly 1.2 miles of double-decker 
highway blocking lining the waterfront, convenient access 
to the majority of the port facilities and the city‟s historic 
Ferry Building was negligible (Equity Office).  Once the  
Figure 6.4: Embarcadero Freeway ending at the Broadway off-
ramp (Lost SF, 2010) 
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earthquake hit, the freeway extension became unusable 
and traffic diverted onto other streets (Cervero, Kang, & 
Shively, 2007). Particularly hit hard was the Chinatown 
area less than a mile away, who‟s businesses claimed a 
“20-40% drop in tourism” in the following years (Chinese 
Historical Society of America, 2006). When discussion of 
freeway removal was rumored from the Board of 
Supervisors in April of 1990, “hundreds of Chinatown 
merchants” appeared to protest the proposition (The 
Preservation Institute, n.d.). Despite the economic 
downturn experienced in the late 1980s, after the removal 
of the Embarcadero Freeway, the waterfront has 
experienced eight years of development and “San 
Francisco‟s Chinatown is still bustling” (Seattle 
Department of Transportation, 2008, p.6D-2). 
Although the Seattle DOT acknowledges the impossible 
task of isolating the Embarcadero Freeway‟s removal on 
economic development in the area (2008), a number of 
indicators show prodigious economic growth. Housing 
values in the surrounding neighborhoods rose by 300% by 
the late 1990s (The Preservation Institute, n.d.), indicating 
a market demand increase for area properties. Also by the 
late 2000s, housing quantity increased by 51% (Congress 
for the New Urbanism, n.d.), further transforming 
perceptions of downtown as a place to live and spend 
money.  Meanwhile, international corporations 
such as Gap clothing have chosen to build 
headquarters along the redeveloped 
Embarcadero. By analyzing US Census and 
American Community Survey data, one can 
additionally find that the 2009 aggregate 
property value in the affected Embarcadero 
impact zone grew to 25 times its 1990 value, 
while San Francisco aggregate property value 
has grown by less than 5 times its 1990 value.  
Figure 6.6 demonstrates how the impact zone, 
which includes Chinatown, compares to the 
city of San Francisco overall when considering 
average growth using 1990 as a base year. 
Although freeway removal may not be the sole 
cause for such a stark contrast to the rest of the 
city, it seems impossible to negate any 
correlation altogether.  In addition to increased 
residential space, the Embarcadero area is now home to 
over one million square feet of commercial office, retail, 
café, and restaurant space (San Francisco Redevelopment 
Agency, 2011). Jobs have increased by 23% within the last 
few decades (Congress for the New Urbanism, n.d.) and 
new development has sprung up in the form of small 
business enterprise, commercial office space, professional 
sport investment, and various other kinds of retail and 
residential structures (Congress for the New Urbanism, 
n.d.). 
A combination of public participation along with public 
and private sector investment helped to develop most of 
commercial space on Embarcadero Boulevard. Although 
millions of square feet of retail, commercial, and 
residential development were privately financed (San 
Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 2011), the entire length 
of the boulevard remains welcoming to pedestrians, 
bicyclists, transit, as well as motorists (Cervero, Kang, & 
Shively, 2007; The Preservation Institute; San Francisco 
Bike Coalition, 2010).  
Of the most notable icons along the Embarcadero‟s 
waterfront is the Ferry Building.  Originally built in 1898, 
the twice earthquake-shaken structure, now owned by 
Equity Office (a private nationwide joint venture), is home 
to forty diversified small businesses, an iconic 245-foot 
clock tower, and 175,000 square feet of Class A 
commercial office space (Equity Office). Equity Office 
also claims a daily count of 11,000 ferry riders passing 
through its terminal, and a farmer‟s market that takes place 
3 days a week drawing in 10-15,000 additional weekly 
shoppers (Equity Office). 
Existing industrial piers currently numbered one-and-a-
half, three, and five are collectively known as The Piers.  
This redevelopment supports a collection of mixed used 
retail, commercial, and residential space (The Piers, 2010).  
These historic structures now house nearly 60,000 square 
feet of Class A commercial office space and 17,000 square 
feet of retail, cafes, and restaurants (The Piers, 2010).  
Additionally, since 2000, the 13-acre AT&T Park 
constituted a $357 million investment at the far southern 
Figure 6.5: Embarcadero Freeway, 1960. (Source: Telstar 
Logistics) 
Figure 6.6: Rise in aggregate property value (Source: US Census 1990 & 2000 
and American Community Survey 2005-2009) 
Appendix A: San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway 
A-42 
end of the Embarcadero boulevard area. The San Francisco 
Giants home field ranks 2nd in the National League for 
number of visitors with over three million visitors a year 
(San Francisco Giants, 2006). The ferry provides 
transportation for over 50,000 visitors to the Giants games 
a year (Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transportation 
District, 2010). 
If the city had chosen to repair the freeway to its previous 
state after the earthquake, the City of San Francisco would 
have had to pay at least $70 million and waited until at 
least 1992 before reaping the freeway‟s benefits once 
again (Wicker, 1991).  Instead, the city invested nearly $50 
million into the project, the demolition for which only cost 
$3.25 million (Wicker, 1991).  Now, users enjoy a 3.2 mile 
long (and 25 foot wide) promenade that runs the length of 
the Embarcadero from South Beach to Fisherman‟s Wharf, 
employees get the opportunity to enjoy a positive and 
diversified work environment, and tourism in San 
Francisco has a view of the bay while dining near the 
Embarcadero (The Preservation Institute, n.d.).  
A report co-sponsored by the Federal Highway 
Administration identifies the quality of location, variety of 
passenger travel services, and amount of capital 
investment made by developers as important signifiers of 
economic developments (Forkenbrock & Weisbrod, 2001).  
Although this case study does not cover the greatest depth, 
the breadth of praise, inclusion of diverse modes of 
transport, and significant private investment each 
demonstrate a measure of success agreed upon by many. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The removal of the Embarcadero Freeway and the 
subsequent creation of a complete street boulevard to 
replace it can be considered by measures of community, 
environmental, and economic indicators a success. As this 
case study has shown, the removal of the freeway had 
positive community effects namely: neighborhoods 
experiencing revitalization, communities benefiting from 
additional jobs, and real estate value increasing. All Bay 
Area residents were benefitted by an increase in 
accessibility to the community asset of the waterfront. 
Environmentally, the region was benefited by changes in 
transportation patterns leading to greater transit usage and 
consequent reductions in air pollution, increased walk-
ability aiding in public health, and greater resiliency with 
the addition of greater transportation opportunities, and 
more reliable infrastructure. Economically, the city has 
benefitted greatly with a new found tourist attraction - real 
estate values have raised dramatically; rejuvenated usage 
of ferry facility and other investments have been leveraged 
to make full use of water front; the private and public 
investment in infrastructure has led to an overall 
renaissance at the waterfront for San Francisco. The city of 
San Francisco in making the courageous decision to not 
rebuild their Embarcadero Expressway after the tragedy of 
the Loma Prieta earthquake has recreated a formerly 
underutilized area for the benefit of all residents of the Bay 
Area. 
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7 Seoul: Cheonggyecheon Highway 
7.1 Introduction
Between 2003 and 2005, the Seoul, South Korea 
metropolitan government planned and executed the 
removal of the Cheonggye Elevated Highway and the 
ground-level roadway beneath it that covered the 
Cheonggyecheon (CGC), a stream that used to run through 
the center of the city (Kil-Dong 2007).  
Historically, Seoul developed around the Cheonggyecheon 
stream, which runs east to west, dividing the city in two. 
The Cheonggyecheon restoration project has been called 
“the boldest and most dramatic freeway removal to date” 
(Kang and Cervero 2008, p. 3) and has won widespread 
praise from the international urban design and planning 
community. Despite earlier worries about the project‟s 
potentially negative economic and traffic impacts, it has 
gained widespread popularity among Seoul tourism and 
business interests, as well as the city‟s general public. 
Thanks in no small part to its ambitious scope, Seoul‟s 
Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project is one of the world‟s 
most often-cited examples of highway removal and 
subsequent urban revitalization. 
7.2 History 
Joseon Period  
The Cheonggyecheon has been a pivotal part of Seoul‟s 
landscape for centuries. In 1406 King Taejo, first king of 
the Joseon Dynasty, commissioned several projects to 
build dykes in order to control flooding in the area. Stone 
embankments and bridges were built over the 
Cheonggyecheon and its tributaries. Taejo‟s successor, 
King Sejon, continued projects on the Cheonggyecheon by 
digging ditches to divert some of the water to its tributaries 
(Noh, 2009). During King Sejon‟s rule, his advisors were 
divided as to what the role of the river should be. Some 
believed that the river should be kept clean according to 
the principles of Feng Shui, while others believed that 
Seoul need sewage options. King Sejon sided with the 
latter camp and opened the stream for sewage purposes. 
During the five centuries of the Joseon Dynasty, the 
tributaries provided Seoul with clean water, while the 
Cheonggyecheon washed out the wastewater. 
By 1675, the population in Seoul had grown to almost 
190,000 people from 100,000 at the start of the Joseon 
Dynasty (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2009c). The 
stream was no longer able to accommodate sewage for the 
city. It was not until almost a century later, during the 
1760s and early 1770s, that King Yeongjo commissioned 
yet more projects to dredge the river and build new 
embankments and dykes. 
Japanese Occupation - Construction 
of the Cheonggye Highway 
Around 1914, during Japanese occupation, it is believed 
that the stream got its current name, Cheonggyecheon, 
which means, “clean water stream.” During this period, 
many farmers that lost their land migrated toward Seoul 
settling around the edge of the Cheonggyecheon. The 
increase of the urban poor along the stream led to more 
pollution, making the stream a source of diseases and 
crime (Kil-Dong 2007). 
Figure 7.1: Map of Seoul (central city in black outline, CHC 
in stripes) Source: Kang, C.D. and Cervero, R. (2009) 
Figure 7.2: Huts lining the edge of the Cheonggyecheon 
Source: PreserveNet 
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In 1925, the Japanese started to cover up many of the 
tributaries, converting them into sewers as part of a project 
designed to give Seoul a proper underground sewage 
system. The idea was to cover the Cheonggyecheon as 
well. From 1926 to 1940, the Japanese devised several 
plans to cover the river for different purposes. These 
included proposals calling for filling in the stream to create 
new land for development, the creation of a roadway with 
an elevated railroad over it, the creation of a road for cars, 
and the construction of a tram on the surface and a subway 
underground. These early proposals floundered, mainly 
because of the economic strain that the Sino-Japanese war 
was exerting on Japan. But the Japanese had covered a 
small section of the river by 1937 (Noh 2009).  
After World War II, South Korea developed plans to 
dredge the Cheonggyecheon, which had become heavily 
silted under Japanese occupation. Once again, plans for the 
improvement of the stream were halted, this time because 
of the Korean War. By the 1950s, the Cheonggyecheon 
had come to symbolize the poverty and grime left behind 
after fifty years of colonialism and war. It was essentially 
an open sewer in the middle of the city that deterred 
investment (Noh 2009). 
In the late 1950s, the huts surrounding the edge of the 
stream were removed, and the Cheonggyecheon was 
encased underground in a four-phase construction project 
that lasted from 1958 until 1976. A 3.7-mile elevated 
highway was built 164 feet to 262 feet above the former 
stream (Kil-Dong 2007). The elevated highway ran 
parallel to a grade-level roadway, and included four lanes 
of two-way traffic that before its deconstruction carried 
168,556 vehicles daily (Kil-Dong 2007). As with many 
other highway projects, it was originally considered a 
successful urban renewal project, one that brought 
modernity to the city and would inevitably attract people 
and business.  
Highway Removal and Stream 
Restoration 
In 2003, Seoul‟s mayor, current president of South Korea 
Lee Myung-bak, commissioned a project to remove the 
elevated highway and restore the stream. The project cost 
an estimated $384 million (Revkin 2009). Several 
organizations were established to guide the project, among 
them the Citizen‟s Committee for Cheonggyecheon 
Restoration Project and the Cheonggyecheon Restoration 
Research Corps. The project was completed within two 
years. Since 2005, the Cheonggyecheon stream has been 
open to the public and it stands as a major success story in 
urban rejuvenation and beautification. 
The project was rendered politically feasible by the fact 
that the Cheonggye Elevated Highway was in need of 
serious and expensive repair (Kil-Dong 2007; Kang and 
Cervero 2008), but the real impetus behind the project was 
then-Mayor Lee Mung-Bak‟s desire to “make a city where 
people come first, not cars” (quoted in Cervero 2006, p.1). 
In other words, the CGC project represents a political 
paradigm shift in South Korea, a nation that had long 
viewed highway construction as a signal of the nation‟s 
modernity. The project represented an explicit move away 
from favoring increasing automobile capacity toward 
improving the quality of the urban environment and the 
quality of life of urban residents (Kang and Cervero 2008). 
7.3 Economic Impacts 
The highway and road removal was part of an overall plan 
to revitalize the economy of the city since the area was 
“becoming a slum and losing any appeal it may have had 
as a residential or commercial area” (Kil-Dong 2007, p. 
12). The CGC area contains more than 100,000 small 
shops and is South Korea‟s largest commercial district, but 
it had suffered from both residential and job depopulation 
in the years before the project‟s implementation and 
declining importance as a business center (Lee 2006). In 
the ten years prior to 2002, the population of the CGC area 
decreased by 40,000, the number of jobs fell by 80,000, 
and several business headquarters moved out of the CGC 
area (Lee 2006). The CGC Restoration Project aimed to 
reverse these negative economic trends by attracting 
residents and various industries back to the area (Kil-Dong 
2007).   
Figure 7.3: Cheonggye Elevated Highway Source: 
PreserveNet 
Figure 7.4: Street Vendors in Seoul. Source: 
http://evelynhoward.blogspot.com/2010/11/street-vendors-
seoul.html 
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Despite the promised benefits of the project, there were 
major concerns about the short-term economic impacts. 
The two main segments of the population that objected to 
the roadwork were the owners of the CGC area‟s many 
shops and the street vendors who worked along the CGC 
corridor (Noh 2009). These store owners and street 
vendors organized into three interest groups to speak out 
against the project. These  groups held at least 14 
demonstrations between December  2002 and December  
2003 (Noh 2009), demanding that the city either cease the 
CGC Restoration Project or provide shop owners and 
vendors with restitution for loss of business due to noise 
and dust from demolition and traffic congestion caused by 
the decrease in available road space (Noh 2009; Lee 2006). 
While the store owners and street vendors were adamant 
that the CGC Restoration Project would cause them 
economic harm, the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
(SMG) did not believe this to be case (Noh 2009). As a 
result, the city government did not compensate store 
owners directly. The city instead took actions to encourage 
commerce along the CGC corridor for store owners who 
wished to remain there during the roadwork. Some of the 
efforts included lowering parking fees in the area, creating 
a nearby parking lot with free shuttle buses, providing 
grants for remodeling of CGC markets, providing loans to 
renew buildings throughout the CGC, and purchasing 
goods needed by the city from stores in the corridor (Noh 
2009, Lee 2006). Importantly, the SMG also provided a 
500,000 square meter logistic complex as a new business 
site for any storeowners who wished to move (Noh 2009). 
This new business site has been noted as a key factor that 
appeased storeowners along the CGC corridor (Noh 2009). 
The SMG refused to negotiate with street vendors because 
“...sidewalk peddling is illegal and measures had to be 
taken to get rid of them [the vendors]” (Noh 2009, p. 37). 
Such disdain for street vendors was physically evidenced 
by the forced removal of their equipment by the City of 
Seoul (Noh 2009). This removal prompted “strong 
resistance” by the CSVRPC on November 30, 2003 (Noh 
2009, p. 34). Street vendor resistance eventually caused the 
SMG to propose that vendors peddle at Dongdaemun 
Stadium, which was being used as the new temporary 
parking lot for the CGC area (Noh 2009). As with the 
storeowners, the provision of a new business site helped 
placate the street vendors by giving them a location that 
was free of the dust and noise that they feared would hurt 
their sales.  
Taken together, the commercial incentives given to 
storeowners in the CGC area, the new business sites 
provided to storeowners and street vendors, and the host of 
transportation changes (described below) made prior to the 
highway removal all served to mitigate most of the 
negative, short-term economic impacts that the CGC 
Restoration Project may have had. At the very least, 
enough negative impact was accounted for so that the 
merchants‟ resistance subsided, and the project could be 
completed without continued disruption. 
Since the completion of the project, tourism has boomed in 
central Seoul. In the first three months after the project‟s 
completion, approximately 12 million visitors came to the 
CGC, and in the three months following the CGC‟s grand 
opening, there were more than 71 million visitors to the 
CGC (Noh 2009). These visitors provide increased 
business to the CGC merchants who operate in the area as 
they shop and eat and make use of the robust commercial 
district surrounding the greenway. The CGC has indeed 
become the “vibrant cultural attraction” that it was 
promised to be (Young 2010, p. 4). 
Aside from boosting revenues for local merchants, transit 
providers, and tourist industries, the CGC Restoration 
Project has been economically beneficial to land owners 
and developers as well. For commercial landowners along 
the CGC corridor, the deconstruction of the elevated 
highway and covering road was a risky undertaking; since 
proximity to the highway increased commercial land 
values, and it was not conclusively known whether the 
conversion to an urban greenway would confer equal or 
greater benefits (Kang and Cervero 2009). The commercial 
landowners could have been economically hurt by the 
CGC Restoration Project. However, research shows that at 
each distance interval for up to five hundred meters around 
the CGC, the non-residential land values had higher 
premiums with the urban greenway than they had with the 
elevated highway (Kang and Cervero 2009). This means 
that compared to commercial land located more than five 
hundred meters from the CGC, commercial land located 
within five hundred meters of the CGC enjoyed greater 
Figure 7.5: Marginal Effects of the Elevated Highway and 
Urban Greenway on Commercial Properties, by distance 
interval. 
Source: Chang and Cervero (2009), page 2786. 
Figure 7.6: Urban Greenway 
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property value benefits (marginal effects) with the urban 
greenway than with the elevated highway. These results 
are shown below in Figure 7.5.  
For residential landowners near the CGC corridor, the 
highway removal and CGC restoration presented a much 
lower risk than for commercial landowners. The original 
elevated highway over the CGC provided some mobility 
advantages to residential landowners, but these benefits 
were reduced since most residents live more than half a 
kilometer away from the highway (Kang and Cervero 
2009).  
Moreover, the highway and the traffic it induced created 
visual blight, noise, and air quality detriments for nearby 
residences that overwhelmed any mobility advantages 
from the highway (Kang and Cervero 2009). These 
highway drawbacks led to a generally inverse relationship 
between residential proximity to the highway and effects 
on property values. The closer people lived to the highway, 
the lower their property values in comparison to residents 
living more than three kilometers away (Kang and Cervero 
2009).  
Conversely, the restoration of the CGC and its 
transformation into an urban greenway led to a positive 
relationship between distance to the park and residential 
property values (Kang and Cervero 2009). The closer one 
lived to an entrance to the greenway, the higher one‟s 
property value when compared to residents living more 
than three kilometers away. These results are shown in 
Figure 7.7. The highway removal and CGC Restoration 
Project, therefore, not only reversed the negative impacts 
of the highway but conferred beneficial economic impacts 
on residential land owners. 
As a corollary to the increase in land values around the 
CGC corridor, land use changes and new development 
began to take place in the area in anticipation of and after 
the highway removal and CGC restoration (Kang and 
Cervero 2009). New high-rise apartment buildings have 
been developed, new restaurants and shops have appeared, 
and new retail complexes like the one constructed by the 
SMG for the original storeowners along the CGC have 
been built (Young 2010; Kang and Cervero 2009). 
Furthermore, even in existing buildings, the high land 
values have led to high rents for offices, retail shops, and 
apartments (Kang and Cervero 2009; Noh 2009). 
Overall, the CGC highway/road deconstruction and 
subsequent transformation into an urban greenway appears 
to have been of great economic benefit to the City of 
Seoul. There have been increases in the construction, real 
estate, tourism, retail, and transportation industries (Noh 
2009). However, while there may have been a net 
economic gain, the effects of the CGC Restoration Project 
do not appear to have been distributed equitably (Noh 
2009). As mentioned earlier, the street vendors were not 
officially recognized by the City of Seoul as legitimate 
participants in the economy, so their equipment was 
forcibly removed from the CGC area.  
After being relocated to Dongdaemun Stadium, the 
vendors had to move again. Many still operate near the 
CGC, constantly on the lookout for the SMG or police 
trying to shut them down (Noh 2009). Since the 
individuals working in the informal economy as street 
vendors are primarily in the lower economic classes, the 
CGC Restoration Project has disrupted the economic 
livelihoods of these people more than that of the wealthier 
storeowners who were provided for by the city 
government.  
Additionally, the greatest benefits on land values from the 
CGC project are being experienced by the commercial 
landowners who own property in the closest proximity to 
the CGC as opposed to the residential landowners who 
own land further away, and who may be assumed to be 
less wealthy than business owners. Even worse off are the 
poorer residents who might have lived in or near the CGC 
but may now be experiencing gentrification as rents rise to 
reflect the increasing land values, and the lower class 
residents are priced out of their homes. For other cities 
hoping to reap similar economic benefits by removing 
highways and turning them into public amenities, special 
care should be taken to ensure that no particular population 
segment is overly disadvantaged by the project. 
7.4 Environmental and Travel 
Behavior Impacts 
Environmental Impacts 
The expressway built over the Cheonggyecheon river was 
itself a response to a serious environmental problem, as the 
river had become a highly contaminated open sewer and 
public health hazard. Covering the river and constructing a 
highway over it was partly intended to mitigate the 
negative effects of its pollution (Hwang 2006; Kang and 
Cervero 2009). 
However, environmental degradation of the area was 
exacerbated by the highway development. The underlying 
riverbed was polluted with lead, chromium, and other 
heavy metals from highway run-off, and underground 
Figure 7.7: Marginal Effects of the Elevated Highway and 
Urban Greenway on Residential Properties, by distance 
interval. 
Source: Chang and Cervero (2009), page 2789. 
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gasses (e.g. carbon monoxide and methane gas) caused 
corrosion to the expressway‟s infrastructure, exacerbating 
safety concerns surrounding the aging highway (Kil-Dong 
2007). In addition, the corridor‟s heavy daily traffic 
contributed to a serious air pollution problem in the 
surrounding area. Pollution levels for various emissions 
and particulates (including highly carcinogenic Volatile 
Organic Compounds (VOCs) like benzene) exceeded 
Seoul‟s environmental air quality standards and were 
significantly higher than other areas in the city (Hwang 
2006; Young 2010). Seoul residents who lived or worked 
near Cheonggyecheon were more than twice as likely to 
suffer from respiratory illness (Hwang 2006). Quality of 
life for nearby residents and employees was further 
impacted by the very high levels of noise pollution 
generated by the corridor‟s traffic (Hwang 2006). 
Finally, the Cheonggyecheon corridor had become a major 
flood hazard. The riverbed had always served as a seasonal 
flood zone, but due to climatic changes, serious floods 
resulting from summer downpours had become more and 
more frequent, creating a serious risk to lives and property 
(Hwang 2006; Kil-Dong 2007; Revkin 2009). 
The environmental impacts of the CGC restoration project 
have been significant. Over the last few decades, South 
Korea has become increasingly concerned with 
environmental and ecological protection, as well as with 
enhancing its international image (Kil-Dong 2007). A 
survey conducted by Hongik University Professor Kee 
Yeon Hwang prior to the CGC project revealed that the 
majority of Seoul residents believed that the environment 
and water were the most important concerns for the city 
(Vidal 2006). The deconstruction of the highway and 
resurrection of the Cheonggyecheon river were completed 
with the goals of ecological restoration and hazard 
mitigation in mind.  
The restored riverbed was designed to maximize flood 
capacity and safely accommodate 200-year flood levels 
(Hwang 2006; Kil-Dong 2007; Revkin 2009). New sewage 
lines were installed to segregate rainwater and wastewater 
and prevent wastewater intrusion during flood events (Kil-
Dong 2007). In order to promote safety, as well as 
maximize the new river-park‟s accessibility, the stream is 
accessible at 17 points, including seven handicapped 
access locations, and sixteen emergency-escape ladders 
have been constructed along the riverbank (Kil-Dong 
2007). In addition, the stream has been engineered to serve 
a variety of fish and wildlife: marshland has been 
constructed, and channels have been constructed to allow 
fish to pass through the river unobstructed (Kil-Dong 
2007). 
Historically, the Cheonggyecheon is a seasonal river with 
an intermittent stream: part of the year, the riverbed is 
naturally dry. The CGC restoration project, however, 
requires a constant flow of water which is currently 
pumped in from the nearby Han River. The fact that most 
of the Cheonggyecheon‟s water must be pumped in 
artificially (and at significant cost) has been a point of 
political contention throughout the project (Revkin 2009); 
however, most dissent has been quelled by the 
overwhelming popularity of the project. Eventually, Seoul 
plans to supplement the river‟s stream with the output of 
the Jungnang Sewage Treatment Plan, which is currently 
undergoing expansion and technological upgrades (Kil-
Dong 2007; Hwang 2006).  
Positive environmental impacts have begun to be 
quantified by researchers. Soil and groundwater 
contamination have been largely eliminated (Kil-Dong 
2007). As anticipated, the river‟s ecosystem has been 
greatly restored: fish, bird, and insect species have 
multiplied (Revkin 2009; see Table 7.1). 
Air quality has also improved substantially. Due to 
reduced motor vehicle traffic, small-particle air pollution 
has dropped from 74 micrograms per cubic meter to 48 
(Revkin 2009). Kee-Yeon Hwang (2006) cites the 
economic value of this reduction in air pollution as up to 
40 billion won per year. In addition, other unplanned 
benefits have emerged from the CGC restoration project.  
For example, the restored river has been found to reduce 
the urban heat island effect and increase wind speeds, 
reducing summer temperatures in the corridor by more 
than 3 degrees Celsius compared to other points in the city 
only 400 meters away (Revkin 2009; Hwang 2006; Vidal 
2006). Overall, the Cheonggyecheon restoration has been 
an unqualified environmental success. It has reduced 
summer temperatures, improved air, soil, and water 
quality, mitigated flood risks, and restored a long-dormant 
ecosystem to health and diversity.  
Table 7.1: Wildlife Species Before and After 
Cheonggyecheon River Restoration 




Fish Species 4 25 
Bird Species 6 36 
Insect Species 15 192 
Source: Revkin 2009 
Travel Behavior Impacts 
Beginning in the 1980s, Seoul began to develop new towns 
on the fringe of the city in an effort to relieve inner-city 
traffic congestion by dispersing the population (Kang and 
Cervero 2009). In fact, the resulting increase in automobile 
travel from suburban commuters made congestion 
problems much worse, despite concurrent increases in 
highway capacity. This may be explained as a prime 
example of the Braess Paradox: “in a network in which all 
the moving entities rationally seek the most efficient route, 
adding extra capacity can actually reduce the network‟s 
overall efficiency” (Baker 2009). The CGC Restoration 
project is an example of the solution to this paradoxical 
problem: by reducing capacity, efficiency and 
effectiveness are improved. 
Before the Cheonggye Road and Cheonggye Elevated 
Highway were deconstructed, they carried 65,810 and 
102,747 vehicles daily, respectively, for a total of more 
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than 168,000 vehicles per day on the corridor (Kil-Dong 
2007). At the outset of the project, there was, predictably, 
a public and political outcry against the perceived negative 
impact that deconstructing the highway would have on 
traffic congestion throughout the city (Kil-Dong 2007). 
The planned CGC restoration project would mean 
narrowing the corridor to only two, 13.5 meter-wide (two-
lane) surface roads on either side of the river (Hwang 
2006).  Traffic models developed in advance of the project 
indicated that impacts would be positive overall (Vidal 
2006), and a pilot simulation test which involved 
temporarily cutting off access to the highway and 
narrowing the Cheonggye surface road with roadblocks 
was conducted. These tests were paired with an aggressive 
advertising campaign publicizing the project and 
encouraging drivers to seek alternate routes or modes 
helped to dispel this fear by making residents aware of 
alternative options (Kil-Dong 2007).  
This publicity campaign was employed leading up to and 
throughout the duration of the CGC reconstruction. Traffic 
information was disseminated and staff was deployed to 
sites of severe congestion to provide guidance to drivers 
(Kil-Dong 2007). This public education program was 
critical in ensuring the project‟s success (Vidal 2006). 
Even more importantly, public transportation investments 
and enhancements were made which facilitated modal 
shifts and minimized traffic disturbances. The entire bus 
system was reconfigured into a trunk-and-feeder system, to 
facilitate transfers between local buses and the city‟s 
subway system. Payment systems were simplified to make 
public transit more convenient. Sixty-eight kilometers of 
bus-rapid-transit-only median lanes were opened along 
arterial streets (including a new BRT route along the 
Cheonggyecheon corridor), new downtown shuttle buses 
were established, and certain streets were designated as 
one-way or left-turn limited (Hwang 2006; Kil-Dong 2007; 
Kang and Cervero 2009; Young 2010). 
As a result, the traffic disaster feared by residents never 
materialized. Instead, a significant modal shift occurred, 
diverting motorists to buses and subways, and overall 
traffic flow and speeds downtown have improved (Revkin 
2009). In the process of making all of the public transit 
enhancements to cope with the reduced roadway capacity, 
the City of Seoul captured one of its first long term 
benefits: subway ridership has increased 13.7% since the 
restoration project began (Lee 2006). These positive 
impacts on traffic flow are consistent with evidence from 
highway deconstruction projects in the United States 
(Baker 2009; Cervero 2006). In urban areas in particular, 
traffic can be easily redistributed through other routes with 
very little disruption. Large modal shifts are not required 
to alleviate traffic conditions, although if transit 
enhancements are implemented concurrent with highway 
removal, transit is likely to absorb a greater share of road 
users. “The tearing down of the motorway has had both 
intended and unexpected effects,” says Hwang. “As soon 
as we destroyed the road, the cars just disappeared and 
drivers changed their habits. A lot of people just gave up 
their cars... In some cases, they kept using their cars but 
changed their routes” (quoted in Vidal 2006, p.1).   
Only 1.3 percent of downtown residents believed that the 
project had worsened traffic conditions, and the subway 
system experienced a 3.6 percent overall growth rate 
following the project (Hwang 2006). Pedestrian activity 
has been observed to have increased substantially, due to 
infrastructure and crossing improvements on the formerly 
auto-centric roadway (Hwang 2006). Increases in bike, 
pedestrian, and public transit mode shares due to public 
infrastructure investment and education campaigns 
compound and multiply the environmental benefits of the 
river reconstruction, while promoting transportation equity 
for low-income commuters who save time and money due 
to these improvements (Young 2010).  
7.5 Community Impacts 
Several million people turned out to celebrate the opening 
of the new, five-mile, 1,000-acre linear park that now 
occupies the site of the removed overpass (Vidal 2006). 
An average of 100,000 pedestrians visits the restored 
Cheonggyecheon daily, according to a Seoul government 
estimate (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2009a).  The 
site has gone from “a dark tunnel of crumbling concrete” 
(Revkin 2009, A4) to an inviting epicenter of leisure 
activity and exercise, a tranquil oasis at the center of this 
bustling megalopolis. At 10.4 million people, Seoul is one 
of the world‟s largest, and also one of its most densely-
populated, cities. Roughly 17,219 people live on each 
square kilometer in the city proper, putting Seoul‟s 
population density at roughly eight times that of New York 
City (“Seoul ranks highest” 2009).  
Along the Cheonggyecheon stream today, there are new 
running and pedestrian paths, waterfalls where children 
play, and a museum. The park now serves as the backdrop 
to a variety of arts and entertainment events. Property 
values and interest in the downtown area have taken off in 
light of the freeway‟s removal (Hwang 2006). The Web 
site for the Korea Tourism Organization includes the 
following idyllic description of daily life along the 
Cheonggyecheon‟s banks:  
[A] surging waterfall provides a lively acoustic 
start to the river‟s flow and to delight the children, 
stepping stones are placed so that even the most 
cautious of them can venture into the middle of the 
stream. At lunchtime and in the early evenings the 
paths on either side become a strolling route for 
Figure 7.8: Cheonggyecheon restored. 
Source: pleasetakemeto.com 
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office workers to exercise their lungs outside their 
air-conditioned work stations or even to jog for a 
few kilometers to work off the excesses of the 
night before. [The streets on either side of the 
stream] have also become invigorated, with 
restaurants and pavement cafes permitting dining al 
fresco during the warm summer months. With the 
rushing water constantly replenishing the area with 
oxygen, average temperatures in the summertime 
have dropped a few degrees, so that the benefits are 
not just confined to the immediate water‟s edge 
(Korea Tourism Organization 2010).  
Seoul Metropolitan Government, on its official 
Cheonggyecheon Web site, references a survey designed 
to gauge residents‟ attitudes about the restoration project. 
It reports that roughly 67 percent of respondents “made 
some positive remarks” about the endeavor and that close 
to 78 percent expected positive results to come from it in 
the future (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2009b).  
Journalists and bloggers who have covered the restoration 
generally reinforce the government‟s contention that Seoul 
residents are overwhelmingly happy with the project.  
"The city centre is so much cleaner," Rhoda Chung, a 
pharmaceutical worker, told The Guardian a year after the 
restoration‟s completion (Vidal 2006). "The shopkeepers 
were arguing against the restoration, but now that they can 
see the difference they all like it" (Vidal 2006). 
Hwang, primary author of the master plan for the overpass 
removal and stream restoration, points to air quality 
problems that plagued the traffic-clogged Cheonggyecheon 
corridor before the freeway‟s removal as a community 
benefit of the project. Pollution levels, he writes, were 
notably higher than in other parts of the city, and people 
living and working in the highway‟s vicinity were found to 
be more than twice as likely to suffer from respiratory 
problems (Hwang 2006). He doesn‟t point to any empirical 
data showing that the health of area residents has improved 
since the freeway‟s removal, however.   
Property values are also on the rise, and the city is working 
to reinvigorate once-decaying downtown neighborhoods in 
the vicinity of the Cheonggyecheon in light of the project 
(Hwang 2006).  “Because of a massive inflow of visitors, 
the CBD area has been resurrecting [sic] as the center of 
Seoul again,” Hwang writes. “The businesses are booming 
and real estate price is skyrocketing and redevelopment 
projects are now going on in many sites (Hwang 2006).”  
He cites a study showing a 30 percent average increase in 
downtown land values, while commercial rents were up an 
average 5 percent (Hwang 2006).  
Of course, not everyone sees the transformation as 
flawless. While many laud the effects the Cheonggyecheon 
restoration project has had on its surroundings, there are, 
as observed above, concerns about former residents and 
merchants being forced out of the area by rising property 
values, and about the estimated $2 million spent annually 
pumping water in to keep the stream flowing where it 
would otherwise flow only intermittently (Walsh 2006).  
Even some generally pleased with the outcome fault 
project architects for ramming the plans through with little 
public input and scrutiny. “There was limited 
consideration of certain user groups, for example older 
people, people with visual impairments and people with 
mobility problems,” advises the Commission for 
Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE). In 
response to a 2005 protest march by a group demanding 
handicapped access along the stream, the group notes that 
new elevators were installed and free wheelchairs provided 
along the Cheonggyecheon (Commission for Architecture 
and the Built Environment, n.d.). CABE declares the end 
result of the ambitious project an “inspirational space 
which is family-friendly and welcoming for a wide range 
of groups,” but it faults designers‟ failure to facilitate 
“inclusive planning” that would have better accounted for 
a full range of community concerns and interests 
(Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment, 
n.d.). 
Still, few would doubt the substantial psychological effect 
the overpass removal and stream restoration has had. The 
project has helped inspire city leaders to adopt other 
sustainability and pedestrian-oriented initiatives (Vidal 
2006). As Hwang told The Guardian newspaper in 2006, 
the project was “above all, a symbolic act” (Vidal 2006). 
“We‟ve made people realize that quality of life is 
important,” then-Mayor Lee Myung-bak told Time 
Magazine in 2006 (Walsh 2006). Myung-bak, who staked 
his successful mayoral candidacy in part on tearing down 
the Cheonggyecheon Freeway, and became president of 
South Korea in 2008, declared of the project: “We‟ve set a 
new standard not just for Seoul, but for Korea” (Walsh 
2006).  It‟s an example that an increasing number of cities 
internationally are looking to as they consider tearing 
down freeways of their own. 
Figure 7.9: Former Seoul Mayor and current South Korea 
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New Orleans Existing Land Use Maps (Source: https://sites.google.com/site/nolaczo/)  
1. Upper N. Claiborne 
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3. Upper N. Claiborne (Upper Left Corner tangent to Claiborne) 
 
 




















FUTURE LAND USE MAP: NOLA MASTER PLAN (Source: 
https://www.communicationsmgr.com/projects/1371/docs/District%207_062210_adopted_11x17.pdf) 




1. Upper N. Claiborne  (Source: http://www.nola.gov/RESIDENTS/City-Planning/Zoning-Base-Maps/)
 




1. Lower N. Claiborne
 





Division of labor force (2000) 













Total population 16 years and 





Not in labor force 52.4%   49.4%   56.6%   59.2%   42.2%   40.6%   36.1% 
In Armed Forces 0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.5%   0.5%   0.5% 
Employed 37.4%   43.6%   36.5%   22.5%   51.8%   54.6%   59.7% 
Unemployed 10.2%   7.0%   6.9%   18.3%   5.5%   4.3%   3.7% 
Source Citation: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community 
Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org> 
 
Table: 2 
Employment by industry (2000) 




Gravier  Iberville 
 Orleans 
Parish   Louisiana US 
Total employed civilian population 16 years and over     2,287   5,382   1,199   290   191,739   1,851,777   129,721,512 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining   0.6%   0.5%   0.8%   0.0%   1.0%   4.2%   1.9% 
Construction   3.6%   7.3%   4.1%   0.7%   4.9%   7.9%   6.8% 
Manufacturing   5.6%   5.3%   4.3%   4.5%   5.2%   10.1%   13.8% 
Wholesale trade   2.2%   2.3%   2.1%   7.6%   2.5%   3.5%   3.6% 
Retail trade   9.5%   11.1%   10.3%   10.0%   9.8%   11.9%   11.7% 
Transportation and warehousing, and utilities   2.8%   7.0%   7.2%   2.8%   5.9%   5.3%   5.2% 
Information   2.5%   1.2%   0.0%   0.0%   2.4%   2.0%   3.1% 
Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing   3.9%   3.1%   0.6%   1.7%   5.6%   5.7%   6.9% 
Professional, scientific, and technical   2.3%   1.8%   2.7%   1.0%   5.8%   4.6%   5.9% 
Management of companies and enterprises   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.1% 
Administrative and support and waste management 
services   5.7%   4.4%   3.9%   6.2%   4.0%   3.0%   3.4% 
Educational services   9.7%   8.3%   15.3%   5.2%   11.8%   9.6%   8.8% 
Health care and social assistance   14.4%   13.7%   16.7%   11.0%   14.1%   12.1%   11.2% 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation   3.6%   3.7%   0.3%   0.0%   3.2%   2.4%   1.8% 
Accommodation and food services   19.7%   17.0%   20.1%   45.5%   12.1%   6.7%   6.1% 
Other services (except public administration)   7.7%   7.8%   5.1%   3.8%   5.3%   5.2%   4.9% 
Public administration   6.2%   5.5%   6.5%   0.0%   6.4%   5.8%   4.8% 
         
Source Citation: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org> 
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1. How would you describe your role in the community and your interest in the Claiborne corridor? (address 
biographical aspect of the question) 
 Part of a neighborhood organization? 
 A business owner? 
 A renter/homeowner in the area? 
 A planner or policy maker? 
 Other roles? 
2. What are your thoughts regarding the possible removal and redevelopment of the Claiborne highway?   
 Do you support or opposed the removal?  
 Please explain the major reasons behind your opinion.  
 Do you think most of your neighbors/colleagues share your opinion?  
 Do you think the majority of the community supports or opposes the removal of the highway?  
3. Assuming the highway was removed and replaced with an attractive boulevard, how would the removal of the 
highway impact you or your community? 
 From a travel perspective?  
 From an economic vitality perspective? 
 From a social equity perspective?  
 From an environmental perspective?  
4. Who are the major champions of the highway’s removal? 
5. Who do you envision are the major opponents of the highway’s removal? 
6. Do you feel there are viable alternate routes to take other than the highway? 
 If so, what? 
7. Would you consider public transit, bicycling or walking as real alternatives to driving along the Claiborne 
corridor? 
8. If the proposal went through, what redevelopment efforts would you expect? 
9. Do you or your community feel that the redevelopment project would accomplish those expectations? 
 Why or why not?  
 





Cheryl Austin Greater Tremé Consortium, Executive Director 
William Borah Author and Environmental Attorney  
Adriane Brown New Orleans East Resident 
Jim Coningsby The Phoenix of New Orleans, Director 
Emily Danielson  
Patty Gay Preservation Resource Center, Executive Director 
Cynthia Hedge-Morrell Elected Official  
Charlie Ho West Bank Commuter 
Leo Jackson Jackson Quality Used Cars, Tremé Business Owner 
Nick Malcovich Uptown Resident 
James McNamara NOLA BioDistrict, CEO 
Lauren New Orleans East Resident 
Medhi Qalbani Tremé Resident 
Keith Scarmuzza Tremé Resident, Landscape Architect 
Jeff Schwartz Broad Community Connections, Executive Director  
Maggie Tishman Providence Community Housing, Special Programs Development 
Director 
Kurt Wiegle New Orleans Downtown Development District, President and CEO 
Name Withheld Elected Official 
Name Withheld Transportation Planner 
Name Withheld New Orleans Resident 
Name Withheld Tremé Resident 
Name Withheld Tremé Resident 
Name Withheld Tremé Resident 
Name Withheld Tremé Employee 
Name Withheld New Orleans East Employee 
 
 




 Local newspaper’s online edition (Times-Picayune, Nola.com) 
 Facebook page  
 Craigslist posts 
 Twitter posts 
 UNO Planning Student Organization web pages 
 UNO’s website 







 LSU Medical School and Dental School 
 UNO Planning Department 
 Catholic Charities 
 Faith based communities in adjacent neighborhoods 
 American Planning Association local chapter 
 Urban Land Institute local chapter 
 Neighborhoods Partnership Network  
Direct soliciting of people: 
 Email blasts to authors’ local network of colleagues, friends and family 
 Interviewees previously providing input 
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